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The Assignment of Temporary Justices




The California Supreme Court often lacks a full complement of
seven justices to hear a case. In these situations, caused by disqualifica-
tion, absence, or an unfilled seat on the court, the California Con-
stitution empowers the state's chief justice to fill the temporary vacancy.'
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
** Professor of Law, Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. We
are grateful to the battalion of students who provided research assistance on various parts of
this study. Elizabeth Laderman and Jeffrey Church were indispensable in programming and
retrieving the data, while Gilles Assant, Jennifer Coughlin, Pamela Johnston, Michael Sobel,
Deepika Udagama, and Megan Wagner helped greatly in collecting the data and performing
numerous research tasks. Martha Matthews provided first-rate editorial assistance. We thank
our colleagues Preble Stolz and Franklin Zimring for helpful comments on an earlier draft;
participants in the Boalt Hall Empirical Research Seminar for valuable suggestions; our col-
league Stephen Sugarman for his stimulating criticism; and Donald P. Barrett for making available
to us his profound knowledge of the California Supreme Court. Some of the financial support
for this study was provided by the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley. No one but us is responsible, of course, for what has resulted.
1. Article VI, section 6, of the constitution states that the chief justice "may provide
for the assignment of any judge to another court . . . ." CAL. CONST. art. VI, §6. The supreme
court has held that this provision confers on the chief justice the power to make temporary
1045
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
California's chief justices have long used this power to pro-
duce a full court for virtually all cases heard. Such temporary
assignments have increased markedly over the past thirty years. From
1954 to 1964, the last ten years of the term of Chief Justice Phil
S. Gibson, the number of votes cast by temporary justices averaged
thirteen per year.' Under the next chief justice, Roger J. Traynor,
who served from 1964 to 1970, the average rose to forty-six votes
assignments to the supreme court itself. Fay v. District Court, 200 Cal. 522, 528-29, 254 P.
896, 899 (1927).
Before 1904 the state constitution said nothing about the assignment of temporary justices.
See id. at 530, 254 P. at 900. In that year an amendment to article VI, section 4, authorized
the remaining justices of the supreme court to select judges from the district courts of appeal
to fill temporary supreme court vacancies. Id. In 1918 a further amendment authorized them
to select superior court judges as well. Id. at 531-32, 254 P. at 900. In 1926 the voters added
to article VI a new section Ia. CAL. CONsT. art. VI., §la. See 1927 Cal. Stat. lxxxviii; 1927
Cal. Stat. res. ch. 48, at 1369. This enactment, which created the California Judicial Council,
stated that the "Chief Justice or acting Chief Justice shall be chairman" of the Judicial Coun-
cil, and further that the "chairman . . . shall provide for the assignment of any judge to
another court of a like or higher jurisdiction . . . to act for a judge who is disqualified or
unable to act." CAL. CONST. art. VI, §Ia. The chief justice was thus empowered-indeed,
apparently required-to fill temporary vacancies on the court. In 1966 the voters approved
a revision of article VI adding a statement that "[a] retired judge who consents may be assign-
ed to any court," and changing the language to provide that the chairman of the Judicial
Council "may," rather than "shall," provide for temporary assignments. CAL. CONST. art.
VI, §6. See 1966 Cal. Stat. res. ch. 139, at 975-76; Judicial Council of California, 1967 Judicial
Council Report to the Governor and the Legislature 7 (Jan. 2, 1967).
In 1974 article VI was further amended to state that the "Chief Justice," rather than the
"chairman," may fill temporary vacancies. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §6. See 1974 Cal. Stat. res.
ch. 96, at 3758. But the chief justice remains the chairman of the Judicial Council, see CAL.
R. CT. 995, and the Official California Reports continue to describe temporary assignments
as having been made, not by the chief justice as the constitution provides, but by "the chairperson
of the Judicial Council." See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 36
Cal. 3d 359, 360 n.* (1984). The supreme court's Minutes do it both ways, describing the
assignments as made by the "Chief Justice of California and Chairperson of the Judicial Coun-
cil." See, e.g., Minutes of the California Supreme Court [hereinafter cited as Minutes], July 18,
1984. The reason for the misdescription in the Official Reports-which has existed since the
constitutional change in 1974 (see, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 805 n.* (1975))-is
not apparent. The practice serves, however, to camouflage the chief justice's role. See, e.g.,
San Francisco Chron., Oct. 22, 1985, at 16, col. 4 (stating that a temporary justice in a supreme
court decision "was assigned to this case by the Judicial Council"). See generally Comment,
The Selection of Interim Justices in California: An Empirical Study, 32 STAN. L. REv. 433,
433 n.2 (1980).
2. This figure, and the figures that follow in this paragraph of the text, includes not only
votes cast by temporary justices whose assignments were made by chief justice in office at the
time their votes were cast, but also votes of temporary justices assigned by an acting chief
justice or by a prior chief justice. Compare infra note 100. The figures were compiled by com-
puter searches identifying all cases in the Official California Reports in which a temporary justice
sat under assignment by the chief justice or acting chief justice (or by the chairman/chairperson
or acting chairman/chairperson of the Judicial Council). The figures given in this paragraph
for temporary-justice votes under Chief Justice Wright and Chief Justice Bird are considerably
higher than the totals for those chief justices reported infra in Tables 15 and 22 and accompanying
text, because the figures here include assignments made by acting chief justices and prior chief
justices. See infra note 100. For Chief Justice Gibson and Chief Justice Traynor we found
no assignments by acting or prior chief justices, so the figures here do not differ from those
in Tables 1 and 8 infra and accompanying text.
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per year. Under Chief Justice Donald R. Wright, from 1970 to 1977,
the average fell to thirty-one votes per year. Under the present chief
justice, Rose Elizabeth Bird, from her entry into office on March
26, 1977, through the end of 1984, temporary justices cast an average
of sixty-eight votes per year.3
Temporary assignments by the chief justice appear to be much more
common in California than in any other state.'
California's chief justice has almost total discretion in deciding how
to choose judges, and which judges to choose, to fill temporary vacan-
cies on the court.' For at least the past thirty years, the practice
apparently has been to make the assignments on a discretionary basis
for each case. Consequently the temporary-assignment practice has
been criticized as giving the chief justice the power to select appointees
likely to vote in agreement with the chief justice. The empirical basis
for such criticism was examined in a 1980 comment in the Stanford
Law Review., From a study of the votes of the temporary justices,
3. This figure represents a total of 527 votes over the 7 3/4-year period. Three hundred
twenty-one of these votes were cast by temporary justices appointed by Chief Justice Bird herself,
in cases in which she participated (see infra Table 22); 112 votes were cast by temporary justices
appointed by an acting chief justice, or by Chief Justice Bird in cases in which she did not
participate; and 94 votes were cast by temporary justices appointed by Chief Justice Wright
before he left office on Feb. 1, 1977. (Of these 94, 61 votes were cast by retired supreme
court Justice Raymond L. Sullivan, sitting under an assignment made by Chief Justice Wright
on Jan. 20, 1977. See Minutes, Jan. 20, 1977; see also infra note 100.) For a rough estimate
of the causes of the temporary vacancies under each of the four chief justices, allocating them
between unfilled seats on the one hand and disqualifications and other absences on the other,
see infra Table 34 and note 395.
4. See infra Appendix, notes 1-20, on the other states in which temporary assignments
are made by the chief justice. In California, from the date Chief Justice Bird took office to
the end of 1984, we count some 351 cases in which one or more temporary justices participated.
(This figure includes assignments made by Chief Justice Bird, by an acting chief justice, and
by Chief Justice Wright before leaving office. See supra notes 2-3.) During this period the
California Supreme Court decided with opinion some 1010 cases. (This figure comes from
WESTLAW and tallies roughly with a count based on the fiscal-year totals in the Annual Reports
of the Judicial Council of California.) Temporary justices thus appeared in some 35% of the
cases of the California Supreme Court. The survey of other states in the Appendix indicates
that this percentage is markedly higher than that of any other state that gives the temporary-
assignment power to its chief justice. A temporary exception was South Dakota, which from
1984 to 1986 had temporary justices filling at least one vacant seat in all cases. See infra Appendix,
note 16. Other states with relatively frequent appointments of temporary justices by the chief
justice are Hawaii and North Dakota. See id. notes 6, 13.
5. Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 482-83, 601 P.2d 1030, 1035-36, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 499-500 (1979). The only discernible limitation is that retired judges must consent.
CAL. CONsT. art. VI, §6. It is not necessary that the assigned judge meet the requirement
of 10 years' membership in the state bar or state judiciary that applies to supreme court justices.
Cf. Edler v. Hollopeter, 214 Cal. 427, 430, 6 P.2d 245, 246 (1931) (dictum). The constitution
was amended in 1966 to provide that "[a] judge eligible for municipal court service"-which
requires only five years' membership in the bar or judiciary, CAL. CONST. art. VI, §15 -"may
be assigned by the Chief Justice to serve on any court." Id.
6. Comment, supra note 1.
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the chief justices, and the supreme court associate justices over the
previous twenty-five years, the Stanford comment reported substan-
tial biases favoring the chief justice in the votes of the temporary
justices appointed by Chief Justice Gibson, Chief Justice Wright, and
Chief Justice Bird, but not those appointed by Chief Justice Traynor.7
The authors found it "plausible to conclude that some chief justices
may have used the appointment power to assure another vote for their
own position," and recommended that temporary assignments either
be dropped entirely or be made on a random basis.8
The temporary-justice assignment practice has been challenged before
the supreme court itself. In Perdue v. Crocker National Bank,9 in
which two disqualifications and a vacant seat caused the appointment
of three temporary justices, the defendant Crocker National Bank filed
with the court in 1983 an "Application to Replace Temporary Vacan-
cies by Selection by Lot."'" Relying heavily on the Stanford com-
ment and stating that "litigants and the public cannot help but suspect
any Chief Justice of yielding on occasion to the subconscious and
human impulse to appoint justices whose views are harmonious with
his or her own," Crocker requested "that the Chief Justice adopt
a procedure of general applicability for making temporary appoint-
ments, including appointments in this case, through selection by lot.'",
The request went unheeded. Chief Justice Bird apparently selected
the temporary justices in Perdue in her usual way, though she did
not appoint a particular justice to whom Crocker had specifically ob-
jected.' 2 Neither Chief Justice Bird nor the court made any response
7. Id. at 438.
8. Id. at 439, 441-42.
9. 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985).
10. Application of Crocker National Bank to Replace Temporary Vacancies by Selection
by Lot, SF 24591, 1 Civil No. A013838, Oct. 3, 1983 [hereinafter cited as Crocker Application].
11. Id. at 4, 2.
12. Perdue was a class action challenging the defendant bank's charges to its customers
for checks written on insufficient funds. 38 Cal. 3d at 913, 702 P.2d at 503, 216 Cal. Rptr.
at 345. After the court of appeal had affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action, 190
Cal. Rptr. 204 (1983), Chief Justice Bird assigned two temporary justices, J. Anthony Kline
and Clinton White, both presiding justices of the First District court of appeal, to replace
two disqualified supreme court justices (Otto M. Kaus and Joseph R. Grodin) in reviewing
the plaintiffs' petition for hearing. Minutes, July 20, 1983. Both temporary appointees
joined Chief Justice Bird and Justices Cruz Reynoso and Allan E. Broussard in voting to grant
the petition. Id. Crocker then filed its application seeking appointment by lot of the temporary
justices who would sit at the hearing of the appeal; the application went on to suggest that
Justice Kline, because of prior connections with attorneys in the case, should not participate.
Crocker Application, supra note 10, at 9-16. Before the case was heard Justice Frank K. Richard-
son retired from the court, producing a third vacancy. See 35 Cal. 3d iii (1983). Chief Justice
Bird assigned Justice White to the appeal but not Justice Kline, and also assigned two superior
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to Crocker's application. 3
The impact of temporary assignments on the law of California is
indicated not only by their substantial number and by controversy
over the existing mode of selection.' 4 The impact can be seen con-
cretely in some major supreme court decisions in which the votes of
temporary justices were decisive. All seventy-three cases from 1954
through 1984 in which temporary justices cast decisive votes-what
we call "swing cases"-are noted at later points in this study.' 5 Those
we would describe as major are one case from the tenure of Chief
Justice Gibson, one from the tenure of Chief Justice Traynor, and
several from the tenure of Chief Justice Bird."' Both to illustrate-the
impact of the temporary-assignment practicd and to provide some fac-
tual and legal content for the numbers that will play a large role in
this study, we summarize those major cases here:
court judges, Richard Breiner and Beverly Savitt. Minutes, Nov. 23, 1983. The supreme court's
eventual decision in Perdue reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded for further pro-
ceedings on the plaintiffs' claim that the bank's charges were oppressive and unconscionable.
38 Cal. 3d at 944, 702 P.2d at 525, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (1985). The decision was unanimous,
with the three temporary justices joining Chief Justice Bird and Justices Mosk and Reynoso
in an opinion for the court by Justice Broussard. On the question whether it is customary
for temporary justices assigned to a petition for hearing to be assigned to the appeal if the
hearing is granted, see infra note 228. On Chief Justice Bird's practice of assigning trial court
judges to sit with the supreme court, see infra notes 321-35 and accompanying text.
13. Telephone interview with William Alsup, counsel for Crocker National Bank (April
10, 1986).
14. In addition to the Stanford comment and the defendant's application in the Perdue
case, such controversy is reflected in, e.g., P. STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES; THE INVESTIGATION
OF ROSE BIRD AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 106 (1981); Wildman and Whitehead,
A Study of Justice Pro Tempore Assignments in the California Supreme Court, 20 U.S.F.L.
REV. 1 (1985); San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 13, 1983, at 1, col. 2; Wall Street J., Jan. 6,
1984, at 20, col. 1 (editorial); L.A. Daily J., June 26, 1985, at 2, col. 4 (reporting statement of state
assemblyman); L.A. Times, Nov. 3, 1985, at II, 10, col. 1 (AP dispatch). See also San Fran-
cisco Chron., Feb. 7, 1986, at 6, col. 5 (reporting criticism by chancellor of University of
California, Berkeley, of choice of municipal court judges assigned to replace disqualified Berkeley
judges in trespass cases involving University).
15. See infra notes 109, 150, 183, 250. We speak now only of cases in which the tem-
porary justice and the assigning chief justice both sat. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
16. In addition, there were two swing cases under Chief Justice Gibson and three under
Chief Justice Bird that were important if not major. See infra notes 140, 305, and accompany-
ing text. The listing of major cases excludes, for reasons noted later, see infra notes 94-98 and
accompanying text, two major cases in which the decisive vote was cast by a temporary justice
who was what we call a "holdover"-a recently retired supreme court justice assigned to
finish a case on which the justice heard argument before retiring. One case was Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), in which contributory
negligence was replaced by comparative negligence. The decision was 4-3, with the swing vote
cast by holdover supreme court Justice Louis H. Burke, in agreement with Chief Justice Wright
who appointed him. See infra note 183. The other case was Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson,
30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982), holding that the Unruh Act prohibits
discrimination against children in rental housing. The vote was 5-2, with holdover retired supreme
court Justice Tobriner, as well as Presiding Justice Clinton White of the court of appeal, join-
ing Chief Justice Bird-who appointed them-in the majority. See infra note 250.
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Negligent infliction of mental distress: Amaya. In the 1963 case
of Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.,' 7 supreme court Justice
Mathew 0. Tobriner was disqualified, having written the opinion below
for the court of appeal. 8 Chief Justice Gibson assigned retired supreme
court Justice Thomas P. White to replace Justice Tobriner. 19 The
supreme court held, 4 to 3, that a mother could not recover for the
mental distress she suffered on seeing her child hit by a truck when
she had not been in the "zone of danger" herself. Justice White pro-
vided the swing vote for this result, which was contrary to the way
Justice Tobriner had voted in the court of appeal. Five years later,
on similar facts in Dillon v. Legg,20 Justice Tobriner was not dis-
qualified. This time he wrote the opinion of the supreme court, holding
4 to 3 that the mother could recover and expressly overruling Amaya. "1
Thus for five years the law of California pursued a dead-end, and
the supreme court was forced to overrule a rather recent decision,
because of a vote cast by a temporary justice. What happened in
Amaya, however, cannot be ascribed to any bias by temporary justices
favoring the position of the chief justice who assigns them. For
while Justice White made the majority in Amaya, Chief Justice
Gibson dissented.
Abortion: the Belous case. In the 1969 case of People v. Belous,"
the supreme court struck down a provision of the Penal Code, in
effect when the case arose in 1966, making it a felony to perform
an abortion unless "necessary to preserve" the life of the mother.23
Although the legislature in 1967 had passed the Therapeutic Abor-
tion Act,2" extending the lawful grounds for obtaining an abortion,
the court's decision was significant because it rested not only on the
asserted vagueness of the "necessary to preserve" language but also
on suggestions of a constitutional right to abortion.25 The vote was
17. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
18. 23 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1962).
19. Justice White was not a holdover appointee in Amaya. See supra note 16. He retired
from the supreme court on October 31, 1962. See 58 Cal.2d iii (1962). The argument in Amaya
took place on December 5, 1962. Minutes, Dec. 5, 1962. See infra notes 141-44 and accom-
panying text.
20. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
21. Id. at 748, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
22. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE §274, amended by 1967 Cal. Stat., ch. 327, §3, at 1523, and by
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§25950-54; 71 Cal. 2d at 959-60, 458 P.2d at 197, 80 Cal.
Rptr. at 357.
24. CAL. PEAL CODE §274, as amended by 1967 Cal. Stat., ch. 327, §3, at 1523; CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§25950-54; see 71 Cal. 2d at 959-60 & n.2., 458 P.2d at 197 & n.2,
80 Cal. Rptr. at 357 & n.2.
25. See 71 Cal. 2d at 960, 963-64, 458 P.2d at 198, 199-200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358, 359-60.
Such a constitutional right was recognized, of course, by the United States Supreme Court
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4 to 3, with the swing vote provided by temporary justice Fred R.
Pierce, a presiding justice of the court of appeal, in agreement with
Chief Justice Traynor who had appointed him.
The MICRA case. In 1983 and 1984 a replay of the Amaya scenario
was narrowly averted in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community
Hospital,26 where the court confronted constitutional challenges to the
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA).1 Again
a supreme court justice, Justice Cruz Reynoso, had decided the issue
below and was disqualified. He had written the opinion for the court
of appeal, upholding the act in a case involving another MICRA pro-
vision.28 There were two other temporary vacancies, and thus American
Bank was heard in 1983 by a supreme court that included three tem-
porary justices appointed by Chief Justice Bird: court of appeal
presiding justice John Racanelli and court of appeal associate justices
Sidney Feinberg and Joseph Rattigan. By a 4 to 3 vote the court
struck down the challenged MICRA provision, in terms probably broad
enough to invalidate the rest of the act as well. 29 The majority con-
sisted of Chief Justice Bird, Justice Stanley Mosk, and temporary
Justices Racanelli and Rattigan. The minority consisted of Justice Otto
M. Kaus, Justice Allen E. Broussard, and temporary Justice Feinberg.
Shortly after this decision, newly appointed supreme court Justice
Joseph R. Grodin took his seat on the court. Replacing Justice
Racanelli in the case, Justice Grodin voted with the three dissenters
first to grant a rehearing 0 and then to uphold the challenged MICRA
provision.3' Thus the original American Bank decision, made possi-
four years later in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Belous decision was reported as
a "landmark" ruling in a story on page one of the second section of the Los Angeles Times.
L.A. Times, Sept. 6, 1969, at II, 1, col. 2. It was described by a lawyer for the Southern
California American Civil Liberties Union as "[t]he beginning of the end of all anti-abortion
statutes." L.A. Daily J., Sept. 9, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
26. 33 Cal. 3d 674 (advance sheets only), 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983), set
aside on reh'g, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
27. 1975 Cal. Stat. 3949-4007 (2nd Ex. Sess. 1975-1976); CIV. PRO. CODE §667.7.
28. Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, 181 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1982), hearing granted, June 15, 1982,
superior court decision affirmed, 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985). Roa
involved MICRA's provision limiting the contingent fees obtainable by an attorney in a medical
malpractice action. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6146. See 37 Cal. 3d at 923, 695 P.2d at 164-65,
211 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
29. 33 Cal. 3d 674 (advance sheets only), 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983). American
Bank involved MICRA's provision authorizing the periodic instead of lump-sum payment of
damages in some medical malpractice actions. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §667.7. See American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 364, 683 P.2d 670, 672, 204
Cal. Rptr. 671, 673 (1984).
30. Minutes, June 15, 1983.
31. 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984). Chief Justice Bird apparently
had discretion to decide which of the three temporary appointees Justice Grodin would replace.
By choosing Justice Racanelli instead of Justice Feinberg, she left the temporary appointees
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ble by a 2 to 1 split of the temporary justices in favor of Chief Justice
Bird's position, was rejected by a majority of the permanent supreme
court justices voting in the case. A contretemps like that of Amaya
was averted in American Bank only because Justice Grodin joined
the court in time to vote for a rehearing before the decision became
final.32
Reapportionment: Assembly v. Deukmejian. The vote of a tem-
porary justice made the difference in the pivotal 1980's reapportion-
ment case, Assembly v. Deukmejian." The court held that the state
legislative districting plan adopted by the Democratic-controlled
legislature and signed by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., in 1981,
but stayed by a Republican-sponsored referendum that was on the
ballot in the June 1982 election, should be used in the 1982 elections
instead of the pre-existing plan.3 ' The vote was 4 to 3. The majority
consisted of Chief Justice Bird, Justice Frank C. Newman, Justice
Broussard, and temporary justice Stephen Tamura, a retired associate
justice of the court of appeal assigned by Chief Justice Bird. The
minority consisted of Justice Frank K. Richardson, Justice Mosk, and
Justice Kaus.
"'Market share" liability. In its 1980 decision in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories," involving the drug DES, the supreme court held that
a products liability plaintiff who cannot prove which manufacturer
made the product that caused her injury could sue all the product's
manufacturers on a "market share" basis. The vote was 4 to 3. The
fourth vote was provided by Presiding Justice Clinton White of the
court of appeal, in agreement with Chief Justice Bird who appointed
him.
Minority preference in university admissions. In the 1981 case of
DeRonde v. Regents of the University of California,36 the court upheld
the constitutionality of preferences for members of racial minorities
at a University of California law school. The vote was 4 to 2. Chief
in a I to 1 split, judiciously forebearing to have the case decided, and her position sustained,
by a 2 to 0 vote of temporary justices.
32. The embarrassment in American Bank might well have been worse than in Amaya,
since a statute held invalid is hard to resurrect, while conflicting decisions on different parts
of the same statute are not desirable either.
33. 30 Cal. 3d 638, 639 P.2d 939, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1982).
34. The plan thus put into effect was defeated in the June 1982 referendum, but the
legislators elected under it adopted a new plan that was signed by Gov. Brown in January
1983. The court subsequently struck from the ballot a Republican-sponsored initiative challenging
the new plan. Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
35. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
36. 28 Cal. 3d 875, 625 P.2d 220, 172 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1981).
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Justice Bird was in the majority for which the fourth vote was pro-
vided by her appointee, Presiding Justice Joseph Rattigan of the court
of appeal.
While California's four most recent chief justices generally have
not announced their policies for selecting temporary justices,37 we have
testimony on the subject from two of them.
Chief Justice Donald Wright, who died in 1985, described his prac-
tice in a telephone interview in 1983.38 Chief Justice Wright said he
had relied on retired supreme court justices and on presiding justices
of the court of appeal, with rare exceptions for associate justices of
the court of appeal. Among court of appeal justices he basically limited
his assignments to presiding justices so that the selection "wouldn't
be too arbitrary." 9 He rotated his assignments among the presiding
justices, but not "systematically," favoring the "most able" judges.
Although he knew the case the assigned judge would be sitting on,
he did not consider how the judge would vote."0
Chief Justice Rose Bird mentioned her assignment policy in her
1982 State of the Judiciary Address. The Chief Justice stated that she
had assigned almost 58 court of appeal justices to sit with the supreme
court and that "[a]ssignments now are rotated to give everyone a
chance to serve.""' More recently, in response to our inquiries in 1983
37. The only official statement appears to have been Chief Justice Bird's brief description
in her 1982 State of the Judiciary Address of her policy at that time. See infra note 41. See
also Chief Justice Bird's statement in a 1984 newspaper interview, infra note 224. In 1985
the supreme court published for the first time a booklet setting forth its "Internal Operating
Practices and Procedures." SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 23,
24-35 (1985) [hereinafter cited as PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES]. The booklet states that "[t]he
Chief Justice may assign pro tempore justices to assist the court when a regular justice
is absent or disqualified in a particular case." Id. at 15. It further states, apparently with
reference to decisions on granting review and other "conference matters," that when a regular
justice is unable to participate in a matter and "there are not four votes among the regular
justices who are participating in favor of any one disposition, the Chief Justice will assign
a judge to assist the court in place of the non-participating justice." Id. at 32. The booklet
says nothing in either case about how the chief justice selects the judges to be assigned.
38. Telephone interview with Chief Justice Donald R. Wright (March 17, 1983)f(notes
of interview on file with the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Wright Interview]. See
also infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Wright gave permission to use
and quote his statements, except on one point involving a named individual; his statements
on that point have not been used.
39. Wright Interview, supra note 38.
40. Wright Interview, supra note 38.
41. The relevant paragraph reads:
The previous use of only a few chosen judges to sit on assignment at the appellate
level has been changed so that almost 300 trial judges have now had the opportunity
to serve pro tempore on an appellate court. Almost 58 Court of Appeal justices have
been assigned to sit with the Supreme Court. Assignments now are rotated to give
everyone a chance to serve.
State of the Judiciary Address of Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird [hereinafter cited as 1982
Judiciary Address], Sept. 1982, reprinted in L.A. Daily J., Sept. 24, 1982, Report sec., at 6.
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and 1985, Chief Justice Bird has provided a fuller and more current
explanation of her assignment practices. At the Chief Justice's request
her executive assistant, Stephen T. Buehl, described her practices at
length in a letter of March 14, 1983:42
In regard to the Chief Justice's assignment powers pursuant to
article 6, section 6 of the California Constitution, let me first describe
the process by which justices pro tempore are assigned to sit on
weekly conference matters. As you know the court meets every
Wednesday to consider some 80 to 130 petitions for hearing, original
proceedings, and other matters.
Should a Supreme Court justice not be participating in one of
those matters, the first step is to determine whether there are four
votes to grant or deny without that justice's participation. If so,
there would be no need for the assignment of a justice pro tempore.
If not, an assigned justice would be needed, sometimes on quite
short notice. For that reason, the Chief Justice has adopted the prac-
tice of assigning the Presiding Justices of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, to sit on a rotating basis when the resolution of
matters arising out of court conferences in San Francisco requires
the participation of a justice pro tempore. This process is automatical-
ly handled by the court secretary's office and the judicial assignments
unit, so in practice the Chief Justice does not know who will sit
on a particular matter until she actually signs the assignment.
In the assignment of pro tempore justices to hear oral argument,
the Chief Justice's practice has been to give as many justices and
judges as possible the opportunity to sit with the Supreme Court.
For the first time in the court's history, almost every Court of Appeal
justice in California has served as a Supreme Court justice pro tem-
pore. In addition, numerous trial court judges have joined the court
on assignment.
This inclusive assignment policy stands in marked contrast to the
assignment pattern followed prior to Chief Justice Bird's tenure. The
previous practice was to select primarily from a handful of favored
Court of Appeal justices who then sat on all Supreme Court cases
in which an assignment was necessary.
Usually these justices would sit for an entire calendar in the event
that a vacancy existed on the court. Chief Justice Bird followed this
format for the first few months after her appointment but soon
switched to the current practice of assigning a large number of
42. Letter from Stephen T. Buehl to Stephen R. Barnett (March 14, 1983) (on file with
the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Buehl Letter]. The inquiry to the Chief Justice stated
that we wished "to obtain whatever information is available on this subject" in order to "report
and discuss it in [a] law review article." Letter from Stephen R. Barnett to Chief Justice Bird
(Feb. 8, 1983) (on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
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justices, each of whom sits on one or perhaps two cases during a
given calendar.
An attempt is made to avoid having a justice sit on a case that
arose out of his or her district, although that is not always possible.
Often assignments are based on geographical factors. For example,
if a case is to be argued before the court in Los Angeles, the Chief
Justice will attempt to assign judges and justices located in Los
Angeles and other counties nearby. The same holds true for cases
argued in the San Francisco and Sacramento courtrooms.
No attempt is ever made to predetermine the views of a particular
assigned justice on a particular issue. Thus, when a justice pro tem-
pore sits on a case, the Chief Justice and the associate justices have
no idea how that individual will vote. 3
Chief Justice Bird herself, in a letter dated February 19, 1985, stated
that "the information set forth in Steve Buehl's letter of March 14,
1983, remains accurate." She added that "some additional facts are
also worth noting," and continued:
In regard to assignments to the Supreme Court, I can report to
you that some 166 judges and justices have been given the oppor-
tunity to sit with this court. That includes every Court of Appeal
justice with the exception of three. They were only recently appointed
by the Governor and have yet to be assigned to the Supreme Court.
I had asked [two of these justices] to join us in November but
[one justice's] case settled before oral argument and [the other justice]
had a scheduling conflict. It is my intention to ask all of them to
serve on assignment some time during the next few months as the
need arises."'
Given the scope and importance of the temporary-justice assign-
ment practice in the California Supreme Court, there is a need for
further study of how the practice has been employed by the state's
43. While the assignment of acting chief justices is beyond the scope of this study, Mr.
Buehl's letter includes a statement on the subject that warrants reporting (particularly since
the court's PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES booklet, supra note 37, contains no comparable
explanation):
...[Alt the beginning of each year the Chief Justice selects the order in which
the associate justices shall serve as acting Chief Justice. That order is then followed
in each case in which the .Chief Justice is "absent or unable to act." Should the
first associate justice in that sequence also be absent or unable to act, the second
associate justice would then become the acting Chief Justice. ...
Buehl Letter, supra note 42.
44. Letter from Chief Justice Bird to Stephen R. Barnett (Feb. 19, 1985) (on file with
the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Bird Letter]. The Chief Justice further reported
that she had assigned "over 400 superior court judges and municipal court judges" to sit as
temporary justices with the courts of appeal. She enclosed "a current list of all these judges
and justices who have sat on assignment in the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal since
I became Chief Justice in 1977," noting that it "numbers nearly 600." Id.
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recent chief justices. One wonders in the first place why temporary
assignments are needed in California, when they are not used in a
number of other states or in the United States Supreme Court.4 If
temporary assignments are to be made, the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the various classes of judges that have been used in Califor-
nia, ranging from retired supreme court justices to trial court judges,
need to be considered. Then there are various possible methods of
selecting the judges, ranging from ad hoc discretion to pre-established
rotation or lot. Further questions are raised about who should choose
both the methods to be used and the individual judges-the chief
justice or someone else. Lurking below the surface are additional in-
quiries about the role temporary justices play when they sit with the
supreme court.
The first step in addressing these questions is to ascertain the facts.
To this end we have conducted an empirical study of the temporary-
assignment practice in the California Supreme Court under the past
four chief justices. We have sought to determine what assignment
policies the chief justices have followed, to what extent the votes of
the temporary justices have evinced a bias favoring the positions of
the assigning chief justice, to what extent it may appear that the chief
justice selected the temporary justices because of the way they would
vote, and what impact any pro-chief-justice bias in the votes of the
temporary justices has had on California's law. In the first part of
this article we discuss the methodology of the study; in the second
part we present our findings; and in the final part we discuss the
policy questions and make recommendations.
BIAs AND METHODOLOGY
A. Possible Causes of Pro-Chief-Justice Bias in the Votes of
Temporary Justices
A central endeavor of this study is to determine whether the votes
of the temporary justices have shown a "bias" in favor of the
position of the chief justice who appointed them. The identification
and measurement of such bias pose questions of methodology. As
a backdrop for those questions, we need to examine the concept
of bias and consider its possible causes-the reasons why temporary
justices might tend to vote the chief justice's way.
45. See infra Appendix; infra notes 374-75 and accompanying text.
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1. Vote Bias and Selection Bias
The observable phenomenon is "vote bias." By this we mean that
the votes of the temporary justices show an agreement rate with the
assigning chief justice higher than called for by an appropriate bench-
mark, such as-perhaps-the agreement rate of the permanent supreme
court justices with the chief justice in the same cases. Vote bias may be
due to "selection bias," meaning that the chief justice selects the tem-
porary justices on the basis, in part, of an expectation that they will
tend to vote with the chief justice. Vote bias, however, need not be
due to this cause; there are three other possibilities.
2. Selection Preference
Vote bias may reflect "selection preference," our term for
preferences based on considerations other than how the assigned judge
may vote. The chief justice may appoint the judges he or she con-
siders best qualified to sit with the supreme court-the "most able"
ones, in the words of Chief Justice Wright."1 The chief justice may
favor judges he or she knows well, has worked with enjoyably and
productively in the past, or would like to get to know better. The
chief justice may appoint lower-court judges to sit with the supreme
court as patronage awards designed to reward past support of the
chief justice, to encourage future support, or to build a loyal corps
of followers in the ranks of lower-court judges for purposes of judicial
reform or other objectives. The chief justice may select particular
judges as temporary appointees in order to test, screen, or groom
them for appointment to the supreme court or other promotion. 47
In all such cases the temporary justices may show vote bias favor-
ing the chief justice, but consideration of how they would vote may
have played no role in the decision to appoint them. Of course, since
there is no satisfactory way to prove what was in the chief justice's
mind, selection preference may be impossible to separate objectively
from selection bias. Even the chief justice cannot be sure that sub-
conscious considerations of how an appointee may vote have not in-
fluenced his or her decision to appoint that particular judge.
3. Appointee Incentives
A third possible cause of vote bias arises from incentives of the
46. Wright Interview, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
47. For evidence of this practice under Chief Justice Gibson and Chief Justice Bird, see
infra Tables 1, 22, notes 133-34, 287-89, and accompanying text.
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temporary justices themselves. One such incentive is desire for re-
appointment as a temporary justice. Appointment to sit with the
supreme court is an honor for a lower-court judge. 41 Whatever con-
siderations actually influence the chief justice in making temporary
appointments, an appointee may think that the chief justice is exer-
cising selection bias, so that voting with the chief justice will increase
the chance of being appointed another time. This incentive is not
wholly independent of selection bias, but requires at least the perception
that such bias may exist. If a system of random selection were instituted
or if it otherwise became clear that the chief justice could not exer-
cise bias in choosing temporary justices, the appointees would have
no basis for thinking that voting with the chief justice would increase
their chance of reappointment, and the incentive would largely
disappear.
Reappointment as a temporary justice is not the only favor the chief
justice of California can confer on a lower-court judge. As chairman
of the California Judicial Council, the chief justice "is in effect the
chief executive of the state's judicial system,"4 9 and can confer many
advantages and disadvantages on individual judges in the system. The
chief justice can assign a judge to sit with another court.5" The chief
justice appoints the three court of appeal judges, five superior court
judges, three municipal court judges, and two justice court judges who
sit on the Judicial Council itself."1 The chief justice appoints judges
to numerous commissions, committees, and other bodies. 2 When a
presiding justiceship in a division of the court of appeal is vacant,
the chief justice selects an associate justice of that division to be acting
presiding justice.53 Further, the chief justice often has links with the
governor and other state political leaders and can be influential in
recommending judges for promotion. And when a judge is promoted,
48. Many lower-court judges list these appointments in their biographical entries in the
California Courts and Judges Handbook. See CALiFoRNL4, COURTS AND JUDGES HANDOOK (K.
Arnold ed., 4th ed. 1985) at vii and, e.g., 386, 396, & 413. Chief Justice Wright in his inter-
view with us related that one of the few occasions when he assigned an associate justice of
the court of appeal came about when a judge who was about to retire confessed that he "would
love to sit once with the supreme court." Chief Justice Wright said he granted the wish by
assigning the judge to a "noncontroversial case." Wright Inverview, supra note 38.
49. Traynor, Rising Standards of Courts and Judges, 40 CAL. ST. B.J. 677, 682, (1986).
See CAL. R. CT. 995; CAL. Co Nsr. art. VI, §6.
50. CAL. CONSr. art. VI, §6.
51. Id.
52. An example was the Advisory Committee appointed by Chief Justice Bird in 1985
to assist the Judicial Council in devising rules for the implementation of Proposition 32. See
CAL. CoNsr. art. VI, §12(b)-(d); PRAcIcES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 37, at 43.
53. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §3.
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the chief justice is one of the three members of the Commission on
Judicial Appointments that must confirm the appointment.1
4
Because of the chief justice's power to influence the career of lower-
court judges, such judges have an incentive to agree with the chief
justice when sitting temporarily with the supreme court. This incen-
tive, unlike the incentive based on desire for reappointment as a tem-
porary justice, could contribute to vote bias on the part of temporary
justices even if they were chosen at random.
Further, a temporary justice who was not thinking of reappoint-
ment, or of any other potential favor from the chief justice, might
be inclined to vote the chief justice's way simply out of gratitude
for being appointed to sit with the court. The judge might wish to
return the favor, and voting with the chief justice would be a ready
way to do so.
Other possible incentives for pro-chief-justice bias spring from what
the temporary justices may think is expected of them. The California
Supreme Court, through its practices, procedures, and traditions, does
much to convey the message that temporary justices are like children
at the dinner table, to be seen and not heard. Temporary justices,
especially those from lower courts (as distinct from retired supreme
court justices), are seldom assigned to write the supreme court's opin-
ion." Temporary justices usually are assigned to a case so soon before
the argument that often they must barely have time to read the
papers." If they should disagree with the disposition recommended
in the court's "calendar memorandum," they rarely would have time
to prepare and circulate their own memorandum before the argument
and the vote that immediately follows the argument." It is thus not
54. Id., §7.
55. See infra Table 33.
56. In 1983, which we chose as a sample year, the average period between the assignment
of the temporary justice and the argument of the case was II days; on one occasion it was
four days, another time one day.
57. The court's internal rules provide that the calendar memorandum need be circulated
only 10 days prior to the start of an argument calendar, and that "[a]ny justice desiring to
circulate a supplemental or dissenting calendar memorandum" must do it within five days after
that. PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 37, at 28. The conference at which the court's
tenative vote is taken is held "as soon as possible" after the argument, "usually that same
day." Id. at 30. On seven occasions in 1983, a temporary justice was assigned to a case less
than five days before the start of the argument calendar (as distinct from the day of the argu-
ment), and thus probably could not have circulated a supplemental or dissenting memoran-
dum. See supra note 56. Permanent justices, too, must often lack time before the argument
to circulate such a memorandum. But the permanent justices, unlike the temporary justices,
have been at the conference at which review of the case was granted, and have had the chance
there to express their own views and hear the other views within the court. See PRACTICES
AND PROCEDURES, supra note 37, at 26-28.
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surprising that temporary justices, especially those from lower courts,
dissent less often than the permanent supreme court justices."8
These practices and apparent expectations may lead temporary
justices, when they cast their votes, to give the benefit of the doubt
to the chief justice as the leader of the Court. In addition, they
may be inclined to support the chief justice out of institutional
loyalty, deference, or a desire to accommodate their host. Such
feelings are likely to be especially strong when the chief justice
is a figure commanding extraordinary respect in the state's judiciary,
as was true of Chief Justice Gibson, for example. 9
Finally, while temporary justices on the whole dissent less often
than permanent supreme court justices," chief justices on the whole
dissent less often than supreme court associate justices. 6' This con-
vergence of low dissent rates would contribute to a high rate of agree-
ment between the temporary justices and the chief justice, and hence
to pro-chief-justice bias in the votes of the temporary justices.
4. Appointee Pools
A fourth possible cause of pro-chief-justice bias lies in the pools
from which the temporary justices are drawn. If we assume arguendo
that vote bias is to be measured by comparing the votes of the tem-
porary justices with those of the permanent supreme court justices,
bias favoring the position of the chief justice might appear simply
because the judges in the pools from which the temporary justices
were drawn-the court of appeal justices in the state, for example-
happened at a particular time to be closer to the chief justice in their
views on legal issues than to the permanent supreme court justices.6"
In that case, if the temporary justices were representative of the popula-
58. See infra Table 32 (showing this to be true of temporary appointees from lower courts
under all four chief justices studied, and of all temporary appointees under three of the four);
infra notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
59. See P. STotz, supra note 14, at 98; cf. the extraordinarily low dissent rate of the
Gibson temporary justices. Infra Table 32.
60. See id.
61. See id. (showing that Chief Justices Gibson, Traynor, and Wright each dissented well
under one-half as often as their associate justices, while Chief Justice Bird dissented one-third
more often than hers). Reasons for low dissent rates by chief justices are probably quite dif-
ferent from the reasons affecting temporary justices. Chief justices frequently lead the majority
position on the court, play a key role in molding majority opinions, and place a high value
on consensus in the court.
62. Although court of appeal justices are appointed by the governor for terms of 12 years
just as supreme court justices are (CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §16), the average lengths of service
of the members of the two courts at any particular time may vary considerably. See infra
note 367 and accompanying text.
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tion from which they came, they would show a vote bias that simply
reflected the views of that population.
B. Measuring Vote Bias: The Stanford Comment
Having cataloged the possible causes of pro-chief-justice bias in the
votes of temporary justices, we turn to the identification and measure-
ment of that bias. We take as our starting point the 1980 Stanford
Law Review comment.
63
The Stanford study covered the cases decided by the California
Supreme Court in the twenty-five years from June 1, 1954, through
May 31, 1979.6' The authors identified all the decided cases in which
a temporary justice and the assigning chief justice both participated.
65
They tabulated the votes in these cases of the temporary justice,
the chief justice, and the "regular" supreme court justices-that is,
the associate justices-and then they compared the agreement rate
between the temporary justices and the chief justice with the agree-
ment rate between the associate justices and the chief justices.
66
The Stanford authors produced three sets of results. First, they
tabulated for each chief justice the agreement rate in all cases be-
tween the temporary justices and the chief justice. They found these
rates to be 97% for Chief Justice Gibson, 79% for Chief Justice
Traynor, 89% for Chief Justice Wright, and 94% for Chief Justice
Bird (in the approximately two years of her tenure covered by the
study). 7 But the authors deemed these rates misleadingly high and
therefore did not compare them with the agreement rates between
the associate justices and the chief justice in the same cases. 8
The Stanford authors found a "more meaningful measure" in "close
cases"-"those in which the regular justices split three-to-three, three-
to-two, or four-to-two" 69-and did make the comparison for those cases.
The authors found that temporary justices appointed by Chief Justice
63. Supra note 1.
64. See Comment, supra note 1, at 435-36.
65. See id. at 435-36 & n.9. They appear to have included, inadvertently, some additional
cases. See infra note 100.
66. In determining agreement, Stanford treated "concurring and dissenting" opinions as
dissents. See Comment, supra note I, at 437 n.13. We do the same. See infra note 101.
67. Comment, supra note 1, at 437.
68. The authors commented that "these figures, which appear to be very high, are misleading
because a large percentage of the cases were decided by unanimous or nearly unanimous votes."
Id. The comparison would nonetheless be meaningful, since the agreement rates of the associate
justices with the chief justice are equally affected by the high frequency of unanimous or nearly
unanimous votes. We make such "all case" comparisons. See infra Tables 2, 9, 16, 23.
69. Comment, supra note 1, at 437.
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Gibson agreed with him in close cases 85% of the time, while the
associate justices agreed with Chief Justice Gibson in these cases 50%
of the time. Temporary justices appointed by Chief Justice Wright
agreed with him in close cases 73% of the time, compared with 54%
for the associate justices. Temporary justices appointed by Chief Justice
Bird agreed with her in close cases 80% of the time, compared with
46% for the associate justices. Chief Justice Traynor was different.
His temporary justices agreed with him in close cases 52% of the
time, while the associate justices agreed with him more often, 54%
of the time.10
Finally, the Stanford study included a brief look at swing cases,
the subset of close cases in which a temporary justice provided a
necessary fourth vote to make a majority.7' The authors reported that
in all the swing cases in their sample, the temporary justice and the
chief justice agreed 78% of the time. 7 They did not calculate the
agreement rate in these cases between the associate justices and the
chief justice, and did not break down the swing cases for the dif-
ferent chief justices.73
C. Measuring Vote Bias: Methodological Questions
1. The definition of a "regular" supreme court justice:
should the chief justice be included?
In inquiring whether the votes of the temporary justices exhibit a
"bias" favoring the position of the chief justice, we need an ap-
propriate benchmark, a "normal" agreement rate, with which to com-
pare their votes. Ideally we might wish a benchmark consisting of
the votes of a control group of temporary justices randomly selected
from an appropriate pool (and immune to the various incentives we
have described). 7' But we have no way of knowing, of course, how
such hypothetical justices would have voted in the supreme court cases
70. Id. at 437-39 & n.17. This was the result, the authors observed, of Chief Justice Traynor's
repeated assignment of retired supreme court Justice B. Rey Schauer, who agreed with Chief
Justice Traynor in only 5 of the 23 close cases in which both sat. Id.
71. See supra text accompanying note 15. The California Constitution states that "[c]oncur-
rence of 4 judges present at the argument is necessary for a judgment." CAL. CONsT. art. VI, §2.
72. Comment, supra note 1, at 439. They found this rate notably high, since "one might
expect an agreement rate close to 50%, given the split of the court in these cases." Id.
73. In all their analyses the Stanford authors treated all temporary justices alike, taking
no account of "holdover" appointees or other categories. See infra notes 94-98 and accom-
panying text; see also infra, e.g., Table 24.
74. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
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in which the actual temporary justices did vote." What we do have
is the votes cast by permanent supreme court justices in those cases.
Using these votes has the disadvantage of taking permanent supreme
court justices as a sort of a proxy for a control group of temporary
justices. But it has the advantage of holding constant the facts and
legal issues on which the temporary justices, the chief justice, and
the "benchmark" justices are all voting. This approach has the further
justification that, since temporary justices are appointed to replace
permanent supreme justices, votes by temporary justices mirroring those
of permanent justices presumably would have to be considered
"normal" and free of bias.
We therefore follow the approach of the Stanford study in com-
paring the votes of the temporary justices with the votes of perma-
nent supreme court justices in the same cases.
The question then arises, which permanent supreme court justices?
The Stanford authors assumed without discussion that the relevant
norm against which to measure the agreement rate between the tem-
porary justices and the chief justice was the agreement rate between
the associate justices and the chief justice."6 That is one possibility,
but not the only one. An alternative method is to compare the agree-
ment rate between the temporary justices and the chief justice with
the agreement rate between the chief justice and the entire supreme
court.
Consider, for example, a case in which five supreme court associate
justices vote one way and the chief justice votes the other way (and
there is one temporary justice). The approach used by the Stanford
authors tabulates the agreement rate of the "regular" supreme court
justices in this case as 5 to 0 against the chief justice. The alternative
approach would count the votes of all the permanent supreme court
justices, including the chief justice, and tabulate the "supreme court
agreement rate" as 5 to 1 against the chief justice. In a case in which
the chief justice and five associate justices split 3 to 3, the Stanford
approach reports an agreement rate of 3 to 2 against the chief justice
(40%), while the alternative approach would report a rate of 3 to
3 (50%).
75. We might assume that such randomly selected justices would be as likely to agree
with the chief justice in each case as to disagree, giving us a "normal" 50% agreement rate.
But this assumption would have no empirical basis and would be inconsistent with the reality
that most supreme court cases are not close-that the permanent supreme court justices agree
with the chief justice much more than 50% of the time. See infra Tables 2, 9, 16, and 23.
76. Comment, supra note 1, at 438.
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The theory underlying the Stanford approach is, perhaps, that if
discretionary assignment by the chief justice produces temporary
justices who agree with the chief justice to a greater extent than do
the supreme court associate justices, then the position of the chief
justice has been improved in relation to what it would have been if
no temporary justices were appointed. But that is an unreal assump-
tion, since some temporary justices are to be appointed. The chief
justice, it would seem, has as much right as the associate justices
to benefit from those appointments. The chief justice, as a member
of the supreme court, is entitled to be counted in determining whether
the votes of the temporary justices exhibit a bias deviating from the
"supreme court norm." 77 Admittedly, it may seem artificial to count
the chief justice as agreeing with himself or herself. But, on balance,
we think it more appropriate to define a pro-chief-justice bias in the
votes of the temporary justices by reference to the votes of the supreme
court as a whole, not just those of the associate justices.78
In reporting our results we have, therefore, compared the agree-
ment rate between the temporary justices and the chief justice with
the agreement rate between the supreme court as a whole and the
chief justice-the "supreme court agreement rate." Our analysis,
moreover, focuses on this comparison. The Stanford approach,
however, also represents a valid comparison, at least with respect to
all cases involving temporary justices, and our "all case" tables
therefore include a second column showing the "associate justices'
agreement rate."
7 9
2. "Close Cases" and "Swing Cases"
Although the Stanford authors did not discuss the theory under-
lying their focus on "close cases," 8 one may well hypothesize that
selection bias by a chief justice is more likely in cases in which the
77. Moreover, the chief justice and associate justices make up a larger and arguably better
control group for the study of vote bias.
78. In addition, this is a more conservative approach to the question of bias. By giving
the chief justice the benefit of his or her vote and thus increasing the agreement rate between
the chief justices and the "regular" supreme court justices-that is, by including the chief justice
as a "regular" justice-this approach reduces whatever pro-chief-justice bias may be found
in the votes of the temporary justices. If bias appears even under this approach, its significance
will be less debatable.
79. But in reporting on the close cases and swing cases we have not included the Associate
Justices' Agreement Rate, because in those contexts we think that rate is unacceptably biased.
See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
80. They suggested only that close cases would produce a "more meaningful measure"
than all cases because the agreement rates would not be so high. Comment, supra note 1,
at 437.
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vote of the temporary justice can be expected to make a difference.
How should we identify those cases? The class of "close cases" used
in the Stanford study, defined as cases in which the permanent justices
split 3 to 3, 3 to 2, or 4 to 2,81 seems overbroad because of the 4
to 2 cases. Cases decided 4 to 2-which represented 63% of Stan-
ford's "close case" samplea 2-are ones in which the temporary justice's
vote did not make a difference, since the four permanent justices con-
stituted a majority. The present procedures of the court, moreover,
are such that the four-vote majority often will have been apparent from
the time the court granted review; hence when the temporary justice
was being appointed, shortly before the argument, the chief justice
would have known that the appointee's vote was unlikely to make
a difference. 3
A better measure of cases in which the vote of a temporary justice
would have been expected to affect the decision is provided by "swing
cases," in which a temporary justice did provide a necessary fourth
vote."" In these cases the chief justice ordinarily would have known
81. Id.
82. Id. at 437 n.15.
83. The votes of four justices are required to grant a hearing. PRAcTICES AND PROCEDURES,
supra note 37, at 15. The general practice is that "the justice who wrote the conference memoran-
dum recommending a grant will be assigned to prepare the calendar memorandum" (id. at
16, 20); and that when the tentative vote is taken after the argument, if the justice who wrote
the calendar memorandum "commands a majority, he or she usually prepares a proposed opin-
ion." Id. at 17, 20. Thus, the justice who wrote the conference memorandum for the four-vote
majority that voted to grant review remains in control of the case unless one of those votes
is lost. It must often happen that the original four-vote majority holds fast. On the other
hand, votes sometimes change in the course of considering a case, and justices must sometimes
vote to grant review simply because the case is important, without knowing how they will vote
on the merits. Moreover, before the court instituted its controversial "depublication" practice,
see, e.g., Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme Court, 72 CAMF. L.
REV. 514 (1984), a majority of justices may have voted to grant review simply because they
did not want the opinion of the lower court to stand, again without knowing how they would
vote on the merits. In addition, before the 1984 passage of Proposition 32 (CAL. CONsT. art.
VI, §12(b)-(d)), which allows the court to review only selected issues in a case, the grant of
a hearing meant that the court had to deal with all the issues, and hence the decision could
turn on issues different from the one on which four justices voted to grant the hearing.
Further, the court's present practice of assigning the calendar memorandum to the justice who
wrote the conference memorandum recommending the grant is relatively recent, dating apparently
from some time in the tenure of Chief Justice Wright. Under Chief Justice Gibson, the calen-
dar memorandum was routinely assigned to the justice voting for the hearing who had the
fewest assignments for the year, while Chief Justice Traynor made the assignments himself
on a case-by-case basis, deliberately avoiding any presumption in favor of the justice who
had written the conference memorandum. Interview with Donald P. Barrett, former chief staff
attorney for the supreme court (February 4, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Barrett Interview].
All things considered, however, it seems unlikely, in most cases decided with a four-vote majority
of permanent justices, that the vote of the temporary justice would have been expected to
make a difference at the time the temporary justice was appointed.
84. See supra text accompanying note 15.
1065
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
of the crucial nature of the temporary justice's vote at the time the
justice was being appointed, unless a subsequent vote shift (or change
in the court's membership) made the vote crucial. We therefore have
isolated the swing cases for each chief justice, compared the respec-
tive agreement rates in those cases, and also reported the holding of
each case so that its importance may be appraised.
Still, there undoubtedly were some "close cases" in which the vote
of the temporary justice appeared, at the time of appointment, to
be capable of affecting the decision, though a four-vote majority of
permanent justices eventually emerged. Close cases provide a more
pertinent sample than "all cases" and a larger sample than swing
cases. For these reasons, and because Stanford relied so heavily on
the close-case sample, 5 we present data for close cases as well as
for all cases and swing cases.1
6
3. Stanford's "Close Case" Error
The Stanford authors stumbled in their close-case analysis. They
defined close cases as those in which the "regular" justices split 3
to 3, 3 to 2, or 4 to 2, and then compared the agreement rate in
those cases between the "regular" justices and the chief justice with
that between the temporary justices and the chief justice. 7 The trou-
ble is that the vote of the chief justice was counted among those of
the "regular" justices for the purpose of determining whether the
case was close, but then was not counted among those of the
"regular" justices for the purpose of determining the agreement rate
between the "regular" justices and the chief justice. For the former
purpose, Stanford used "regular" justices to mean permanent justices;
for the latter purpose, Stanford used "regular" justices to mean
associate justices.
The result was to increase, by a factor ranging from 6.7% to 16.7%,
the measure of any pro-chief-justice bias found in the votes of the
85. See Comment, supra note 1, at 437-38; see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
86. We have expanded the "close case" sample to include some additional sets of cases
that Stanford unaccountably left out. In defining the close-case category as cases in which
the permanent justices split 3 to 3, 3 to 2, or 4 to 2, Stanford left out cases in which they
split 3 to 1, 2 to 2, or 2 to I. See Comment, supra note I, at 437. Stanford elsewhere noted
that there were some of these latter groups of cases in its total sample, and included them
in its sample of swing cases, but did not count them among the close cases. Id. at 440 n.24,
437 & n.15. They should have been counted, since they were swing cases and hence aforliori
close cases. We include them as close cases, thus defining that class as cases in which the
permanent justices split 3 to 3, 3 to 2, 4 to 2, 3 to 1, 2 to 2, or 2 to 1.
87. Comment, supra note 1, at 438. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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temporary justices. Consider, for example, the set of close cases in
which the chief justice and five associate justices split 3 to 3. When
Stanford asked the agreement rate in these cases between the "regular"
justices and the chief justice, Stanford's answer was 40%-since three
of the associate justices voted against the chief justice and only two
voted with the chief justice. The more relevant answer is 500%0, since
the supreme court split evenly. If the data disclosed that in the set
of 3 to 3 cases the temporary justices agreed with the chief justice
50% of the time, the appropriate conclusion would be that their votes
showed no bias in favor of the chief justice's position, instead of
the 10% bias the Stanford authors would find.'8
Because of this misstep, the dramatic differentials Stanford reported
between the agreement rates of the temporary justices and the
''regular" justices in the close cases under Chief Justices Gibson,
Wright, and Bird-differentials of 350%0, 19%, and 34%, respectively g9-
overstate the vote bias by a factor ranging around 1000.90
A correction has already been suggested.9" It is to count the vote
of the chief justice not only for the purpose of identifying the close
cases, but also for the purpose of tallying the agreement rate in those
cases between the chief justice and the "regular" justices. The chief
justice is counted as a regular justice, agreeing with himself or
herself. Thus, in the 3 to 3 case, three justices are recorded as disagree-
ing with the chief justice and three as agreeing; the result is an agree-
ment rate of 50%-not Stanford's 40% -to be compared with
whatever the temporary justices' agreement rate may be. 92 We pre-
sent our data on close cases and swing cases in this manner. A column
headed "Supreme Court Agreement Rate" gives the agreement rate
between the chief justice and all permanent justices of the supreme
court, the chief justice included. 93
88. The Stanford authors appear to recognize as much when, in discussing swing cases,
they say that "one might expect [from the temporary justices] an agreement rate close to 50%70,
given the split of the court in these cases." Comment, supra note 1, at 439.
89. Comment, supra note 1, at 438. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
90. The -2% differential reported under Chief Traynor was similarly overstated. See id.
91. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
92. Likewise, in cases where the permanent justices split 4 to 2, with the chief justice
in the minority, Stanford recorded an agreement rate of 20% (four "regular" justices against
the chief justice, only one with the chief justice). See Comment, supra note 1, at 438. Our
method records an agreement rate of 33% (four justices against, two with).
93. Earlier, in discussing the all-case samples, we likewise raised the question whether the
chief justice's own vote should be counted in determining the benchmark agreement rate of
the supreme court justices with which the agreement rate of the temporary justices would be
compared. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. We concluded that this was the better
approach, but we thought the other approach (looking to the agreement rate of the associate
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4. "Holdover" Assignments of Retired Supreme Court
Justices
Of the several classes of judges that have been used as temporary
justices in the California Supreme Court, one raises a question of
methodology. These are "holdover" appointees-recently retired
supreme court justices who are assigned as temporary justices to finish
cases on which they heard argument before retiring. Such assignments
were used to an appreciable extent by all four chief justices in this
study.9" Although holdover assignees are temporary justices-the chief
justice formally assigns them like any other temporary assignee9 5-the
question arises whether their votes should be considered in testing
for and measuring pro-chief-justice bias in the votes of temporary
justices.
Holdover assignments entail no discretion by the chief justice in
choosing from a pool of possible appointees; the only choice is
whether or not to keep a particular justice on a case to finish it.
The chief justice's decision to make the assignment, if the retired justice
is available, appears to be customary, traditional, and routine.9 6 There
are good reasons why it should be. Holdover assignments conserve
judicial resources by allowing the retired justice to finish work that
has been started, and particularly by avoiding the need to have the
case reargued before a different justice if the retired justice's vote
should prove crucial. True, the decision whether to make holdover
assignments of a particular retired justice, or whether to make such
an assignment in a particular case, could provide an opportunity for
selection bias by a chief justice. This is particularly so because the
justices) was also valid, and we said we would present the all-case data both ways. Supra text
accompanying note 79. Here, because the close-case and swing-case samples constitute classes
of more-or-less-evenly-split cases that are defined by counting the chief justice's vote, it seems
inconsistent and biased to fail to count the vote of the chief justice in then determining the
agreement rate of the supreme court justices with the chief justice in those cases. Such an
approach builds in an uneven split against the chief justice. Therefore in the close-case and
swing-case analyses we do not present figures for the associate justices' agreement rate, but
only for the "Supreme Court Agreement Rate." In footnotes, however, we compare our figures
with those derived by Stanford through the other method. See, e.g., infra Table 3, note b.
94. For Chief Justice Gibson, they constituted 11% of all his temporary-justice assignments
during the 1954-1964 period. See infra Table 1. Holdover appointments constituted 17% of
the assignments by Chief Justice Traynor, 37% of those by Chief Justice Wright, and 130
of those by Chief Justice Bird through the end of 1984. See infra Tables 8, 15, and 22.
95. See, e.g., Minutes, Feb. 8, 1982 (Assignment of Justice Tobriner, who retired Jan.
3, 1982, in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr.
496 (1982), which was argued Aug. 3, 1981. Minutes, Aug. 3, 1981).
96. See supra note 94; Barrett Interview, supra note 83. Chief Justice Bird, in the lists
she has provided of her temporary assignees, has not included her holdover assignments of
retired justices Tobriner and Richardson, apparently considering them routine. See supra note
44 and accompanying text.
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retired justice Will already have voted on the case at the time the
assignment is to be made.97 But if a chief justice failed to appoint
a just-retired colleague who had heard a case argued, and had voted on
it, and was available to help the court complete it, that failure would
be readily apparent to the other justices and could be expected to
offend them, not least because of the extra work it might impose
on them. The theoretical potential for bias in holdover assignments
thus seems limited not only by the nature of the choice but also by
pragmatic concerns and the customary nature of the practice. Indeed,
the potential seems so slight that even if a system of nondiscretionary
selection were instituted for temporary assignments generally, an excep-
tion Would be in order to enable the continuation of holdover
assignments.
Since our inquiry into vote bias is designed to assess a system of
discretionary assignment, the votes cast by holdover assignees seem
largely beside the point. We have included these votes in our data,
but we report the results both including and excluding holdovers.
In our analysis we focus on the agreement rates of the temporary
justices that exclude the holdover votes.98
5. The Mechanics of This Study
This study comprises in its basic data all cases decided by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court from June 1, 1954, through December 31, 1984.
It thus covers the last ten years of the tenure of Chief Justice Gibson
(1954-1964), the full tenures of Chief Justice Traynor (1964-1970) and
Chief Justice Wright (1970-1977), and the tenure of Chief Justice Bird
from her entry into office on March 26, 1977, to the end of 1984. 99
97. See PRACTCES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 37, at 30. See also id. at 20.
98. We define a holdover assignment as one in which the temporary justice heard argu-
ment in the assigned case before retiring from the supreme court. (Since the dates of argument
are not reported in the Official Reports, we identified these assignments by obtaining the argu-
ment dates from the docket books at the supreme court and, for the years before 1966, by
searching the Minutes of the supreme court). It might be suggested that the definition of holdovers
should have been expanded to include cases in which the retired justice participated in the
court's conference at which the case was accepted for review, retired before the case was argued,
and then heard the argument by virtue of the temporary assignment. In these cases, however,
the court's work on the case at the time of the justice's retirement is less advanced; it has
not included the argument, the tentative vote taken immediately after the argument, or prob-
ably the completion and circulation of the calendar memorandum shortly before the argument.
See PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 37, at 17, 20, 28, 30. And since the retired justice
has not heard the argument before retiring, the interest in assigning this particular judge to
the case in order to avoid the possible need to have it reargued is not present. Hence these
assignments seem properly treated not as holdover assignments but as discretionary ones, like
assignments of retired supreme court justices who had nothing to do with the assigned case
before they retired.
99. For one purpose-to cover assignments made by Chief Justice Bird through the end
of 1984-we extended the data to include cases decided through July 1985. See infra notes
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We used computer searches to identify all the decided cases in which
votes were cast by both a temporary justice and the appointing chief
justice. 00 We then calculated and compared the agreement rates in
these cases between the temporary justices and the chief justice and
between the supreme court justices and the chief justice.' In doing
this we subdivided the temporary justices by holdover retired supreme
court justices, nonholdover retired supreme court justices, court of
appeal presiding justices, court of appeal associate justices, and trial
court judges. We made such comparisons for all cases, for "close
cases,"'' 0 2 and for "swing cases.'
103
In addition, we looked at each chief justice's use of "repeat"
appointees, temporary justices assigned to two or more cases. We com-
pared the first-case agreement rates of temporary justices who were
not assigned to repeat with the first-case agreement rates of ones who
were, and we compared the overall agreement rates of one-time
appointees with those of various categories of repeat appointees.
Further, to see whether any vote bias might be due to the pools from
which the temporary justices were drawn,"' and as an independent
231-32 and accompanying text; Tables 23A, 25A, 26A. For other limited purposes we took
account of 1985 data. See, e.g., infra note 227 and accompanying text.
100. We thus eliminated votes cast by temporary justices who had been appointed by an
acting chief justice or by a prior chief justice. See supra notes 2, 3; see also Comment, supra
note 1, at 436 n.10. We also eliminated the rare case in which the current chief justice makes
the assignment but does not sit. E.g., Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 482, 601 P.2d
1030, 1035, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 (1979). The elimination of acting-chief-justice assignments
and of cases in which the chief justice did not participate (categories that largely overlap) was
performed by computer searches and then checked by inspecting in the Official Reports all
the cases remaining on the list. The elimination of prior-chief-justice assignments, in cases in
which the chief justice did participate, could not be done by computer searches. By reference
to the daily Minutes of the California Supreme Court, where the assignments of temporary
justices are initially reported, we checked periods of transition between chief justices to ascer-
tain that it was the new chief justice, and not the prior one, who had appointed the temporary
justice who sat in a case with the new chief justice. The Stanford authors noted this problem
but dismissed it as "unlikely." Comment, supra note 1, at 436 n.10. Yet there were 20 cases
decided from June 1977 to April 1978, with Chief Justice Bird participating, in which retired
supreme court Justice Raymond Sullivan sat as a temporary justice under an assignment made
by Chief Justice Wright prior to the latter's retirement on Feb. 1, 1977. See Minutes, Jan.
20, 1977 (Justice Sullivan assigned to sit from that date to June 30, 1977, and until he has
completed all matters submitted to him); e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court,
20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). These cases should not be included
in the samples for Chief Justice Bird, though in the Stanford study they apparently were. (Under
the same assignment Justice Sullivan sat in 41 cases in which Chief Justice Bird did not par-
ticipate. See supra note 3. These cases presumably were not included in the Stanford study,
see Comment, supra note 1, at 436 & n.10, as they are not included in this Study.)
101. We recorded justices as agreeing with each other if they voted for the same result,
whether or not they joined the same opinion. Opinions labeled "concurring and dissenting"
were counted as dissents. The agreement rate of the "supreme court justices" was tabulated
both as the "supreme court agreement rate," including the chief justice's own vote, and as
the associate justices' agreement rate. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 69-70, 80-86, and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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way of identifying bias, we compared the temporary justices assigned
by each chief justice with the statewide pools from which they came
in terms of the percentages appointed by governors of each political
party.
The temporary assignments of Chief Justice Bird were examined in
further detail. Because Chief Justice Bird has substantially changed her
appointment policy during the course of her tenure, we broke the
data down by year, when practical, and we used the dates on which
her temporary justices were assigned as well as the dates on which
the cases in which they sat were decided." °5 We also briefly investigated
Chief Justice Bird's practice in assigning temporary justices to sit on
"conference matters," and how it might relate to their assignments
in argued cases.' 6
RESULTS OF THE STUDY
A. Chief Justice Gibson, 1954-1964
1. Assignment Patterns and Voting Analysis
Chief Justice Phil S. Gibson, in cases in which he participated
from June 1, 1954, until he retired on August 31, 1964,107 appointed
temporary justices who cast a total of 135 votes. As shown in
Table 1, 22% of those votes were cast by retired supreme court
justices, divided equally between holdovers and nonholdovers; 16%
were cast by presiding justices of the court of appeal; and 62%
105. The assignment dates were obtained from the court's Minutes and from the letters
of assignment on file in the clerk's office at the supreme court. It should be noted that we
are speaking only of dates of assignment in cases actually decided by the court. The temporary-
justice assignments included in this study, like those included in the Stanford study, are limited.
to ones that resulted in votes by temporary justices in decided cases. Yet, as our comparison
of the Minutes with the decided cases has disclosed, there have been, at least under Chief
Justice Bird, many temporary-justice assignments that have not resulted in vdtes. This may
be because the case settles before argument, because the assigned justice has a scheduling con-
flict, because the justice was appointed only as a precaution in case vacancies occurred during
an argument calendar, or for other reasons.
It seems reasonable to assume that the omission of such abortive assignments from our data
does not affect the validity of the comparisons we make on the basis of votes cast by assigned
justices. For one thing, it is likely that an assigned justice who does not get to sit will be
given a raincheck by the chief justice. See Bird Letter, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
Further, the non-sitting factor should apply on a neutral and random basis, so that the data
on assigned justices who actually sit would not differ in any relevant way from the data on
assignments. If this were not true, that would imply that the assignments were influenced by
knowledge on the part of the chief justice that particular assignments might not result in sittings,
so that the actual sittings by the assigned justices would indeed be more relevant than the
assignments.
106. See infra note 228. With that exception, the empirical part of this study is concerned
with the role of temporary justices in argued cases, and not with their role in "conference
matters" such as decisions on petitions for hearing.
107. See 61 Cal. 2d iii (1964).
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were cast by associate justices of the court of appeal. Chief Justice
Gibson's assignments were heavily concentrated among particular
appointees. Of his twenty-one assignments of court of appeal presiding
justices, seventeen went to three justices. Of his eighty-four assignments
of court of appeal associate justices, sixty-six went to four justices.
Table 1 lists all the repeat appointees and the number of cases
heard by each of them.
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES APPOINTED BY CHIEF JUSTICE GIBSON,




































aThomas P. White served as an associate justice of the California Supreme Court from
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August 1959 to October 1962. See 52 Cal. 2d iii (1959); 58 Cal. 2d iii (1962). He was
assigned by Chief Justice Gibson to sit with the court as a temporary justice both after
his retirement and before his appointment, when he was a presiding justice of the court of appeal.
bMaurice T. Dooling, Jr., served as an associate justice of the California Supreme Court
from June 1960 to June 1962. See 54 Cal. 2d iii (1960); 58 Cal. 2d iii (1962). He was assigned by
Chief Justice Gibson to sit with the court as a temporary justice both after his retirement and before
his appointment, when he was an associate justice of the court of appeal.
cPaul Peek, Marshall F. McComb, and Mathew 0. Tobriner were subsequently promoted
to the supreme court during the term of Chief Justice Gibson (in 1962, 1956, and 1962, respec-
tively). See 58 Cal. 2d iii (1962); 46 Cal. 2d iii (1956). So was Raymond E. Peters, a court of appeal
presiding justice who was assigned by Chief Justice Gibson as a temporary justice for one case
in 1956 and was appointed to the supreme court in 1959. See 51 Cal. 2d iii (1959). In all these cases
(and those of Justices White and Dooling, see notes a and b supra), the assignments as temporary
justices while sitting in the court of appeal took place prior to the gubernatorial nominations to
the high court.
Table 2 shows the agreement rates in all the cases in our sample
between the temporary justices and Chief Justice Gibson, between
the associate supreme court justices and Chief Justice Gibson, and
between all the supreme court justices and Chief Justice Gibson. Chief
Justice Gibson's temporary appointees (excluding holdovers) agreed
with him 97% of the time, compared with 92% for the supreme court
as a whole (and 90% for the associate supreme court justices).
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TABLE 2
AGREEMENT RATES IN ALL CASES OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES, ASSOCIATE SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES, AND ALL SUPREME COURT JUSTICES WITH CHIEF JUSTICE GIBSON (1954-1964)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Associate Supreme Court Temporary Difference
Justices' Agreement Rate Justices' (3) - (2)
Agreement (All Justices Agreement
Rate Including Chief Rate
Justice)a
Retired Supreme







CA Total 97% (102/105)
All




90% (507/562) 92% (622/677) 97% (116/120) +5%
(p =. 0 6 )
aSee supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
bEvaluation of Table 2, and succeeding tables, raises the question of statistical significance.
In comparing agreement rates to determine whether bias exists in the votes of the temporary justices,
it is reasonable to ask whether an observed difference in the rates is "statistically significant"-
that is, unlikely to have arisen by chance. In reporting our results we will address this question
in two ways: usually noting the "probability value" or degree of significance associated with the
result, and sometimes also noting that the result is sufficiently significant to pass the standard
statistical threshold of "significance at the 5% level."
We will report significance at the 5% level, where it exists, by using a t-test. See D. FREED-
MAN, R. PISANI, & R. PURVIS, STATISTiCS 463 (1978). This test is customarily used to evaluate
whether the means of two different populations are different. Our study can be viewed as one
that compares a sample with the population from which it is drawn. Our sample consists of the
votes of the temporary justices appointed by a particular chief justice, and the question of "bias"
is the question whether the agreement rate embodied in these votes was different (that is, more
favorable to the chief justice) from the agreement rate that would have been produced by the
entire pool of judges eligible for appointment as temporary justices-a pool that we are assuming
would have voted the same way the sitting supreme court justices did vote in the cases in question.
See supra text following note 75. Statistical testing (using the t-test in this case) evaluates the degree
of confidence we can have that an observed difference between the agreement rates shows a true
difference between the sample of temporary justices appointed by the chief justice and the entire
pool of possible appointees (or their proxies, the supreme court justices). The greater the dif-
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ference in the agreement rates and the more the available information (number of votes), the more
confident one can be that an observed difference did not arise by chance.
If the probability that the difference arose by chance is five percent or less, one states that
the result is significant at the 5% level, implying that one has 95% confidence that the difference
did not arise by chance. This can be shown by using a t-statistic, which is 1.96 for samples
of the size involved here. Thus, in Table 2, the 6% difference in column (4) between the Temporary
Justices' Agreement Rate and the Supreme Court Agreement Rate, including holdovers, carries
a t-statistic of 2.44 and is significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, the 5% difference
in the rates that exclude holdovers carries a t-statistic of 1.85 and is not significant at the 5% level.
For some purposes 95% confidence is a high level of confidence. The 5% significance test
is used frequently in scientific research where the cost of concluding that a result is not due
to chance can be great. It is not always desirable to limit consideration to whether a result is
significant or not by this rather arbitrary threshold. A result significant only at the 10% or 20%
level warrants 90% or 80% confidence, respectively, that the observed bias was not due to chance.
Even a result significant at the 50% level means that one will be wrong only half the time in
concluding that the observed bias is not due to chance.
For this reason we will usually report P-values (probability values) in our tables. These values
describe the significance level (100% minus the degree of confidence) associated with the result.
Thus in Table 2 the 5% difference in column (4) for the results excluding holdovers carries a
P-value of .06, indicating that (given the statistical assumptions involved in the calculations)
one can have 94% confidence that the difference is not due to chance and reflects a real difference
between the temporary justices and the supreme court justices. The P-value of .06 also means
that th6 difference is significant at the 6% level.
Of course, this discussion is based on certain assumptions. One assumption that is not valid
for the temporary assignments of Chief Justice Gibson-or for those of the other chief justices-is
that all the assignments are "independent" of each other. Because of the many repeat assignments,
P-values and other significance estimates overstate the significance of the results.
Statistical significance in general, whether measured by t-tests or P-values, should be distinguished
from practical significance. Statistical significance is very sensitive to the quantity of information
available and takes no account of the practical or policy reasons for examining the information.
As a result, practical significance-how substantial are the differences in view of the quantity
of data? do the differences all point in the same direction? what are the benefits and risks of
crediting them for the policy purposes at hand?-often should be given more attention than
statistical tests. See Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUm. L. REv. 1048 (1985).
The statistical tests we report thus provide additional information about our results, but are
not essential to understanding and evaluating them.
c The exclusion of holdovers reduces, of course, not only the sample of temporary-justice
votes but also the samples of supreme court justice votes, since it excludes all votes in cases
where the temporary justice was a holdover appointee.
Table 3 shows the agreement rates in close cases between the tem-
porary justices and Chief Justice Gibson and between all the supreme
court justices and Chief Justice Gibson. The temporary justices,
excluding holdovers, agreed with him 80% of the time, while the
supreme court justices agreed with him only 58% of the time, a 22%
differential.
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TABLE 3
AGREEMENT RATES IN CLOSE CASESa OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES AND SUPREME COURT















CA Total 8276 (14/17)
All 59% (95/ 160)b 85% (23/27) +26%0
(p=.01)
Excluding
Holdovers 58% (69/118) 80% (16/20) +22%
(p =.0 7)
aSee supra notes 80-83, 85-86, and accompanying text.
bThe Stanford comment, counting only the votes of the associate justices, reported an agree-
ment rate of 50% compared with our 590. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text. Stan-
ford accordingly found a percentage difference in the close cases, including holdovers, of 35%
compared with our 26%o. See Comment, supra note 1, at 438.
cSignificant at the 5% level. See supra Table 2, note b.
Table 4 shows the agreement rate in swing cases between the tem-
porary justices and Chief Justice Gibson, compared with the agree-
ment rate between all the supreme court justices and the chief justice.
The temporary justices, excluding holdovers, agreed with Chief Justice
Gibson 73°o of the time, while the supreme court justices agreed with
him only 52% of the time. This 21% differential is essentially the
same as the 22% differential in close cases, but is less significant
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TABLE 4
AGREEMENT RATE IN SWING CASES OF TEMPoRARY JusncEs AND SUtREME COURT















CA Total 78% (7/9)
All 51% (39/76)a  77% (10/13) +26%
(p = .09)
Excluding 52% (33/64) 73% (8/11) +21%
Holdovers (p =.
20 )
aThe agreement rate for the associate justices of the supreme court was 41%
(26/63). See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
There were thirteen swing cases under Chief Justice Gibson, in-
cluding two in which the temporary justices were holdovers. We sum-
marize in the footnote the holdings and votes in each of the Gibson
swing cases.' °9
108. See supra Table 2, note b.
109. Gibson Swing Cases (asterisk indicates presence of holdover appointee):
1) Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 44 Cal. 2d 715, 285 P.2d 636 (1955):
Insurance Commissioner's approval of plan for voluntary mutualization of an in-
surance company upheld; 4-3 decision, with temporary justice Fred Wood, associate
justice of the court of appeal, joining Chief Justice Gibson in majority.
2) People v. County of Tulare, 45 Cal. 2d 317, 289 P.2d 11 (1955): Petition for
writ to direct county to increase assessed valuation of property denied because another
court was already hearing the case; 4-3 decision, with temporary justice Marshall
McComb, associate justice of the court of appeal, writing the majority opinion while
Chief Justice Gibson joined dissent.
3) City of Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 2d 710, 290 P.2d 841 (1955):
City of Vernon denied damages and specific performance in suit on a contract with
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The next table reflects our inquiry into the repeat assignments of
temporary justices by each chief justice. Here we test for selection
of performance; 4-2 decision, with temporary justice A. F. Bray, associate justice
of the court of appeal, joining Chief Justice Gibson in majority.
4) Hopkins v. Hopkins, 46 Cal. 2d 313, 294 P.2d 1 (1956): Plaintiff awarded ac-
crued arrearages under divorce decree from another state; decree's failure to separate
awards for spouse support and child support did not make it so uncertain as to
be incapable of enforcement; 4-3 decision, with temporary justice Maurice T. Dool-
ing, Jr., associate justice of the court of appeal, joining Chief Justice Gibson in
majority.
5) Foust v. Foust, 47 Cal. 2d 121, 302 P.2d 11 (1956): Execution of property settle-
ment agreement ordered upon finding that merger of documents was supported by
physical attachment and written declaration in the document; 4-3 decision, with tem-
porary justice Raymond E. Peters, presiding justice of the court of appeal, joining
Chief Justice Gibson in majority.
6) MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959): Com-
plaint for libel held to state cause of action in alleging that defendant newspaper
falsely charged, on day of election, that candidate for city council had been recom-
mended by newspaper that was mouthpiece of Communist Party; 4-2 decision, with
temporary justice Maurice T. Dooling, Jr., associate justice of the court of appeal,
joining Chief Justice Gibson in majority.
7) Burdette v. Rollefson Construction Co., 52 Cal. 2d 720, 344 P.2d 307 (1959):
Judgment for defendant construction company in slip-and-fall negligence action reversed
on ground that failure to provide guardrail violated city building code; 4-3 decision,
with temporary justice Paul Peek, associate justice of the court of appeal, joining
Chief Justice Gibson in majority.
8) Hagan v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 498, 348 P.2d 896, 2 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1960):
Writ of prohibition issued because court exceeded jurisdiction by requiring shareholders
to post security when they were seeking to vindicate personal, not corporate, rights;
4-3 decision, with temporary justice Paul Peek, associate justice of the court of ap-
peal, joining Chief Justice Gibson in majority.
9) City of Los Angeles v. Offner, 55 Cal. 2d 103, 355 P.2d 926, 10 Cal. Rptr. 470
(1961): Los Angeles ordinance levying special assessment for sewers struck down because
it included "incidental expenses" in assessment; 4-3 decision, with temporary justice
Mildred L. Lillie, associate justice of the court of appeal, joining majority while
Chief Justice Gibson wrote dissent.
*10) People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748, 376 P.2d 449, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1962):
Convictions for unlawful taking of auto and second-degree burglary affirmed, con-
viction for grand theft reversed; 4-3 decision (though dissents address different
holdings), with temporary justice Thomas P. White, retired supreme court justice
(holdover), joining Chief Justice Gibson's majority opinion.
11) In re Patterson, 58 Cal. 2d 848, 377 P.2d 74, 27 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1962): Minor's
commitment to Youth Authority affirmed because minor and mother were advised
of right to counsel and did not request counsel; 4-3 decision, with temporary justice
Thomas P. White, retired supreme court justice, joining Chief Justice Gibson in
majority.
*12) Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284,
27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962): Insurer held liable on an airplane trip policy despite reasonable
substitution of transportation necessitated by emergency; 4-3 decision, with temporary
justice Thomas P. White, retired supreme court justice (holdover), joining Chief Justice
Gibson in majority.
13) Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel, & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963): Tort liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress without
physical impact denied; 4-3 decision, with temporary justice Thomas P. White, retired
supreme court justice, joining majority while Chief Justice Gibson joined dissent.
See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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bias by comparing the agreement rates of temporary justices in the
first case to which they were assigned by the criterion of whether or
not they were assigned to subsequent cases. Specifically, we com-
pare (i) the "first case agreement rate" of temporary justices who
were never assigned by the same chief justice to sit in another case
("nonrepeat" justices); (ii) the first-case agreement rate of justices
who were assigned by the same chief justice to sit in some subse-
quent case ("repeat" or "some case repeat" justices); and (iii) the
first-case agreement rate of justices who were subsequently assigned
by the same chief justice to sit in a swing case ("swing case repeats")."0°
If there is a higher agreement rate with the chief justice in the first-
case votes of the repeat justices than in those of the nonrepeats,
and a higher rate in the first-case votes of the "swing case repeats"
than in those of the "some case" repeats, this may suggest that
selection bias was present. Here we are comparing, not temporary
justices with supreme court justices, but one group of temporary
justices with two other groups. Hence any differences in first-case
agreement rates between the groups are unlikely to be due to the pools
from which the temporary justices are drawn or to the incentives of
temporary justices."' That leaves an outcome-neutral selection
preference by the chief justice '" as the alternative to selection bias
110. We define "repeat" justices as those who sit and vote in more than one case, whether
those sittings result from separate assignments or from a single multi-case assignment. Admittedly
there is some discontinuity between this approach and the hypothesis that the chief justice con-
siders the temporary justice's first vote in deciding whether to appoint that justice for another
case. But we think successive cases in which a temporary justice sits are a legitimate gauge,
and probably the most reliable gauge, of the repeat-justice preferences of a chief justice.
Assignments often are made on a single-case basis, so that successive cases do represent suc-
cessive assignments. Even when this is not true, the chief justice in making an assignment knows
how many cases it will cover. When the chief justice assigns Judge A to sit in one case and
Judge B to sit in two cases (or in 10 cases), it is fair to assume that the choice between a
one-case and a multi-case assignment was not made randomly but was based on some appraisal
of Judges A and B. The respective votes of the two judges in their first cases seem legitimately
correlated with that appraisal. If temporary justices assigned for two or more cases have a
higher first-case agreement rate with the chief justice than temporary justices assigned for only
one case, it seems reasonable to infer that a higher likelihood of agreement was one of the
reasons for the multi-case assignment. (While we therefore think the first-case agreement rates
provide the best gauge of repeat preferences, as a check we have done the comparison for
Chief Justice Bird on the basis also of first-assignment agreement rates, and the results are
parallel. See infra Table 27A.).
I11. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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in explaining such differences. While selection preference cannot be
ruled out, it seems less likely when the chief justice thought well enough
of the judges in each group to appoint them at least once, and
especially if the chief justice knew the vote in the first case when
the second assignment was made." 3 At the least, appreciably higher
first-case agreement rates for repeat justices may create an appearance
of selection bias, and thus threaten the court's reputation for neutral
and fair adjudication.
Accordingly, Table 5 compares the first-case agreement rates with
Chief Justice Gibson of temporary justices who were not assigned
to sit in a subsequent case, who were assigned to sit in some subse-
quent case, and who were assigned to sit subsequently in a swing
case. The rates are 83%, 92%, and 100%, respectively. The samples
are small, however, and even the differential between the "nonrepeats"
and the "swing case repeats" involves only a single dissenting vote.
These results therefore have no statistical significance and, it would
seem, no practical significance either.
TABLE 5
FIRST-CASE AGREEMENT RATES oF NONREPEAT, REPEAT, AND SWING-CAsE-REPEAT






















First-Case Agreement 83% (5/6) 92% (11/12) 100% (3/3)
Rate With Chief
Justice Gibson
Difference From - 9% 17%




113. But cf. supra note 110.
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Another way to test for selection bias in repeat appointments is
to compare the agreement rate of repeat appointees in all their votes
with the agreement rate of one-time appointees. If repeat appointees
agree with the chief justice to a greater extent than one-time appointees,
this again may suggest selection bias. Here again selection preference
is also possible, but since the one-time appointees have themselves
been selected by the chief justice once, a link between the repeat selec-
tion of particular judges and a greater tendency on the part of those
judges to agree with the chief justice may be difficult to dismiss. The
suspicion may increase if the differences between repeat justices' agree-
ment rates and one-time justices' agreement rates are greater in close
cases and swing cases.
In this test we have compared the agreement rates of temporary
justices appointed to sit in five or more cases, in three or more cases,
and in only one case. Table 6 shows the results for Chief Justice
Gibson, with the supreme court agreement rates in the Gibson samples
shown as well for comparison. The table shows higher agreement rates
for the five-time appointees than for the one-time appointees in all cases
and close cases, by margins of 15°%o and 20%, respectively, but a lower
agreement rate by 25% in swing cases. The margin for all cases is
statistically significant and provides some indication of selection bias,
but the small numbers of one-time appointees and the negative margin
in the swing cases leave the indication weak.
TABLE 6
AoREEMENT RATES WrrH CHIEF JUSTICE GIBSON OF ONE-TIME, THREE-OR-MORE-
TIME, AND FIVE-OR-MoRE-TIME TEMPORARY JUSTICES APPOINTED BY HIM
(1954-1964)
a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Supreme One-Time Three-or- Five-or- Difference
Court Justices' More-Time More-Time (4) - (2)
Agreement Agreement Justices' Justices'
Rateb Rate Agreement Agreement
Rate Rate
All 92% 83% 98% 98% + 15%c
Cases (5/6) (104/106) (101/103) (p = .03)
Close 58% 67% 87% 87% +20%
Cases (2/3) (13/15) (13/15) (p = .40)
Swing 52% 100% 75% 75% -25%
Cases (2/2) (6/8) (6/8) (p = .43)
aHoldovers excluded.
bThe figures in this column are drawn from Tables 2, 3, and 4 supra.
cSignificant at the 5% level.
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2. The Political-Derivation Tests
In addition to tests based on votes cast by temporary justices in
the supreme court, we have sought to test for bias in the selection
of temporary justices by comparing the temporary appointees with the
statewide pools of judges-court of appeal presiding justices, court
of appeal associate justices, and superior court judges-from which
they were drawn. We compared the selected judges with the statewide
pools in terms of the percentages of each group appointed to the
bench by Democratic or Republican governors. Admittedly, a gover-
nor's political party bears no certain or complete relationship to the
judicial votes cast by judges appointed by that governor. But it does
bear some relationship; that is why the judicial appointment power
is given to the highest elected official in a democracy. And it pro-
vides an accessible, objective, comprehensive guide, albeit a rough
one, to the ideological inclinations of the state's judges. Moreover,
we can compare in this manner not only the selected temporary justices
with the statewide pools, but also each of these groups with the con-
temporaneous chief justice and all the justices of the supreme court.
These "political derivation" tests may be useful in two ways. First,
where vote bias was present, these tests may tend to support or rule
out the possibility that the temporary justices in favoring the chief
justice's position were reflecting the ideological make-up of the pools
from which they came."' Second, these tests may independently show
a form of selection bias by a chief justice. A chief justice who favors
judges appointed by governors of the chief justice's "own" political
party-that is, the party of the governor who appointed the chief
justice-is favoring an ideological bent that presumably accords with
the chief justice's own ideology and that may well affect the outcome
of cases. IS True, such favoritism may reflect selection preferences;
judges a chief justice knows best or respects most are likely to be
disproportionately derived from the chief justice's own party. But such
favoritism may well create the appearance that the chief justice gave
114. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. If during a given period a statewide pool
was not closer in political derivation to the chief justice than were the justices of the supreme
court, then pro-chief-justice bias by the temporary justices cannot be ascribed to the political
make-up of that pool. In addition, even if the pool was closer to the chief justice, the tests
may show that a chief justice appointed by a Republican governor, for example, was selecting
as temporary justices an appreciably higher percentage of judges appointed by Republican gover-
nors than the percentage in the pool. If so, these assignees would not reflect the ideological
make-up of the pool, and the "pools" explanation for their vote bias could still be discounted.
115. Unlike bias in the votes cast by the temporary justices, favoritism in selection by the
chief justice cannot reflect the incentives of the temporary justices. See supra notes 48-61 and
accompanying text. This test looks directly at selection by the chief justice, instead of drawing
inferences about selection criteria from the votes of the temporary justices.
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some consideration either to the political orientation of the selected
judges or to how they might vote.
At least this may be true if the results of this test reinforce the
results of the vote-bias tests. If there is bias favoring the chief justice
in the votes of the temporary justices and favoritism by the chief
justice for judges appointed by governors of the chief justice's own
party, the inference is strengthened that the temporary appointment
power is being used with case outcomes in mind. On the other hand,
if the selections by a chief justice show bias against appointees of
governors belonging to the chief justice's own party, this is evidence
tending to refute an inference of selection bias that otherwise might
be drawn from the presence of vote bias.
We have conducted these political-derivation tests for the temporary
appointees of each chief justice, in each case comparing the appointees
with their statewide pools"' , in terms of the percentages appointed
to the bench by governors of each party." 7 We also have compared
both the selected judges and the statewide pools with the supreme
court justices during each period." 8
As was seen in Table 1,1" Chief Justice Gibson appointed as tem-
116. We did this for court of appeal presiding justices, court of appeal associate justices,
and superior court Judges, bdt did not attempt to do it for retired supreme court justices.
Since they are retired justices, the membership of the statewide pool at any given time-the
number and identity of those who are able and willing to return temporarily to the supreme
court-is too uncertain.
117. For uniformity and simplicity we used the governor by whom the judge was first
appointed to the bench, ignoring subsequent gubernatorial promotions to higher courts or
presiding justiceships. (Where a judge was first elected to the bench, we used the governor
who first appointed the judge to a higher court. In the case of elected superior court judges,
we excluded them from both the temporary appointees and the statewide pools.) We ascertained
the appointing governors from the judges' biographical entries in the CALIFORNIA COURTS AND
JUDGES HANDBOOK (K. Arnold ed., successive editions). Compiling the statewide pools posed
a problem, since retirements, resignations, deaths, and new appointments mean that the member-
ship of the pool changes continually. Our solution was to include, as a first step, all the judges
listed in the rosters of sitting judges in any of these volumes of the California Official Reports
or California Appellate Reports: the volume dated closest to the start of the chief justice's
period, the volume in each year dated closest to the anniversary of the period's start, and
the volume dated closest to the end of the period. We then sought to weight the listed judges
by the time for which they sat. We accorded a judge one year's credit for each anniversary
volume in which he or she was listed. Judges who appeared in the opening volume but not
thereafter were given one-half year's credit. With respect to the end of the period, we measured
the interval between the last anniversary volume and the closing volume and applied a standard
of the nearest half-year. If the interval was less than three months, judges got no additional
credit for being listed in the closing volume (and newly-appointed judges listed only in the
closing volume were eliminated). If the interval was at least three months but less than nine
months, judges got a half-year's credit for appearing in the closing volume; and if it was nine
months or more, they got a full year's credit. Our tables thus report the statewide pools in
terms of "judge-years" attributable to appointing governors of each political party.
118. We used the method described supra in note 117, except that the appointing governor
of a supreme court justice was the governor who appointed the justice to the supreme court.
119. See supra Table 1 and accompanying text.
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porary justices appreciable numbers of both presiding justices and
associate justices from the court of appeal. Chief Justice Gibson
himself had been appointed to both the supreme court and the chief
justiceship by Governor Culbert Olson, a Democrat.2 0 Table 7 shows
the political derivation of the court of appeal presiding justices and
associate justices who were appointed as temporary justices by Chief
Justice Gibson from 1954 to 1964,' compared with the political deriva-
tion of the presiding justices and associate justices in the state during
that period.
TABLE 7
POLITICAL DERIVATION OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES APPOINTED BY CHIEF JUSTICE
GIBSON, 1954-1964, COMPARED WITH POLITICAL DERIVATION OF STATEWIDE POOLS







First First First First Democratic Republican
Appointed Appointed Appointed Appointed Governor Governor
To Bench To Bench To Bench To Bench Appointees Appointees
By By By By
Democratic Republican Democratic Republican
Governor Governor Governor Governor
Court of 29% 71% 15% 85% -14% + 14%
Appeal (23) (56) (2) (11) (p =.30)
Presiding
Justices
Court of 35% 65% 27% 73% -8% + 80
Appeal (55) (103) (23) (61) (p =.24)
Associate
Justicesb
aSee supra note 117 and accompanying text.
bIn the case of two associate justices, the governors who first appointed them
to the superior court could not be ascertained. These judges have been allocated
to the governors who appointed them to the court of appeal.
The table shows that in both pools Chief Justice Gibson favored
appointees of Republican governors, by margins of 14% among the
presiding justices and 8% among the associate justices. Meanwhile
120. See P. SToi.z, supra note 14, at 96.
121. As usual, the sample is limited to decided cases in which Chief Justice Gibson himself
sat. See supra notes 2, 100, and accompanying text.
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the supreme court was much more Democratic in political derivation
than were the appellate pools.' 22 Thus the pro-chief-justice vote bias
shown by the Gibson temporary justices' 23 cannot be explained as
reflecting statewide pools that were closer to the political orientation
of the chief justice than the supreme court justices were. At the same
time, however, Chief Justice Gibson's preference for Republican ap-
pointees, when he himself was a Democratic appointee, tends to under-
mine the inference of selection bias that otherwise might be drawn
from the vote bias shown by his appointees.
3. Observations on Chief Justice Gibson
Chief Justice Gibson in selecting his temporary justices made notably
greater use of court of appeal associate justices than of court of appeal
presiding justices.' 2 Among the associate justices he relied heavily
on certain repeat appointees, with .almost 80% of the assignments
going to Justices Dooling, Peek, McComb, and Tobriner.'25 Although
these preferences for a wide pool and for particular judges in that
pool might imply selection bias, Chief Justice Gibson's associate-justice
assignees agreed with him less often than his presiding-justice
assignees.' 26 A better explanation may lie in a form of selection
preference: Chief Justice Gibson apparently used temporary
assignments as a means of grooming judges for promotion. Justices
Dooling, Peek, McComb, and Tobriner all were promoted to the
supreme court during Chief Justice Gibson's tenure as chief justice. 2
122. While the presiding-justice and associate-justice pools had 29% and 35% Democratic
appointees, respectively (see Table 7), the supreme court had 70% Democratic appointees. In-
cluding Chief Justice Gibson himself, 12 justices served during the 1954-1964 period, nine
appointed by Democratic governors and three by Republican governors. By our weighting method
there were 49 judge-years of Democratic derivation (70%) and 21 of Republican derivation
(30%). See supra note 118.
123. See supra Tables 2, 3, 4.
124. The ratio among the Gibson appointees was four to one, see Table 1, while the ratio
between the associate justices and presiding justices in the state, at both the start and the end
of the period covered, was only two to one. In 1954 there were 14 associate justices and seven
presiding justices; in 1964 there were 20 and 10. See 125 Cal. App. 2d iii-iv (1954); 229 Cal.
App. 2d iv-vii (1964).
125. See supra Table I.
126. See supra Tables 2, 3, 4.
127. See supra Table 1, notes b and c. Justice McComb was appointed to the supreme
court in 1956 by Governor Goodwin Knight; Justices Dooling, Peek, and Tobriner were appointed
in 1960, 1962, and 1962, respectively, by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr. See id. Also promoted
to the supreme court by Governor Brown, Sr., during the Gibson tenure (in 1959) were Presiding
Justice Thomas White, whom Chief Justice Gibson assigned seven times while he (White) was
a presiding justice, and Presiding Justice Raymond E. Peters, whom Chief Justice Gibson assigned
once. See 52 Cal. 2d iii (1959); 51 Cal. 2d iii (1959). Two other court of appeal associate
justices who were Gibson repeat appointees, Justices Murray Draper and A.F. Bray, were pro-
1085
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
The agreement-rate results show substantial vote bias favoring Chief
Justice Gibson. While he obtained in all cases a very high supreme
court agreement rate of 92%, the agreement rate he obtained from
his temporary justices was higher still-a remarkable 97%, representing
116 agreements out of 120 votes.' 28 In the close cases and swing cases,
where the supreme court agreement rate naturally fell steeply (to 58%
and 52%, respectively), the agreement rates of the Gibson temporary
justices stayed 22% and 21% higher.'
29
The question remains whether the vote bias was due to selection
bias. The comparison of first-case agreement rates between repeat and
nonrepeat appointees shows differentials that are positive but so small,
given the numbers involved, as to lack any import.'30 The comparison
of agreement rates between five-or-more-time repeat appointees and
one-time appointees does support an inference of selection bias in
its all-case and close-case differentials, but in view of the small numbers
and the negative differential in the swing cases, the inference is not
a strong one.'
3'
The political-derivation test suggests that Chief Justice Gibson was
not choosing judges because they were likely to agree with him. If
that were his purpose it seems unlikely that Chief Justice Gibson,
a Democrat appointed by a Democratic governor, would have chosen
court of appeal justices appointed by Republican governors to a greater
extent than their representation in either of the pools from which they
came.'
32
Since an overwhelming majority of Chief Justice Gibson's appointees
received judicial promotions during his tenure, 3 3 one purpose of his
appointments apparently was to screen or groom judges for promo-
tion. Of course, the qualities that Chief Justice Gibson thought made
a judge deserving of promotion may have included a tendency to agree
moted to presiding justice by Gov. Brown during the Gibson tenure. See 56 Cal. 2d iv (1961);
51 Cal. 2d iv (1959). Professor Stolz has written that Chief Justice Gibson, though appointed
by Governor Olson, "enjoyed good relations" with Governors Earl Warren, Knight, and Brown,
Sr. P. STotz, supra note 14, at 98.
128. See supra Table 2. The comparable agreement rates for temporary justices in all cases
were 77% for Chief Justice Traynor, 91% for Chief Justice Wright, and 78% for Chief Justice
Bird. See infra Tables 9, 16, 23. All the figures in this discussion exclude holdovers and holdover
cases. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
129. See supra Tables 3, 4. All the differentials carry relatively low P-values (indicating
high levels of confidence): .06 for the 5% differential in all cases, .07 for the 22% differential
in close cases, and .20 for the 21% differential in swing cases. See supra Table 2, note b.
130. See supra Table 5 and accompanying text.
131. See supra Table 6 and accompanying text.
132. See supra Table 7.
133. See supra Table I, notes a, b, c; supra note 127.
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with Chief Justice Gibson, as the Gibson appointees in fact tended
to do. But if Chief Justice Gibson had bigger things in mind for his
temporary appointees than the temporary appointments themselves,
things that would require a recommendation by the chief justice to
the governor, this consideration may well have strengthened the role
played in his appointment policy by criteria other than how the
appointees would vote."'
Whatever Chief Justice Gibson had in mind, his temporary justices
had powerful incentives to vote his way. His evident involvement in
judicial promotion, together with his awesome command of the state's
judiciary,'" suggested major advantages to be gained from winning
his favor. Also probably affecting the Gibson appointees, in view of
Chief Justice Gibson's towering stature among California's judges, 
3 6
was an unusually strong deference to the chief justice and hence
readiness to take his guidance in casting votes.
The incentive to defer to the supreme court's majority also must
have been unusually strong under Chief Justice Gibson, and deference
to the majority almost totally coincided with deference to Chief Justice
Gibson. The Gibson temporary justices had a very low dissent rate-
less than 1 % in all cases, far below the rates for the other chief
justices."' And Chief Justice Gibson himself dissented rarely, less
than 3%'0 of the time.1 38 So in deferring to the supreme court's ma-
jority the temporary justices either were deferring as well to Chief
Justice Gibson, or they were both deferring to the court's majority.
In either case the deference to the majority by the temporary justices
appears to have contributed to their vote bias in favor of the chief
justice.
Finally, if a chief justice is indulging selection bias one would expect
to see the effect in swing cases, where the votes of temporary justices
determine the outcome. The Gibson appointees did show a substan-
tial margin of vote bias in swing cases.1 39 Further, the Gibson swing
cases included two decisions which, while not major, had some im-
134. So far as the contemporary perception is concerned, Professor Stolz has written: "No
one ever questioned Gibson's involvement in judicial selection because they knew that he would
not abuse his influence for partisan or other improper purposes." P. STotz, supra note 14, at 99.
135. See id. at 98-99: "By the time he retired his reputation was, at least in California,
colossal. . . . Gibson was a commanding man held in awe if not fear by nearly everyone. He
led the Judicial Council not by appointing its members but by the force of his personality ..
136. See id.
137. See infra Table 32. The comparable rates (excluding holdovers) were 210% under Chief
Justice Traynor, 7% under Chief Justice Wright, and 11% under Chief Justice Bird. Id.
138. Id. This was close to the rates for Chief Justice Traynor (2%) and Chief Justice Wright
(5%), but far below that for Chief Justice Bird (20%). Id.
139. See supra Table 4.
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portance at the time, and in both of them the temporary appointees
swung the results the chief justice's way.1
4 0
Yet the only Gibson swing case that was a major decision tells a
different story. This was Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.,' 4' a
crossroads decision for California law on the ubiquitous issue of
negligent infliction of mental distress. Not only was Amaya impor-
tant, but the view of the case taken by the court's disqualified member,
Justice Tobriner, was known, since he had decided the case in the
court of appeal.' 42 Amaya thus presented a tempting opportunity for
Chief Justice Gibson-who agreed with Justice Tobriner's view-to
appoint a temporary justice who would vote the way Justice Tobriner
would have voted, and the way Justice Tobriner did vote when the
issue came up again. But Chief Justice Gibson did not do that. He
appointed retired supreme court justice Thomas White, who cast the
deciding vote in Amaya in disagreement with Chief Justice Gibson,
thus making law that the court predictably had to overrule as soon
as Justice Tobriner was able to vote on the issue.'" Amaya suggests
that Chief Justice Gibson was not choosing temporary justices on the
basis of how they would vote. " '
But if he was, the impact on California's law was not substantial.
The Gibson swing cases were limited in number-only eleven cases
decided by nonholdover justices, an average of one per year. 4 And the
only major decision among them was Amaya.
140. The 4 to 3 decision in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 44 Cal. 2d 715,
285 P.2d 636 (1955), see supra note 109, drew long and heated dissents and an extensive report
in the Los Angeles Times, which described the case as involving "the hotly contested mutualization
plan of the huge Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. of California." L.A. Times, June 28,
1955, at I, 25, col. 1. The 4 to 2 decision in MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal.
2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959), see supra note 109, had some political importance because the
alleged libel involved a charge of Communist connections, and some legal importance because
the court's opinion was a comprehensive attempt to modernize the state's libel law. The deci-
sion apparently was not reported, however, in the Los Angeles Times. A third case, Hagan
v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 498, 348 P.2d 896, 2 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1960), see supra note
109, had some significance in expanding shareholders' rights.
141. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). See supra notes 17-21 and
accompanying text.
142. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
143. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
144. It is possible that Chief Justice Gibson thought Justice White would vote the other
way in Amaya. But Justice White was a former colleague and frequent appointee of Chief
Justice Gibson, whose legal views presumably were well known to the chief justice, and he
had voted to grant the hearing in Amaya before retiring from the court. Minutes, Aug. 29,
1962. On the other hand, all six justices (including Chief Justice Gibson) had voted to grant
the hearing (id.), so the possibility that Justice White's vote in Amaya surprised the chief justice
cannot be excluded.
145. Compare supra Table 2 with Table 4. See supra note 109.
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In sum, the results on Chief Justice Gibson are equivocal. The
agreement-rate results show substantial vote bias, but the case for
selection bias is rebutted by the evidence of other possible causes for
the vote bias, by the political-derivation results, and by Amaya. The
evidence on Chief Justice Gibson, considered alone, in our view does
not make a case for changing the discretionary-assignment system,
but together with evidence on other chief justices it may do so.
B. Chief Justice Traynor (1964-1970)
1. Assignment Patterns and Voting Analysis
Roger J. Traynor, who served as chief justice from September
1, 1964, to February 1, 1970,46 appointed temporary justices who
cast 247 votes in cases in which he participated. This was an average
of forty-six votes per year, more than three times the Gibson average.' 47
As shown in Table 8, Chief Justice Traynor relied overwhelmingly
on retired supreme court justices, who received 86% of his temporary
assignments. For the remainder he favored presiding justices of the
court of appeal, who received 11% of the assignments. He made
very little use of court of appeal associate justices, appointing them
only 3% of the time.
146. See 61 Cal. 2d iii (1964); 1 Cal. 3d iii (1970).
147. The increase was due mainly to a sharp rise in disqualifications. See infra Table 34
and note 395. This in turn was due mainly to the fact that Justice Stanley Mosk,
who joined the court in September 1964 after serving as Attorney General of California, dis-
qualified himself in criminal (and other) cases that had been under his aegis as Attorney General.
E.g., People v. Roberts, 65 Cal. 2d 514, 421 P.2d 420, 55 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1966). See infra
Table 34 & note b.
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TABLE 8
DIsTRIBUTION OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES APPOINTED BY CHIEF JUSTICE TRAYNOR,

























Roth 11 Devine 1
Draper 5 Pierce 1
Molinari 4 Kaus 1
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Table 9 shows the all-case agreement rate of the Traynor temporary
justices, compared with the agreement rates of the supreme court
associate justices and of all the supreme court justices. The table shows
that the temporary justices (excluding holdovers) agreed with Chief
Justice Traynor 9%'o less often than all the supreme court justices (and
6% less often than the associate justices). The cause of this negative
differential was the relatively low agreement rate Chief Justice Traynor
obtained from his appointments of retired supreme court justices, par-
ticularly Justice B. Rey Schauer. Justice Schauer was appointed as
a nonholdover assignee in ninety-seven cases-almost half of all the
TABLE 9
AGREEMENT RATES IN ALL CASES o TEMPORARY JUSTICES, ASsocIATE SUPREME




















CA Total 91% (32/35)
All




83% (708/853) 86% (886/1031) 77% (158/204) -9%
a
(p = .003)
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assignments, excluding holdovers' 4 -and he agreed with Chief Justice
Traynor in only sixty-three of those cases, or 65%. On the other
hand, Chief Justice Traynor obtained a striking 100% agreement rate
from the court of appeal presiding justices he appointed; but these
twenty-eight appointments represented only 14% of the total, excluding
holdovers, and 11 % of the complete total.
Table 10 shows the close-case agreement rates with Chief Justice
Traynor. While the supreme court agreement rate, excluding holdovers,
has declined from 86% in the all-case sample to 62% here, the agree-
ment rate of the temporary justices has declined even more, from
77% to 4600. The negative differential thus has increased from -9%
to -1606. Again the primary cause was Justice Schauer. He was
assigned as a nonholdover appointee in twenty-four close cases, and
agreed with Chief Justice Traynor in only four (or 170o) of them.
TABLE 10
AGREEMENT RATES IN CLOSE CASES OF TEMPORARY JUSnCES AND SUPREME COURT















CA Total 75% (9/12)
All 62% (176/283)- 49% (26/53) -13%
(p =.07)
Excluding 62% (149/241) 46% (21/46) -16% b
Holdovers (p =.04)
aThe Stanford comment, counting only the votes of the associate justices, reported
an agreement rate of 54%. See Comment, supra note 1, at 438; supra notes 87-
93 and accompanying text.
'Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 11 shows the agreement rate in swing cases between the tem-
porary justices and Chief Justice Traynor, compared with the agree-
ment rate between the supreme court justices and the chief justice.
The positive differential of 21% (excluding holdovers) is surprising
after the negative differentials in the close-case and all-case samples,'
4 9
and we discuss it presently.
TABLE 11
AGREEMENT RATES IN SWING CASES OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES AND SUPREME COURT















CA Total 71% (5/7)
All 54% (36/67) 76% (13/17) +22%
(p = .09)
Excluding
Holdovers 54% (33/61) 7506 (12/16) +21%7
(p =.13)
There were twelve swing cases under Chief Justice Traynor, including
one in which the temporary justice was a holdover. The cases are
summarized in the footnote.' 50
149. See infra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
150. Traynor Swing Cases (asterisk indicates at least one holdover):
1) In re Norwalk Call, 62 Cal. 2d 185, 397 P.2d 426, 41 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1964):
Petitioner held a newspaper of general circulation for the purpose of carrying official
advertising; 4-3 decision, with retired supreme court Justice B. Rey Schauer joining
majority while Chief Justice Traynor wrote dissent.
2) People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 P.2d. 753, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965):
Death sentence reversed for inadmissible confession (following Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964)); 4-3 decision, with retired supreme court Justice Maurice T.
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Table 12 compares the first-case agreement rates of the Traynor
temporary justices who did not repeat in another case, who repeated
in some case, and who repeated in a swing case. The table shows
ascending agreement rates of 83%, 91%, and 100%, respectively. The
use of percentages is misleading here, since the differences involve
retired supreme court Justice B. Rey Schauer dissented.
3) Greve v. Leger Ltd., 64 Cal. 2d 853, 415 P.2d 824, 52 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1966): Holder
of a liquor license held able to transfer it; 4-3 decision, with court of appeal associate
justice Edwin J. Regan joining majority while Chief Justice Traynor joined dissenters.
*4) People v. Garavito, 65 Cal. 2d 761, 423 P.2d 217, 56 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1967): Con-
viction for possession of drugs reversed for inadmissible confession (following
Escobedo); 4-3 decision, with retired supreme court justice Paul Peek (holdover) joining
Chief Justice Traynor in majority.
5) People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 427 P.2d 772, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1967): Murder
conviction affirmed despite failure to meet Escobedo and Miranda requirements when
interrogating another defendant; death penalty reversed for admission in penalty stage
of uncorroborated testimony of accomplice concerning previous crimes; 4-3 decision
on latter point, with retired supreme court justice Thomas P. White joining majority
opinion written by Chief Justice Traynor.
6) Akins v. County of Sonoma, 67 Cal. 2d 185, 430 P.2d 57, 60 Cal. Rptr.
499 (1967): County and fairgrounds lessee held not liable for injury to child who
fell from bleacher seat since trial court properly instructed jury to determine whether
property was in "dangerous condition" under 1963 Tort Claims Act (CAL. Gov.
CODE §830(a)); 5-2 decision, with retired supreme court justice B. Rey Schauer
and court of appeal presiding justice Murray Draper joining Chief Justice Traynor
in majority.
7) Becker v. Johnston, 67 Cal. 2d 163, 430 P.2d 43, 60 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1967): County
held not liable for auto accident because of "plan or design immunity" in 1963 Tort
Claims Act (CAL. Gov. CODE §830.6), despite finding that the road design now created
"dangerous condition" under CAL. Gov. CODE Section 835; 5-2 decision, with retired
supreme court justice B. Rey Schaner and court of appeal presiding justice Murray
Draper joining Chief Justice Traynor in majority.
8) Cabell v. California, 67 Cal. 2d 150, 430 P.2d 34, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1967): State
held not liable for injury to a student at state university on ground that "plan or
design immunity" in 1963 Tort Claims Act (CAL. GOV. CODE §830.6) covered type
of glass used in door; 5-2 decision, with retired supreme court justice B. Rey Schauer
and court of appeal presiding justice Murray Draper joining Chief Justice Traynor
in majority.
9) People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968): Death
sentence reversed and first-degree murder conviction reduced to second-degree, on
grounds of failure to prove either premeditation and deliberation or intent to commit
felony; 4-3 decision, with retired supreme court justice Paul Peek joining Chief Justice
Traynor in majority.
10) People v. Williams, 71 Cal. 2d 614, 456 P.2d 633, 79 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1969): Death
sentence reversed on ground of improper exclusion of jurors for scruples against capital
punishment (following Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)); 4-3 decision,
with retired supreme court justice Paul Peek joining Chief Justice Traynor in majority.
11) People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969): Penal
Code provision in effect when case arose, making it felony to perform abortion unless
"necessary to preserve" life of mother, held unconstitutional; 4-3 decision, with court
of appeal presiding justice Fred R. Pierce joining Chief Justice Traynor in majority.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
12) Bishop v. San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969): City's
home rule powers held to make prevailing-wage law inapplicable; 4-3 decision, with
court of appeal presiding justice Murray Draper joining Chief Justice Traynor in
majority, and court of appeal associate justice Richard M. Sims, Jr., joining dissenters.
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only one disagreeing vote in each of the first two columns and
unanimity in column (3). For Chief Justice Traynor as for Chief Justice
Gibson, this test reports nothing of statistical or practical significance.
TABLE 12
FIRST-CASE AGREEMENT RATES OF NONREPEAT, REPEAT, AND SWING-CAsE-REPEAT

























Justice Traynor 83% (5/6) 91% (10/11) 100% (5/5)
Difference from
Column (1) - 8% (p = .65) 17% (p=.34)
Difference from
Column (2) 9% (=.49)
aHoldovers excluded.
Table 13 compares the agreement rates of temporary justices
appointed by Chief Justice Traynor in five or more cases, in three
or more cases, and in only one case. The table shows negative dif-
ferentials in all cases and close cases (the one-time appointees agree-
ing with the chief justice more often than the five-time appointees),
and a positive differential of 3507o in the swing cases. But the numbers
of one-time appointees are too small, especially in the close cases and
swing cases, to give the results any significance.
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TABLE 13
AGREEMENT RATEs WITH CHIEF JusTIcE TRAYNOR OF ONE-TIM, TMEE-OR-MORB-



























All 86% 83% 78% 77% -6%
Cases (5/6) (149/192) (142/185) (p =. 70)
Close 62% 50% 48% 45% -5%
Cases (1/2) (20/42) (18/40) (p = .89)
Swing 54% 50% 85% 85% + 35%
Cases (1/2) (11/13) (11/13) (p =.26)
2Holdovers excluded.
bThe figures in this column are drawn from Tables 9, 10, and 11, supra.
Table 14 shows the political-derivation test for the temporary justices
appointed by Chief Justice Traynor. Since he appointed so few
associate justices from the court of appeal,"' we have made the com-
parison for presiding justices only. Chief Justice Traynor himself was
appointed to the supreme court in 1940 by Democratic Governor
Culbert Olson, and was appointed chief justice in 1964 by another
Democratic governor, Edmund G. Brown, Sr.' 52 Table 14 shows that
65% of the presiding justices in the state during the Traynor chief
justiceship had been appointed to the bench by Democratic gover-
nors.' The table also shows that 64% of the assignments of presiding
justices by Chief Justice Traynor went to Democratic appointees.
Meanwhile the supreme court was even more heavily of Democratic
derivation, with 85% Democratic appointees. 54
151. See supra Table 8.
152. See P. SToLz, supra note 14, at 76.
153. The figure is weighted by judge-years. See supra note 117.
154. Eight justices, including Chief Justice Traynor, served on the court during these years;
seven were appointed by Democratic governors and one by a Republican. Weighted by
years served, there were 32 "Democratic" years (85%) and 5.5 "Republican" ones (15%0).
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 14
POLITICAL DERIVATION OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES APPOINTED BY CHIEF JUSTICE
TRAYNOR COMPARED WITH POLITICAL DERIVATION OF STATEWIDE POOL FROM
WHICH THEY CAME
Percentage in Percentage of Difference
Statewide Pool Temporary Justices
(Judge-Years) (Votes Cast)
First First First First Democratic Republican
Appointed Appointed Appointed Appointed Governor Governor
To Bench To Bench To Bench To Bench Appointees Appointees
By By By By
Democratic Republican Democratic Republican
Governor Governor Governor Governor
Court of 65% 35% 64% 36% -1% + 1%
Appeal (44) (23.5) (18) (10) (p = .93)
Presiding
Justices
2. Observations on Chief Justice Traynor
Chief Justice Traynor's temporary-assignment policy was notable
for its heavy reliance on retired supreme court justices, who received
83%/0 of his assignments, excluding holdovers.'55 An even more notable
consequence was the negative agreement-rate differentials in the all-case
and close-case samples.' 56 These were due primarily to the frequent
appointment of retired Justice Schauer, who agreed with Chief Justice
Traynor in only 65% of his (nonholdover) assignments and in an
amazingly low 16% of his close-case assignments.'1
7
In calling so often on retired supreme court justices, Chief Justice
Traynor presumably was attracted by their special advantages as tem-
porary assignees.'5" Retired supreme court justices have experience and
competence in the work of the supreme court, as well as the cachet
and credibility of having been members of the court themselves. The
regular supreme court justices know them personally and are
accustomed to working with them. The use of retired justices does
not draw sitting judges away from other courts, and retired justices
155. See supra Table 8 (169 of 204 assignments).
156. See supra Tables 9, 10.
157. The figures on Justice Schauer come directly from our data. See also supra Tables 9, 10.
158. Justice Stevens of the United States Supreme Court suggested in a 1985 speech that
a law be passed allowing retired justice$ of that Court to be called on for temporary assign-
ment when needed to break ties. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1985, at 4, cols. 5-6 (national ed.). Justice
Stevens apparently did not suggest using lower-court judges. See id.
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may be available to sit repeatedly, as Justice Schauer and the other
retired supreme court justices appointed by Chief Justice Traynor
did.15
9
Further, retired supreme court justices are likely to be free of the
careerist incentives that may lead lower-court judges to vote with the
chief justice. The assignment of retired supreme court justices tends,
moreover, to defuse both the possibility and the perception of selec-
tion bias by the chief justice. It entails no discretionary "elevation"
of a lower-court judge, and the very small size of the eligible pool
reduces-though it does not eliminate' 6°-the potential for bias in
selection. Given this array of benefits for the judicial system, Chief
Justice Traynor appears to have accorded little or no weight to the
consideration that the retired justices he assigned were likely to vote-
indeed, regularly were voting-against him.' 61
What is one to make, then, of the very different result in the
Traynor swing cases, where the negative differentials are replaced by
a positive differential of 21 %?162 Was Chief Justice Traynor cannily
saving his selection bias for the cases where it mattered? After a close
look at the Traynor swing cases, we think not. The positive differen-
tial appears to be mostly an aberration, arising from a concatenation
of unusual features of those cases.
If Chief Justice Traynor was attempting to influence the swing cases
toward results he desired, an obvious and necessary step would have
been to assign Justice Schauer much less frequently in those cases.
At first blush it appears that Chief Justice Traynor did that. While
Justice Schauer received 48°7 of the Traynor all-case assignments and
52% of the close-case assignments, he received only 310%0 of the swing-
case assignments.' 63 But, in one unusual feature of the swing-case sam-
ple, there were sixteen votes cast by temporary appointees (excluding
holdovers) in those cases but only eleven cases, since five cases had
two appointees each. 164 Justice Schauer was assigned in four of those
five cases (plus one other swing case); but obviously he could only
159. See supra Table 8.
160. While the pool of retired justices is small, the chief justice can still exercise discretion
in choosing from it, and especially in choosing particular justices to sit repeatedly or in close cases.
161. Not only did Justice Schauer agree with Chief Justice Traynor in close cases only 17qo
of the time, but all the retired supreme court appointees (excluding holdovers) agreed with
Chief Justice Traynor in those cases only 35% of the time. See supra Table 10.
162. See supra Table 11. Chief Justice Gibson's swing-case differential was also 21 qo. See
supra Table 4.
163. These and all other figures used in this discussion exclude holdover appointees and
holdover cases. See supra notes 94-93 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 150.
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be assigned once in each case, so four of the sixteen swing-case
assignments were not available to him. If one compares the percen-
tages of the cases in which Justice Schauer was assigned in the all-
case, close-case, and swing-case samples, the diminution of his assign-
ment rate in the swing cases is much reduced. He was assigned in
55% of all cases, in 57% of the close cases, and in 4500 of the swing
cases.
Then, when Justice Schauer was assigned in the swing cases, he
agreed with Chief Justice Traynor much more often than usual-
three of five times (60%), compared with his 17% agreement rate
in the close cases. A major reason was that three of the swing cases
in which Justice Schauer sat, and the three in which he agreed with
Chief Justice Traynor, involved related issues. Akins v. County
of Sonoma,' 6s Becker v. Johnston, 66 and Cabell v. California'
67
interpreted related provisions of the 1963 Tort Claims Act.' 68 Hence
Justice Schauer's unusual agreement with Chief Justice Traynor on
those issues was magnified threefold.
69
The positive vote bias shown by the Traynor temporary justices
in the swing cases thus seems to have been largely accidental. With
Justice Schauer still assigned in 45% of the swing cases, and with
the three-case linkage magnifying his agreement with the chief justice
and supporting a shift from retired supreme court justices to presiding
justices,'7 1 the swing cases cannot be said to represent a substantial
departure from Chief Justice Traynor's dominant policy of relying
on retired supreme court justices, and on Justice Schauer in particular.
There was, however, another strand in the Traynor assignment
policy. To the modest extent that he did not use retired supreme court
justices, Chief Justice Traynor overwhelmingly used court of appeal
presiding justices. Relying mainly on repeat appointments of four





169. The linkage of the three Tort Claims Act cases had a corollary effect. Presumably
because these cases involved related issues, not only was Justice Schauer assigned in all three
of them, but so was Justice Murray Draper, a presiding justice of the court of appeal. See
supra note 150. Justice Draper agreed with Chief Justice Traynor in each case, as did all Chief
Justice Traynor's presiding-justice appointees in all 28 of the votes they cast. See supra Table
9. Primarily because of these three assignments of Justice Draper, the swing cases had a higher
percentage of presiding-justice assignments (5 of 16, or 31%) than either the close cases (20%)
or all cases (1406). Correspondingly, the swing cases had a lower percentage of assignments
of retired supreme court justices: 56%, compared with 74% in close cases and 83% in all cases.
170. See supra note 169.
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ment rate of 100% (twenty-eight of twenty-eight votes).'"' In the
all-case and close-case samples the effect of this unanimity was
swamped by the frequent disagreement of the retired supreme court
appointees. In the swing cases, however, where 31% of the appointees
were presiding justices, the impact was greater.
Further, the rise in presiding-justice appointments in the swing cases
may not have been entirely accidental. The aberrational aspects of
the swing cases stop short of explaining the drop between the 550o
case assignment rate for Justice Schauer in all cases and the 45%
rate in the swing cases. 7 ' This decline could be taken as the measure
of an effort by Chief Justice Traynor to appoint in swing cases
temporary justices who would vote, not necessarily his way, but
less often against him than his appointees were doing in other cases.
On the other hand, the decline could well have been random. The
political-derivation results for Chief Justice Traynor, showing that his
presiding-justice assignees included almost exactly the same propor-
tion of Democratic appointees as the statewide pool,' argue against
selection bias in the presiding-justice assignments."'
With respect to the impact of the Traynor appointments, swing cases
under Chief Justice Traynor were no more frequent than under Chief
Justice Gibson.'75 There was, however, one major case in which a
Traynor appointee swung the result the chief justice's way. In People
v. Belous,76 the court struck down the abortion law as it existed before
the Therapeutic Abortion Act and suggested that all abortion laws
were unconstitutional. Arguably even a single case of this kind, in
which a major, controversial ruling results from the vote of a tem-
porary appointee in agreement with the appointing chief justice, may
171. See supra Tables 8, 9. Twenty-three of the 28 presiding-justice assignments went to
Justices Roth, Draper, Molinari, and Van Dyck. Supra Table 8. There were 10 presiding justices
in the state at the start of Chief Justice Traynor's tenure and 13 at the end. 229 Cal. App.
2d iii-v (1964); 4 Cal. App. 3d iii-vi (1970).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 164-65.
173. See supra Table 14 and accompanying text.
174. On the other hand, the Traynor presiding-justice assignees did thus reflect accurately
the political derivation of their pool. And the 100% agreement rate of these assignees with
Chief Justice Traynor, compared with 86% for the supreme court justices (see supra Table
9), cannot be explained on the basis that the statewide pool was closer to the chief justice
in political derivation than the supreme court as a whole was. See supra notes 62, 114, and
accompanying text. For while 65% of the state's presiding justices in the Traynor years were
Democratic appointees, 85% of the supreme court justices were. See supra note 154 and ac-
companying text.
175. Swing-case votes represented 8% of the total temporary-justice votes in the Traynor
cases. Compare supra Table 9 with Table 11; see supra note 150. The figure for Chief Justice
Gibson was an almost identical 9%. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
176. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969); see supra notes 22-25 and
accompanying text; note 150.
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create an appearance of bias that casts doubt on the fairness of the
court's processes. The possible appearance of selection bias in Belous is
diminished, however, by the fact that presiding Justice Fred R. Pierce,
who cast the swing vote, far from being a favored appointee of Chief
Justice Traynor, was assigned by him in no other case.
77
In sum, the major theme in the results on Chief Justice Traynor
remains the evidence against selection bias. This evidence, found in
the negative vote-bias differentials in the all-case and close-case samples
and in Chief Justice Traynor's evenhandedness in the political-
derivation test, is more persuasive than the positive differential in the
aberrational swing-case sample. True, there is a minor theme of possi-
ble attention by Chief Justice Traynor to the votes of his appointees
in swing cases, if only for the purpose of reducing the extent to which
they voted against him. On balance, however, the Traynor results pro-
vide little support for abandoning the system of discretionary
assignment by the chief justice.
C. Chief Justice Wright (1970-1977)
1. Assignment Patterns and Voting Analysis
Donald R. Wright, who served as chief justice from April 29, 1970,
to February 1, 1977,178 appointed temporary justices who cast 156
votes in cases in which he participated, an average of twenty-three
per year. As shown in Table 15, almost half the Wright appointments
went to retired supreme court justices. More than three-quarters
of these were holdover appointments, mainly of Justice Louis H.
Burke. Nonholdover appointments of retired supreme court justices
thus represented only 10%70 of the Wright total. Exactly half the Wright
appointees, and 80%'0 of the appointees excluding holdovers, were
presiding justices of the court of appeal, leaving only four who were
associate justices of the court of appeal. The seventy-eight assignments
that went to presiding justices were spread among ten judges, nine
of them appointed repeatedly. These ten were the presiding justices
of the First and Second Appellate Districts, located in San Francisco
and Los Angeles, respectively.' 79
177. See supra Table 8.
178. Chief Justice Wright was appointed April 6, 1970, see 2 Cal.3d iii (1970), but did
not take the oath of office until April 29, 1970. Minutes, April 29, 1970. He retired Feb.
1, 1977. See 18 C.3d iii (1977).
179. Justice Thomas W. Caldecott, who was appointed only once, replaced Justice Preston
Devine as presiding justice of Division Four of the First District in 1974. See 10 Cal.
3d iv; CALIFORNIA COURTS AND JUDGES HANDBOOK at 116, 142 (K. Arnold ed., 3d ed. 1979).
1101
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
TABLE 15
DISTRIBUTION OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES APPOINTED BY CHIEF JUSTICE WRIGHT,




































Table 16 shows the all-case agreement rates for Chief Justice Wright.
It shows that he obtained an agreement rate of 91 % from his tem-
porary justices (excluding holdovers), compared with 87% from the
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supreme court justices (and 84% from the associate justices). The
resulting differential of + 4% compares with all-case differentials of
+ 5% for Chief Justice Gibson and -9% for Chief Justice Traynor.' °
TABLE 16
AGREEMENT RATES IN ALL CASES OF TEMPORARY JUsTICEs, AssOCATE SUPREME


























CA Total 90% (74/82)
All




84% (344/408)87% (430/494) 91% (89/98) +4%
(p =.30)
Table 17 shows the close-case agreement rates of the Wright tem-
porary justices and the supreme court justices. The temporary justices
(excluding holdovers) agreed with Chief Justice Wright 76% of the
time, while the supreme court justices agreed with him 60% of the
time, yielding a difference of + 16%. This compares with + 22% for
Chief Justice Gibson and -16% for Chief Justice Traynor.' 8 '
180. See supra Tables 2, 9.
181. See supra Tables 3, 10.
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TABLE 17
AGREEMENT RATES IN CLOSE CASES OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES AND
















CA Total 72% (13/18)
All 62% (142/229)- 68% (30/44) +6%
(p =.44)
Excluding 60% (80/133) 76% (19/25) +16%
Holdovers (p =. 13)
aThe Stanford comment, counting only the votes of the associate justices, reports
an agreement rate of 54%. See Comment, supra note 1, at 438; supra notes 87-
93 and accompanying text.
Table 18 shows the swing-case agreement rates for Chief Justice
Wright. The temporary justices (excluding holdovers) agreed with him
80% of the time while the supreme court justices agreed with him
56% of the time, yielding a difference of + 24% (compared with
+ 21 % for both Chief Justice Gibson and Chief Justice Traynor).1
8 2
There were ten swing cases, summarized in the footnote, eight of which
involved appointees other than holdovers. 1 83
182. See supra Tables 4, 11.
183. Wright Swing Cases (asterisk indicates at least one holdover justice in the case):
I) Wood v. Public Utilities Commission, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 481 P.2d 823, 93 Cal. Rptr.
455 (1971): Credit rules of utilities held not to deny equal protection since there was
reasonable relationship between classifications and their purpose; 5-2 decision, with
retired supreme court justice B. Rey Schauer and court of appeal associate justice
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TABLE 18
AGREEMENT RATEs IN SWING CASES OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES AND SUPREME















CA Total 88% (7/8)
All 55% (30/55) 67% (10/15) +12%
(p = .40)
Excluding 56% (24/43) 80% (8/10) +24%
Holdovers (p =. 16)
2) Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 496 P.2d 1276, 101 Cal. Rptr.
908 (1972): Utility held liable for decedent's electrocuting himself, because of
foreseeability of danger and failure to take reasonable precautions; 4-3 decision, with
retired supreme court justice Schauer in majority and Chief Justice Wright dissenting.
3) People v. Gale, 9 Cal. 3d 788, 511 P.2d 1204, 108 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1973): Police
search of defendant's car upheld on probable cause, police search of another car
invalidated for lack of probable cause; 4-3 decision on first point, with court of
appeal presiding justice Parker Wood joining Chief Justice Wright in majority.
4) In re Michael V., 10 Cal. 3d 676, 517 P.2d 1145, 111 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974):
Police request that minor and other boys empty their pockets was not based on prob-
able cause, but minor's flight held not direct response to unlawful police action and
subsequent search therefore was based on probable cause; 4-3 decison on latter point,
with court of appeal presiding justice Murray Draper joining majority and Chief
Justice Wright dissenting.
5) In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 144 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974): Order conti-
nuing foster care held invalid because mother declared a fit parent, and California
Civil Code section 4600 requires that custody by a nonparent be supported by finding
that parental custody would harm child; 5-2 decision, with court of appeal presiding
justices Gordon Files and Otto Kaus joining Chief Justice Wright in majority.
*6) Sarracino v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 1, 529 P.2d 53, 118 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974):
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Table 19 shows that the first-case agreement rates of the Wright
temporary justices were 100% in all three categories. Thus, every one
of the Wright appointees agreed with the chief justice in the appointee's
first case.
TABLE 19
FRST-CASE AGREEMENT RATES OF NONREPEAT, REPEAT, AmD SWING-CASE-REPEAT
TEMPORARY JUSTICES APPOINTED BY CHIEF JUSTICE WRIGHT a
(1) (2) (3)
Nonrepeat Repeat Justices Swing-Case
Justices Repeats
(Never assigned (Assigned to (Subsequently
to another case some subsequent assigned to a
by Chief Justice case by Chief swing case by
Wright) Justice Wright) Chief Justice
Wright)
First-Case




temporary support held not a party litigant, so stipulation by party litigants at hear-
ing is sufficient without his signature; 4-3 decision, with retired supreme court justice
Louis H. Burke (holdover) joining majority opinion by Chief Justice Wright.
*7) No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr.
34 (1974): City ordinance permitting oil wells in residential zone held invalid under
California Environmental Quality Act because no written determination of environmen-
tal impact was made before final vote; 4-3 decision, with court of appeal presiding
justice John B. Molinari joining Chief Justice Wright in majority, and retired supreme
court justice Burke (holdover) dissenting.
*8) Builders Association of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Counties v. Superior Court, 13
Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1974): City ordinance putting interim
freeze on residential zoning held validly enacted by initiative and constitutional in
its provisions limiting city council's power to rezone during freeze; 4-3 decision, with
court of appeal presiding justice Gordon Files joining Chief Justice Wright in majority,
and retired supreme court justice Burke (holdover) writing dissent.
*9) San Diego Building Contractors Association v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205,
529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974): Zoning ordinance held valid since hearing
and notice requirements of federal due process are limited to adjudicatory and quasi-
judicial proceedings and do not apply to ordinances; 4-3 decision, with court of appeal
presiding justice Gordon Files joining Chief Justice Wright in majority, and retired
supreme court justice Burke (holdover) writing dissent.
*10) Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975):
Contributory negligence replaced by comparative negligence; 4-3 decision, with retired
supreme court justice Burke (holdover) joining Chief Justice Wright in majority. See
supra note 16.
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Table 20 compares the agreement rates of the temporary justices
appointed by Chief Justice Wright in five or more cases, three or
more cases, and only one case. Since there were no one-time appointees
in close cases or swing cases, and only three in all cases, the data
in this table lack statistical or practical significance.
TABLE 20
AGREEmNT RATES WITH CHIEF JUSTICE WRmHT O O E-TIwE, THREE-oR-MoRE-
TmE, AND FIVE-oR-MoRE-TIME TEMPORARY JUSTICES APPOINTED BY Hiha
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Supreme One-Time Three-or- Five-or- Difference
Court Justices' More-Time More-Time (4) - (2)
Agreement Agreement Justices' Justices'
Rateb Rate Agreement Agreement
Rate Rate
All 87% 10007 90% 91% -9%
Cases (3/3) (84/93) (77/85) (p = .59)
Close 60% 0% 75% 74%
Cases (0/0) (18/24) (17/23)
Swing 56% 0% 78% 75% -
Cases (0/0) (7/9) (6/8)
aHoldovers excluded.
"The figures in this column are drawn from Tables 16, 17, and 18, supra.
Table 21 shows the political-derivation test for the Wright temporary
justices. Since Chief Justice Wright, like Chief Justice Traynor,
appointed very few court of appeal associate justices, we again have
done the test for presiding justices only. Chief Justice Wright was
a Republican.' 84 He was first appointed to the bench -by Governor
Earl Warren, a Republican, and was promoted to the court of appeal
and then to the chief justiceship by Governor Ronald Reagan, also
a Republican. 8 ' Table 21 shows that while 51% of the court of ap-
peal presiding justices in the state during the Wright tenure were ap-
pointees of Republican governors, only 15% of Chief Justice Wright's
assignments of presiding justices went to Republican appointees-a
184. CALIFORNIA COURTS AND JUDGES HANDBOOK 344 (K. Arnold ed., 3d ed. 1979). But the
governor "could not have chosen a more apolitical person .... P. STOLZ, supra note 14, at 100.
185. CALIFORNIA COURTS AND JUDGES HANDBOOK 344 (K. Arnold ed., 3d ed. 1979).
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36%70 differential in favor of Democratic appointees. Since all the
presiding justices appointed by Chief Justice Wright were from the
First and Second Appellate Districts, 1 6 Table 21 also compares his
appointees with the pools of presiding justices limited to those districts.
The results show that the presiding justices in those Districts were
more "Democratic" than the statewide pools, and Chief Justice
Wright's differential in favor of Democratic appointees is consequently
reduced to 28%, still a significant figure. 87
TABLE 21
POLITICAL DERIVATION OF TEMPoRARY JUSTICES APPOINTED BY CHIEF JUSTICE








First First First First Democratic Republican
Appointed Appointed Appointed Appointed Governor Governor
to Bench to Bench to Bench to Bench Appointees Appointees
by by by by
Democratic Republican Democratic Republican
Governor Governor Governor Governor
Court of
Appeal 49% 51% 85% 15% +36% -36%a
Presiding (44) (46) (66) (12) (p =.001)
Justices in
State
Percentage in First and Percentage of Difference
Second Appellate Temporary Justices




Justices 57% 43% 85% 15% +28% 28%a




aSignificant at the 5% level.
186. See supra Table 15 and accompanying text.
187. Meanwhile, the supreme court in the Wright years was slightly less "Republican" than
the statewide pool of presiding justices, and slightly more so than the pool in the First and
Second Appellate Districts. While 51% of the state's presiding justices, and 43% of those in
the First and Second Districts, were appointees of Republican governors (see Table 21), 45%
of the supreme court justices were. Five justices were appointees of Democratic governors and
four of Republicans; in judge-years, there were 27 for Democratic appointees and 22 (or 45%)
for Republican appointees. See supra note 118.
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2. Observations on Chief Justice Wright
In his interview with us in 1983188 Chief Justice Wright described
his approach in assigning temporary justices. He said he had rotated
his selections among the presiding justices of the appellate district
in which the supreme court was sitting (in San Francisco or Los
Angeles), but had not done so on a random or systematic basis, at-
tempting rather to choose the "most able" judges. When Chief Justice
Wright made an appointment he knew the case in which the appointee
would be sitting, but he did not consider how the appointee might
vote. His appointments were not "random" but were "arbitrary,"
in the sense of being made consciously for each case. He "did stick
pretty much" to court of appeal presiding justices, however, so that
the choice "wouldn't be too arbitrary." He used retired supreme court
justices as well, but in the course of his term their availability dwindled.
He would "once in a while" appoint a court of appeal associate justice.
Chief Justice Wright said he had not appointed trial judges, as he
noted that Chief Justice Bird had done, because "the appellate func-
tion is different."' 89
Our data show, consistently with Chief Justice Wright's account,
that 80% of his appointments, excluding holdovers, went to presiding
justices of the court of appeal, all from the districts located in San
Francisco and Los Angeles. Another 16% of the appointments, ex-
cluding holdovers, went to retired supreme court justices, and the re-
maining 3% (four appointments) went to court of appeal associate
justices., 9
The data also show considerable vote bias for the Wright temporary
justices. In the close-case and swing-case samples the appointees agreed
with Chief Justice Wright 16% and 24% more often, respectively, than
did the supreme court justices.' 9' (These figures are rather similar to
the results for Chief Justice Gibson, although the Gibson practice dif-
fered in making predominant use of court of appeal associate justices
rather than presiding justices.)' 9
The vote bias of the Wright appointees may have been due to selec-
tion bias, to selection preference, or to the incentives of the tem-
188. Wright Interview, supra note 38.
189. Id. See supra note 48.
190. See supra Table 15. There 98 appointments, excluding holdovers, of which 78 went
to presiding justices, 16 to retired supreme court justices, and four to associate justices. Id.
191. See supra Tables 17, 18.
192. See supra Tables 3, 4; table 2 and accompanying text. The vote-bias margins for Chief
Justice Wright in all cases, close cases, and swing cases were 4%, 16%, and 24%, respectively;
for Chief Justice Gibson they were 5%, 22% and 21%. See supra Tables 2, 3, 4, 16, 17, 18.
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porary justices.' 93 Chief Justice Wright said he used selection
preference, choosing the "most able" judges without considering how
the appointees would vote.' 9" It is possible, of course, that his choice
of the "most able" judges was influenced, at least subconsciously,
by knowledge that those judges were likely to see a case the way he
saw it. Whatever Chief Justice Wright's true state of mind, the substan-
tial vote bias reported in the close-case and swing-case samples may
create an undesirable appearance for the court.19'
On the other hand, the political-derivation test shows that Chief
Justice Wright, a Republican, chose court of appeal presiding justices
who were substantially more "Democratic" than the pools from which
they came. 96 This evidence tends to support Chief Justice Wright's
claim that he was choosing judges for their ability, rather than for
ideological inclinations that tallied with his own.
In any event, if Chief Justice Wright was exercising selection bias,
it had little impact on California's law. The Wright swing cases were
relatively few, like those under Chief Justice Gibson and Chief Justice
Traynor,'97 and they included no case-except a holdover case-that
was major or important. 9
In sum, the inference of selection bias created by the vote bias results
for Chief Justice Wright is arguably rebutted, chiefly by the political
derivation results. In addition, the votes of the Wright appointees,
excluding holdovers, were not decisive in any important case. Still,
the vote bias itself may impair respect for the court.
193. Or, of course, to some combination of the three. The "pools" explanation (see supra
text accompanying note 62) is undercut by the fact that the Wright appointees did not reflect
the political derivation of their pools. See supra Table 21; note 114 and accompanying
text. See infra note 367.
194. See supra text accompanying note 40.
195. The comparison of first-case agreement rates for Chief Justice Wright proves nothing
concerning selection bias. See supra Table 19. The unanimous agreement with Chief Justice
Wright by all the temporary justices in their first cases may reflect an incentive to be reappointed,
but it deprived Chief Justice Wright of the ability to distinguish in his subsequent appoint-
ments (if he wanted to) on the basis of whether the prospective appointees had agreed with
him the first time.
196. See supra Table 21.
197. Swing-case votes represented 10% of all the votes excluding holdovers by temporary
justices appointed by Chief Justice Wright. Compare supra Table 16 with Table 18. See supra note
183. This compares closely with 9% under Chief Justice Gibson and 8N under Chief Justice
Traynor. See supra notes 145, 175.
198. See supra note 183. One of the Wright swing cases, Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.
3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), was a landmark decision, but the temporary
justice who cast the deciding vote was Louis H. Burke, a holdover appointee. See supra notes
16, 183.
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D. Chief Justice Bird (1977-1984)
1. Distribution of Assignees and Assignment Patterns Over
Time
Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird, who took office on March 26,
1977,' 99 appointed temporary justices who cast 321 votes through the
end of 1984, in cases in which she participated, an average of forty-
one votes per year.
199. See 19 CaI.3d iii (1977).
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TABLE 22
DISTRIBUTION OF TEmPoRARY JusncEs APPOINTED BY CHIEF JUSTICE BiD,














White 10 Puglia 3
Caldecott 6 Spencer 2
Taylor 4 Gerald Brown 3
Racanellia 4 Klein 1
Grodin 4 Roth 1
George Brown 3 Stone I





(3 or more cases):
Jefferson 18 Staniforth 7
Rattigana 13 Kingsley 5
Reynoso 11 Wiener 5
Feinberga 9 Hanson 4
Grodin 7 Blease 4






(2 or more cases):
Thompson 6 Fainer 2
Abbe 2 Kongsgaard 2
Ibanez 2 Pacht 2
Karesh 2
TOTALS 321 100%
aThe case of American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, see supra
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justices (Racanelli, Rattigan, and Feinberg) participating, and then was decided the
other way in 1984 with two of those justices (Rattigan and Feinberg) participating,
is included here in both incarnations. One reason is that fresh assignments were
made for the rehearing of the case. See Minutes, July 5, 1984. A more important
reason is that in the agreement-rate tables that follow this one (but not in some
subsequent tables), it seemed appropriate to include both hearings of the case.
While the first decision no longer stands as law, it was expected to when the
assignments were made and when the votes were cast; hence the data it provides,
including the assignment and vote of Justice Racanelli, are appropriately included
in this study. But the second hearing must be included as well for agreement-rate
purposes, since it was definitive and provides a different vote of the permanent
supreme court justices. The resulting duplication of the votes of Justices Rattigan
and Feinberg does not unbalance the agreement-rate data, since their votes split
evenly for and against the chief justice. Inclusion of both hearings in the subsequent
tables mandated their inclusion in this table as well, so that the tables would be
consistent in the numbers of votes counted.
As Table 22 shows, 13% of Chief Justice Bird's assignments were
holdover assignments of retired supreme court justices Mathew 0.
Tobriner and Frank K. Richardson. Chief Justice Bird made no
assignments of retired supreme court justices other than holdovers.
Fourteen percent of the Bird appointments went to presiding justices
of the court of appeal; 52% to associate justices of the court of appeal;
and 21% to superior court judges (or in one case a municipal court
judge).10  Table 22 lists all the court of appeal presiding justices ap-
pointed by Chief Justice Bird, all the court of appeal associate justices
appointed to hear three or more cases, and all the trial court judges
appointed to hear two or more cases, together with the number of
cases heard by each.
Table 22 needs to be supplemented, however, by examination of
the way Chief Justice Bird altered her assignment practice within the
period covered. The Chief Justice's assistant, Mr. Buehl, has described
the change in his letter quoted earlier.20'
200. See also infra note 323 (Municipal Court Judge). More recently, on August 27, 1985,
Chief Justice Bird dipped deeper into the judicial hierarchy and appointed a justice court judge
to sit with the supreme court. Minutes, Aug. 27, 1985. The justice court is the lowest court
in the state's judiciary and is not a court of record. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §1.
201. This inclusive assignment policy stands in marked contrast to the assignment
pattern followed prior to Chief Justice Bird's tenure. The previous practice was to
select primarily from a handful of favored Court of Appeal justices who then sat
on all Supreme Court cases in which an assignment was necessary.
Usually these justices would sit for an entire calendar in the event that a vacancy
existed on the court. Chief Justice Bird followed this format for the first few months
after her appointment but soon switched to the current practice of assigning a large
number of justices, each of whom sits on one or perhaps two cases during a given
calendar.
Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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As Mr. Buehl indicates, Chief Justice Bird during her first months
in office followed the format of assigning temporary justices to sit
"for an entire calendar." ' 2 These assignments resulted in one assignee's
sitting in six cases and another's sitting in eighteen cases. 203 Entire-
calendar assignments ceased after "the first few months," as Mr. Buehl
further indicates, but assignments were not then reduced to "one or
perhaps two cases during a given calendar. ' 2 0  Assignments to sit for
more than one day and in more than two cases continued for more
than four years.
For example, on January 21 and January 27, 1981, almost four
years into her tenure, Chief Justice Bird assigned court of appeal
associate justice Joseph Grodin to sit for two consecutive days that
202. Supra note 201. It does not appear to be the case, however, that Chief Justice Bird
in this respect was following "[t]he previous practice." Id. Chief Justice Bird's three predecessors
usually assigned temporary justices, at least those who were not retired supreme court justices,
for a single case or at most for one day, not for an entire calendar. Barrett Interview, supra
note 83. A sampling of the supreme court's Minutes under the three predecessors supports
Mr. Barrett's report. Under Chief Justice Wright, see, e.g., Minutes, April 2, 1974 (court of
appeal presiding justice Otto Kaus, under assignment by Chief Justice Wright, hears argument
in one case); Minutes, April 4, 1974 (court of appeal presiding justice Gordon Files, under
assignment by Chief Justice Wright, hears argument in three cases on one day, same calendar);
Minutes, April 5, 1974 (court of appeal presiding justice Parker Wood, under assignment by
Chief Justice Wright, hears argument in one case, same calendar). Under Chief Justice Traynor,
see, e.g., Minutes, Oct. 17, 1968 (court of appeal presiding justice Otto Kaus, under assign-
ment by Chief Justice Traynor, hears argument in one case); Minutes, Oct. 17, 1968 (court
of appeal presiding justice John J. Ford, under assignment by Chief Justice Traynor, hears
argument in one case, same calendar, same day). Under Chief Justice Gibson, our extensive
though not inclusive search found no instances of more than one assignment of court of appeal
justices to hear argument in the same calendar, whether the same justice or different ones.
203. On April 19, 1977, Chief Justice Bird assigned superior court Judge H. B. Thompson of
Santa Clara County to sit for a five-day period (May 2-6, 1977) that resulted in his voting in six
cases. Minutes, April 19, May 2, 4, 1977; e.g., Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 577
P.2d 188, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1978). On June 3, 1977, Chief Justice Bird assigned court of appeal
Associate Justice Bernard Jefferson to sit for a four-day period that resulted in his voting in 18
cases. Minutes, June 3, 13, 14, 16, 17, 1977; e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,
575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). These two assignments accounted for 24 of the 26 votes
that resulted from assignments made by Chief Justice Bird in 1977. In addition, on May 31, 1977,
Chief Justice Bird assigned superior court Judge Bruce Sumner of Orange County to sit for one
day that resulted in his hearing argument in five cases. Minutes, May 31, June 15, 1977. Each of
those cases was decided, however, with only six votes and without Judge Sumner's recorded par-
ticipation. E.g., People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 573 P.2d 433, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1978). See
also CALIFORNIA COURTS AND JUDGES HANDBOOK 386-87 (K. Arnold ed., 4th ed. 1985) (Judge
Sumner's entry, mentioning the supreme court assignment). The explanation for Judge Sumner's
nonparticipation in these decisions may lie in his announced candidacy for state Attorney General
in 1978. See id. These assignments of Justice Jefferson and Judges Thompson and Sumner
appear to have been the only assignments made by Chief Justice Bird during her first six months
in office.
204. Supra note 201.
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resulted in his voting in seven cases." °' On February 23, 1981, Chief
Justice Bird assigned court of appeal associate justice Joseph Rattigan
to sit for two consecutive days that resulted in his voting in eight
cases."0 6 On July 20 and July 31, 1981, Chief Justice Bird assigned
court of appeal presiding justice Clinton White to sit for three con-
secutive days that resulted in his voting in four cases (including Marina
Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson).2 7 As late as December 15, 1981, Chief Justice
Bird assigned retired associate justice Stephen Tamura of the court
of appeal to sit for three days that resulted in his voting in three
cases, including two 4 to 3 decisions in which his vote agreed with
Chief Justice Bird's and was decisive: Assembly v. Deukmejian"8 and
Frink v. Prod.0 9
After 1981, Chief Justice Bird ceased assigning temporary justices
(except holdovers) to sit for more than one day at a time. As late
as July 15, 1982, however, she made a one-day assignment of court
of appeal associate justice Sidney Feinberg that resulted in his voting
in three cases, one of which was the first hearing of American Bank
& Trust Co. v. Community Hospital."'
Chief Justice Bird also continued through at least her first four
years in office to select her temporary appointees "primarily from
205. Minutes, Jan. 21, 27, Feb. 2, 3, 1981. One of the cases was Keating v. Superior Court,
31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982), rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 1 (1984),
a swing case of some importance in which Justice Grodin wrote the majority opinion. See
infra note 305.
206. Minutes, Feb. 23, March 3, 4, 1981; e.g., Richmond v. Dart Industries, 29 Cal. 3d
462, 629 P.2d 23, 174 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1981). In addition, on March 26, 1981, Chief Justice
Bird assigned court of appeal associate justice Howard Wiener to sit for two consecutive days
that resulted in his voting in five cases (including Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 30 Cal. 3d
268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1981), see infra note 305). Minutes, March 26, April
6, 7, 1981. Also on March 26, 1981, Chief Justice Bird assigned court of appeal associate
justice Robert Staniforth to sit for one day that resulted in his voting in four cases (also in-
cluding Bell v. Industrial Vangas, supra). Minutes, March 26, April 7, 1981.
207. Supra note 19; Minutes, July 20, Aug. 3-5, 1981. Meanwhile, on April 21, 1981,
Chief Justice Bird assigned associate justice Sidney Feinberg of the court of appeal to sit for
two days that resulted in his voting in three cases. Minutes, April 21, May 4, 5, 1981; e.g.,
People v. Leyba, 29 Cal. 3d 591, 629 P.2d 961, 174 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1981).
208. 30 Cal. 3d 638, 639 P.2d 939, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1982); Minutes, Dec. 15, 1981;
Jan. 11, 1982; see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
209. 31 Cal. 3d 166, 643 P.2d 476, 181 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1982); Minutes, Dec. 15, 1981;
Jan. 4, 5, 1982; see infra note 305 and accompanying text.
210. Minutes, July 15, 21, 1982; 33 Cal. 3d 674 (advance sheets only), 660 P.2d 829, 190
Cal. Rptr. 371 (1982). See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text. Such one-day multi-case
assignments had remained common into 1981. On January 21, 1981, Justice Cruz Reynoso,
then an associate justice of the court of appeal, was assigned for one day that resulted in
his voting in five cases. Minutes, Jan. 21, Feb. 2, 1981. On March 13, 1981, Associate Justice
Robert Staniforth of the court of appeal was assigned for one day and four cases. See supra
note 206.
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a handful of favored Court of Appeal justices .. ."I" Through
March 26, 1981, her fourth anniversary in office, Chief Justice Bird
made assignments that resulted in 104 votes cast by only twenty-nine
assignees. Justice Bernard Jefferson sat in eighteen cases,2"2 Justice
Joseph Rattigan in ten,2"3 Justice Cruz Reynoso in nine,21 Justice
Joseph Grodin in seven, 2 5 superior court Judge Homer Thompson
in six, 216 and Justices Howard Wiener 2 7 and Robert Staniforth18 in
five each. More than a year later, Chief Justice Bird was still making
two-case assignments and repeated one-case assignments of justices
she had often appointed in the past. 2 9
After the summer of 1982, however, the familiar appointees of Chief
Justice Bird reappeared rarely, and mainly as part of a roll call of
the state's appellate justices.220
For in April 1981, just after her fourth anniversary in office, Chief
Justice Bird had indeed begun a new policy of "assigning a large
number of justices," most of them for only a single case.22' The new
211. Supra note 201.
212. See Minutes, June 3, 13, 14, 16, 17, 1981.
213. See Minutes, Feb. 17, 28, Oct. 27, Nov. 6, 1980; Feb. 23, March 3, 4, 1981.
214. See Minutes, Nov. 8, 9, 1977; Jan. 21, 27, Feb. 2, 3, March 3, 1981.
215. See Minutes, Jan. 21, 27, Feb. 2, 3, 1981.
216. See Minutes, April 19, May 2, 4, 1977.
217. See Minutes, March 26, April 6, 7, 1981.
218. See Minutes, March 19, April 3, 1980; March 26, Apr. 17, 1981.
219. In July 1982 Justice Joseph Rattigan and Presiding Justice John Racanelli were each
appointed for one day and two cases. See Minutes, July 14, 15, 21, 1982. For each justice
one of the cases was the first hearing of American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital,
supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text. In addition, Justices Thomas Caldecott, Clinton
White, John Racanelli, Sidney Feinberg, and Joseph Grodin were each appointed for one case
in August 1982. See Minutes, Aug. 27, 30, 31, 1982. Justice Robert Staniforth was appointed
for one case on Sept. 24, 1982. See Minutes, Sept. 24, Oct. 6, 1982. For the total assignments
of all the justices appointed in five or more cases by Chief Justice Bird, see infra Table 29.
220. Simultaneously, in September 1982 Chief Justice Bird announced in her State of the
Judiciary Address that "[a]ssignments now are rotated to give everyone a chance to serve."
1982 Judiciary Address, supra note 41. One reappearance of a familliar appointee after this
time was the November 23, 1983, assignment of Justice Clinton White in the Perdue case
(Minutes, Nov. 23, 1983), see supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text. (That case was not
decided until 1985 and hence does not appear in our sample. See supra note 99 and accompa-
nying text.)
221. Supra note 201. See also 1982 Judiciary Address, supra note 41. Neither Mr. Buehl
nor Chief Justice Bird, so far as we know, has given a reason for the change in policy. The
change followed publication of the Stanford comment in 1980. Supra note 1; see supra notes
9-16 and accompanying text. It also followed publication in 1981 of P. STOLZ, supra note
14, which cited the Stanford comment and stated that "some lawyers began to wonder whether
ideology was not influencing pro tem assignments, with judges selected because they were likely
to decide cases in a particular way" (at 106). But the change also began at a time, April 1981,
when the number of assignments required was increasing dramatically. The court then had
two unexpectedly vacant seats, left by the death of Justice Wiley Manuel in January 1981 and
the retirement of Justice William P. Clark, Jr., in March 1981. See 28 Cal. 3d iii (1981); 29
1116
1986 / Temporary Justices
policy was phased in gradually; the old policy of multi-case and repeat
assignments did not fade away, as we have seen, until more than
a year later. The new policy apparently was designed, as Mr. Buehl
writes, "to give as many justices and judges as possible the oppor-
tunity to sit with the supreme court"-or, as Chief Justice Bird herself
has put it, "to give everyone a chance to serve.'' 222
The policy began with the assignment in April 1981 of nineteen
cases spread among fifteen assignees. This was the start of a roll call
of the state's court of appeal justices, interspersed with superior court
judges. The process continued until October 1982, by which time
almost all the state's court of appeal justices had received
assignments." 3
Chief Justice Bird then focused on superior court judges.224 From
October 29, 1982, through the end of 1982 she appointed at least
twenty-one superior court judges, each to sit in one case. In 1983
she appointed at least another thirteen, and through early July of
1984 at least another twelve.225 The lists provided by Chief Justice
Bird with her letter to us of February 19, 1985, name ninety-five court
of appeal justices and seventy-two superior court judges as having "sat
on assignment in the Supreme Court ... since I became Chief Justice
in 1977. 1226 The policy of appointing trial judges-now including
Cal. 3d iii (1981). As can be seen in Table 23A infra, 1981 was by far the biggest year for tem-
porary assignments by Chief Justice Bird.
222. Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying text; 1982 Judiciary Address, supra
note 41.
223. From April 1981 through October 1982, Chief Justice Bird assigned-as reflected in
cases decided through 1984-51 different court of appeal justices. There were 57 court of appeal
justices in the state in October 1982 (two taking office that month). See 32 Cal. 3d iv-vii.
Eighteen new court of appeal justiceships were created and filled at the end of 1982, see Brown
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 242, 655 P.2d 1260, 188 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1982), and in February
1983 Chief Justice Bird started assigning the new justices, a process that continued through 1983.
224. While this policy began shortly after Chief Justice Bird's statement about temporary
assignments in her September 1982 State of the Judiciary Address, that statement had mentioned
only court of appeal justices, not trial judges, as supreme court assignees. See 1982 Judiciary
Address, supra note 41. In a newspaper interview published in January 1984, Chief Justice
Bird reportedly stated that, having given virtually all court of appeal justices the opportunity
to serve with the supreme court, she "plans to start giving trial judges the same opportunity."
L.A. Daily J., Jan. 2, 1984, at 17, col. 3. Extensive appointment of trial judges began in
late October of 1982. See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
225. Our basic data do not go later than that, since the sample is limited to assignments
reflected in cases decided through December 31, 1984. See supra note 99 and accompanying
text. But see infra note 227 for more recent data.
226. Bird Letter, supra note 44. These lists, however, apparently include judges who were
assigned not by Chief Justice Bird but by an acting chief justice, or by Chief Justice Wright
before leaving office. For instance, Chief Justice Bird's list includes Otto Kaus, who was presiding
justice of the fifth division of the Second District Court of Appeal until his elevation to the
supreme court in 1981 (see 29 Cal. 3d iii, v), and Gordon Files, who was presiding justice
of the fourth division of the Second District until his retirement in February 1982. See 30
Cal. 3d v. According to our data, neither Justice Kaus nor Justice Files had sat with the supreme
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municipal as well as superior court judges-remained in place through
1985 . 227
Chief Justice Bird's tenure thus has included two quite different
temporary-justice assignment policies.228 The Chief Justice apparently
court under assignment by Chief Justice Bird. But Justice Kaus had sat during her tenure under
assignment by an acting chief justice, and Justice Kaus and Justice Files both had sat during her
tenure under assignments made by Chief Justice Wright before he left office. See, e.g., People
v. Perez, 25 Cal. 3d 133, 594 P.2d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1979) (Kaus, J., assigned by Acting
Chairperson of Judicial Council); Arp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal. 3d
395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977) (Files, J., assigned by Chief Justice Wright on
January 6, 1977; see Minutes, Jan. 6, 1977).
227. Assignments of temporary justices made by Chief Justice Bird during 1985, as reported
in the Supreme Court Minutes, broke down as follows (in terms of numbers of assignments,
not necessarily numbers of cases):
Retired Supreme Court Justices: I (Justice Otto Kaus as a holdover appointee);
Court of Appeal Associate Justices: 10;
Court of Appeal Presiding Justices: 2;
Superior Court Judges: 17;
Municipal Court Judges: 9;
Justice Court Judges: 1.
228. Relevant throughout the Bird period is the question, raised in connection with the
Perdue case, see supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text, of a possible relationship between
temporary assignments made on "conference matters," such as petitions for hearing, and subse-
quent assignments to hear the argued appeal in the same case. So far as assignments on con-
ference matters are concerned, Chief Justice Bird's assistant reported in his letter of March
1983, and Chief Justice Bird in her letter of February 1985 confirmed it to be still the case,
that an automatic rotation system among the presiding justices of the First District Court of
Appeal was in effect to fill temporary vacancies when a fourth vote was needed. Buehl Letter,
supra note 42 and accompanying text; Bird Letter, supra note 44 and accompanying text. (No
such system is mentioned in the court's Practices and Procedures booklet published in 1985.
See PRAcrics AND PROCEDURES, supra note 37, at 26, 28, passim.) The question remains whether
a temporary justice assigned to sit on a petition for hearing is likely to be continued on the
case if a hearing is granted-as the defendant in Perdue assumed, and as did happen for
Justice Clinton White in that case. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
To test this question we have inspected the Minutes of the California Supreme Court for a
two-year period, 1982 and 1983, comparing the temporary justices assigned to conference matters
with those assigned to subsequent hearings on the merits in the same cases. During that period
the Minutes report only six conference matters, involving eight temporary justices, in which
assignments were made by Chief Justice Bird. See Minutes, March 30, 1982; April 20, 1982;
June 15, 1982; April 1, 1983; June 16, 1983; July 20, 1983. (One of the assignees was not
a presiding justice of the First District Court of Appeal in accord with the reported rotation
system; he was Associate Justice Joseph Rattigan, assigned in Roa v. Lodi Medical Group,
hearing granted, June 15, 1982. See Minutes, June 15, 1982.) All six matters-plus three others
in which temporary justices apparently were assigned by an acting chief justice, see Minutes,
Feb. 11, 1982; Nov. 14, 1983; Nov. 15, 1983-involved grants of petitions for hearing. (It appears
that the court's Minutes identify the temporary justices sitting on conference matters only if
the petition is granted.) Of the six cases in which hearings were granted with the participation
of temporary justices assigned by Chief Justice Bird, one was retransferred to the court of
appeal, Flippen v. Superior Court, 1 Dist. A020971 Div. 2, see Minutes, Apr. 1, 1983, and
one was subsequently remanded to the superior court for stipulated dismissal as moot. Golden
State Mobilehome Owners League, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, S.F. 24576, see Minutes,
Sept. 22, 1983. Hence only four of these cases were argued: People v. Miller, 33 Cal. 3d 545,
658 P.2d 1320, 189 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1983); In re Kelly, 33 Cal. 3d 267, 655 P.2d 1282, 188
Cal. Rptr. 447 (1983); Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1985); Perdue v. Crocker National Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503,
216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985). Eight temporary justices were assigned by Chief Justice Bird for
the arguments. See id. Only one of the eight, Justice Clinton White in the Perdue case (see
1118
1986 / Temporary Justices
has not publicly stated whether she plans to complete the roll call
of superior court judges in which she was engaged through 1985.229
Nor does she appear to have indicated whether she plans to pursue
the roster of municipal court judges on which she began extensively
during 1985.230
2. Results for Chief Justice Bird
Because of the midstream change in Chief Justice Bird's assign-
ment practice, we have, where practical, broken down the vote data
by year. In doing this the question arises whether to use the dates
of the case decisions or the dates on which the temporary justices
were assigned. In the previous section we traced Chief Justice Bird's
assignment policies over time by using the dates of assignment, as
reported in the supreme court's Minutes.13 ' Here, consistently with
the presentation of the data for the other chief justices, the tables
in the text are based on the dates of the case decisions.
At the same time, in order to show more directly the relationship
between Chief Justice Bird's changing assignment policy and the vote
pattern of the temporary justices, we present in the footnotes tables
showing the vote data organized by the dates of assignment. These
"assignment date" tables reflect not only a different organizing prin-
ciple, but also a somewhat larger and later sample than appears in
the text. In order to include as many as possible of the assignments
made in 1984, we have gone beyond our normal cut-off date of
December 31, 1984, and included cases decided through July of 1985.
Table 23 shows the all-case agreement rates, by date of decision,
of the temporary justices appointed by Chief Justice Bird (excluding
holdovers),232 the associate justices of the supreme court, and all the
justices of the supreme court. The results are broken down by year
from the beginning of Chief Justice Bird's tenure through the end
of 1984. In addition, to show the effect of Chief Justice Bird's midterm
change in assignment policy, Table 23 and succeeding tables provide
subtotals for the first and second "halves" of the Bird period. The
first half covers cases decided through March 31, 1981, a date just
supra note 12), had sat on the petition for hearing. This evidence indicates that, at least in
1982 and 1983, there was no strong relationship between Chief Justice Bird's conference
assignments and her argument assignments in the same cases.
229. See supra note 227.
230. Chief Justice Bird's most relevant public statement appears to be the January 1984
interview stating that she "plans to start giving trial judges the same opportunity." See supra
note 224. This leaves open both the question of finishing the superior court roster and that
of extending the opportunity to all the state's trial judges (including municipal court judges).
231. See supra notes 202-27 and accompanying text.
232. For the data including holdovers, see Table 23, note a.
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after Chief Justice Bird's fourth anniversary in office and just before
the introduction of her second assignment policy.233 The second half
covers cases decided from April 1, 1981, through the end of 1984.
TABLE 23
ALL-CASE AGREEMENT RATES OF TEMPoRARY JUSTICES, ASSOCIATE SUPREME













1977 98% (49/50) 98% (59/60) 100% (10/10) +2%
1978 69% (59/85) 75% (76/102) 82% (14/17) +7%
1979 87% (33/38) 89% (41/46) 100% (10/10) +11%
1980 63% (25/40) 69% (33/48) 100% (8/8) +31%
1981 66% (133/203) 72% (183/253) 77% (74/96) +5%
1982 70% (96/138) 75% (127/169) 80% (32/40) +5%
1983 71% (163/228) 76% (211/276) 76% (45/59) 0%
1984 69% (107/155) 74% (140/188) 64% (25/39) -10%
TOTALSb 71% (665/937) 76% (870/1142) 78% (218/279) +2%
(p =. 4 9)
Totals
Through





Through 69% (489/712) 74% (648/871) 75% (171/229) +1%
1984 (p = .93)
aIn the interest of visual economy Table 23 entirely excludes holdover appointees
and holdover cases. These consisted of 18 cases in which retired supreme court
justice Tobriner appeared in 1982 and 24 cases in which retired supreme court
justice Richardson appeared in 1983 and 1984. See Table 22 supra. With those
cases included, the figures for 1982-1984 and the relevant totals in Table 23 are
as follows:
233. See supra text accompanying note 221. Since Table 23 is based on dates of decision,
it does not reflect all the assignments made by Chief Justice Bird through March 31, 1981.
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1982 70% (145/208) 75% (190/253) 79% (46/58) + 4%
1983 73% (177/243) 78% (228/294) 76% (48/63) -2%
1984 72% (177/245) 77% (228/296) 53% (31/59) -24%




Mar. 31, 78% (176/225) 82% (222/271) 94% (47/50) +12%c
1981 (p =.O3)
Totals -3%
Apr. 1, (p = .19)
1981,
Through 70% (622/887) 75% (816/1081) 72% (194/271)
1984
bBoth hearings of the American Bank case are included in this
Table 22, note a.
cSignificant at the 5% level.
table. See supra
Table 23 shows that for the entire period the temporary justices
agreed with Chief Justice Bird 78%'0 of the time, while all the supreme
court justices agreed with her 76% of the time (and the associate
justices agreed with her 71% of the time). The resulting differential
of +2% compares with all-case differentials of +5% for Chief Justice
Gibson,23 1 -9% for Chief Justice Traynor, 2  and + 40 for Chief
Justice Wright.236 In the subtotal for the first four years of the Bird
period, Table 23 shows that Chief Justice Bird's temporary justices
agreed with her 94% of the time, compared with 8276 for the supreme
court justices (and 78%'0 for the associate justices), producing a statis-
tically significant differential of + 12%. The subtotal for April 1, 1981,
through 1984 shows that the temporary justices agreed with Chief
Justice Bird only 106 more often than the supreme court as a whole
(and 6% more often than the associate justices).
234. See supra Table 2.
235. See supra Table 9.
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The all-case agreement rates for the Bird temporary justices by date
of assignment appear in Table 23A (in the footnote). ' This table
links the vote data to the assignment dates; thus the + 9% differen-
tial for the period through March 31, 1981, includes the vote results
237.
TABLE 23A
ALL-CAsE AGREEErr RATES oF TEmpoRARY JUSTICES, AssoCIATE SUPREME COURT
JusTIcEs, AND ALL SUPREME COURT JusticEs WITH CHIEF JUSTICE BIRD (1977-1984) BY












1977 78% (101/130) 81% (127/156) 88% (23/26) +7%
1978 88% (30/34) 90% (37/41) 100% (8/8) + 10%
1979 79% (15/19) 83% (19/23) 100% (515) +17%
1980 65% (22/34) 71% (29/41) 100% (7/7) +29%
1981 61% (146/238) 69% (204/296) 76% (81/106) +7%
1982 72% (206/288) 77% (268/350) 73% (57/78) -4%
1983 82% (103/126) 85% (130/153) 82% (27/33) -3%
1984 63% (78/124) 69% (104/150) 68% (21/31) -1%




Mar. 31, 76% (246/324) 80% (317/395) 8906 (88/99) +9%




Through 68% (455/669) 74% (601/815) 72% (141/195) -2%
1984 (p =. 68)
aThis table includes temporary-justice assignments made by Chief Justice Bird through
December 31, 1984, to the extent reflected in cases decided through July 31, 1985.
bFor reasons of space this table excludes holdover appointments and holdover cases.
CThere were eight cases involving two or more temporary justices whose assignments were
made shortly before and shortly after the end of a year. For the purpose of this table and
the subsequent assignment-date tables it was necessary to allocate all the assignments in each
case to the same year (since the permanent supreme court justices voting in the case could
not be separated by year without producing duplication). We adopted the convention of
allocating all the assignments in each case to the later of the two years involved.
dBoth hearings of the American Bank case are included in this table. See supra Table 22,
note a.
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of all the assignments made by Chief Justice Bird through that date,
whenever the case was decided. This 9% figure therefore provides
a more complete picture of Chief Justice Bird's first assignment policy
than does the 12% figure in Table 23.
Table 24 shows the all-case agreement rates for the Bird temporary
justices broken down by class of appointee. The totals for the entire
period show that retired supreme court holdovers (Justices Tobriner
and Richardson) agreed with Chief Justice Bird 55% of the time;
238
court of appeal presiding justices agreed with her 86% of the time;
court of appeal associate justices agreed with her 78% of the time;
and trial judges agreed with her 72% of the time. The table also shows
the increased appointment of trial judges in the last two years.239 In
cases decided in 1984, trial judges represented two-thirds of the
assignees (excluding holdovers).24 0
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238. For their individual agreement rates, see infra Table 29.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 224-27.
240. There were 26 trial-judge votes among 39 by assignees excluding holdovers.
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Table 25 shows the close-case agreement rates with Chief Justice
Bird of the temporary justices and the supreme court as a whole,
broken down by year of decision. FQr the entire period the temporary
justices (excluding holdovers) agreed with Chief Justice Bird in close
cases 57% of the time, while the supreme court justices agreed with
her 51%/0 of the time. The resulting differential of +6% compares
with close-case differentials of +22% for Chief Justice Gibson,2 '
-16% for Chief Justice Traynor,24 2 and + 16% for Chief Justice
Wright." 3 In the subtotals one can see the effect of Chief Justice
Bird's change in assignment policy. In the first four years the supreme
court justices agreed with Chief Justice Bird 55% of the time, while
her temporary appointees agreed with her 93%'0 of the time, produc-
ing a significant differential of +38%. In the rest of the period, the
differential was only + 1M.
241. See supra Table 3.
242. See supra Table 10.
243. See supra Table 17.
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TABLE 25
CLOsE-CAsE AGREEMENT RATEs OF TEMPORARY JuSTICEs Arn SUPREME COURT





























1978 520 (25/48) 52% (25/48) 88% (7/8) 88% (7/8) +36%
1979 67% (4/6) 67% (4/6) 100% (1/1) 1000o (1/1) +33%
1980 58% (14/24) 58% (14/24) 100% (4/4) 100% (4/4) +42%
1981 47% (36/76) 47% (36/76) 50% (14/28) 50% (14/28) +3%
1982 48% (36/75) 51% (26/51) 60% (12/20) 64% (9/14) +13%
1983 52% (51/99) 52% (51/99) 50% (10/20) 50% (10/20) -2%
1984 49% (40/81) 49% (28/57) 31% (5/16) 42% (5/12) -7%




Mar. 1, 55% (46/83) 55% (46/83) 93% (13/14) 93% (13/14) +38%"
1981 (p = .87)
Totals Apr.
1, 1981,
Through 49% (160/326) 50% (138/278) 48% (40/83) 51% (37/73) +1%
1984 (p = .87)
aBoth hearings of the American Bank case are included in this table. See supra
Table 22, note a.
bSignificant at the 5% level.
Table 26A shows the close-care agreement rates by date of assign-
ment. It shows a total-period differential of + 8%; a first-half dif-
ferential of +22%; and a second-half differential of +9%.14'
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Table 26 shows the swing-case agreement rates of the temporary
justices and the supreme court justices. It shows that for the entire
period the temporary justices (excluding holdovers) agreed with Chief
Justice Bird 56%-/ of the time, while the supreme court justices agreed
with her 48% of the time. The + 8% differential is considerable lower
244.
TABLE 25A
CLOSE-CASE AGREEMENT RATES OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES AND SUPREME COURT































1977 54% (29/54) 540o (29/54) 89% (8/9) 89016 (8/9) +35%
1978 50% (3/6) 50o (3/6) 100% (1/1) 100% (1/1) +50%
1979 670 (4/6) 67% (4/6) 100% (1/1) 100% (1/1) +33%
1980 59% (10/17) 59% (10/17) 100% (3/3) 100% (3/3) +41%
1981 48% (49/102) 48% (49/102) 54% (19/35) 54% (19/35) +6%
1982 49% (69/142) 50% (59/118) 47% (15/32) 46% (12/26) -4%
1983 58% (14/24) 58% (14/24) 75% (3/4) 75% (3/4) + 17%
1984 44% (36/81) 42% (24/57) 35% (6/17) 46% (6/13) +4%




Mar. 31, 53% (62/117) 53% (62/117) 75% (21/28) 75% (21/28) +22%c
1981 (p = .04)
Totals Apr.
1, 1981,
Through 48% (152/315) 49% (130/267) 47% (35/74) 50% (32/64) +1%
1984 (p =.86)
aThis table includes temporary-justice assignments made by Chief Justice Bird through
December 31, 1984, to the extent reflected in cases decided through July 31, 1985.
bBoth hearings of the American Bank case are included in this table. See supra Table 22,
note a.
CSignificant at the 5% level.
1127
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
than the swing-case differentials of + 21% for Chief Justice Gibson,
+ 21% for Chief Justice Traynor, and + 24% for Chief Justice
Wright. 24 The subtotals for the first and second halves of the Bird
period show widely differing margins of + 49% for the first four years
and +4% for the rest of the period.
24 6
TABLE 26
SWING-CAsE AGREEMENT RATES OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES AND SUPREME COURT.





























1978 50% (9/18) 50% (9/18) 100% (3/3) 100% (3/3) +50%
1979 .-
1980 50% (6/12) 50% (6/12) 100% (2/2) 100% (2/2) +50%
1981 46% (32/70) 46% (32/70) 52% (14/27) 52% (14/27) +6%
1982 49% (28/57) 49% (22/45) 65% (11/17) 62% (8/13) +13%
1983 52% (17/33) 52% (17/33) 56% (5/9) 56% (5/9) +4%
1984 40% (6/15) 40% (6/15) 20% (1/5) 20% (1/5) -20%










Through 47% (80/170) 47% (74/158) 53% (30/57) 51% (27/53) +4%
1984 (p =. 60)
aBoth hearings of the American Bank case are included in this table. See supra
Table 22, note a.
bSignificant at the 5% level.
245. See supra Tables 4, 11, 18.
246. The sample for the first four years contains only six votes by temporary justices in
swing cases, but the six votes all agreed with Chief Justice Bird; the 49% differential is signifi-
cant at the 5% level.
1128
1986 / Temporary Justices
Table 26A247 shows the swing-case agreement rates by date of assign-
ment. It shows a total differential of + 9%; a first-half differential
of 21%; and a second-half differential of +2%. The 21% figure pro-
vides a more complete picture of the first assignment policy than the
49% figure in Table 26.
Swing-case votes were a much greater fraction of the temporary
justice votes under Chief Justice Bird than under the other chief
247.
TABLE 26A
SWINGCCASE AGREErmrN RATES OF TEMPORARY JusTicEs AND SuPP.Em COURT JUSTICES






























1977 50% (9/18) 50% (9/18) 100% (3/3) 100% (3/3) +50%
1978 50% (3/6) 50% (3/6) 100% (1/1) 100% (1/1) +50%
1979 .....
1980 55% (6/11) 55% (6/11) 100% (2/2) 100% (2/2) +45%
1981 46% (41/90) 46% (41/90) 55% (18/33) 55% (18/33) +9%
1982 50% (35/70) 50% (29/58) 55% (11/20) 50% (8/16) 0%
1983 - - --
1984 40% (6/15) 40% (6/15) 33% (2/6) 33% (2/6) -7%








Through 47% (66/141) 47% (60/129) 51% (23/45) 49% (20/41) +2%
1984 1_1_1___ 1_ (p=.
8 0)
aThis table includes temporary-justice assignments made through December 31, 1984, to
the extent reflected in cases decided through July 31, 1985.
bBoth hearings of the American Bank case are included in this table. See supra Table 22,
note a.
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justices. Thirty-eight swing cases were decided through 1984, in which
temporary justices cast sixty-one votes. Appointees other than
holdovers participated in thirty-six of the cases and cast fifty-seven
votes.""8 Swing-case votes thus represented 20% of the votes cast by
appointees (excluding holdovers) in the Bird sample, twice the percen-
tage under any of the other chief justices." 9 The Bird swing cases
are summarized in the footnote.250
248. These figures, unlike those in the tables just presented, count only the first hearing
in the American Bank case. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text; Table 22, note a.
While both hearings are relevant with respect to agreement rates (see id.), for the purpose
of counting swing cases American Bank is more appropriately treated as a single case, and
the first hearing captures the three votes cast by temporary justices in the case.
249. Compare supra Table 23 with Table 26. See infra note 250. Under Chief Justice Gib-
son swing-case votes represented 904 of the votes cast by appointees excluding holdovers;
under Chief Justice Traynor, 8%; under Chief Justice Wright, 10%. See supra Tables 2,
4, 9, 11, 16, 18; notes 145, 175, 197.
250. Bird Swing Cases (asterisk indicates at least one holdover appointee in the case):
1) Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 572 P.2d 188, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368
(1978): Statutory procedure for obtaining confession of judgment in cases not in-
volving consumer transactions struck down as violating federal due process; 4-3 deci-
sion, with superior court judge Homer B. Thompson joining Chief Justice Bird in
majority.
2) Campbell v. Southern Pacific Co., 22 Cal. 3d 51, 583 P.2d 121, 148 Cal. Rptr.
596 (1979): Plaintiff's judgment in negligence and strict liability action affirmed; plain-
tiff's alleged contributory negligence properly disregarded under law prevailing at time
of trial; 4-3 decision, with court of appeal associate justice Bernard Jefferson joining
Chief Justice Bird in majority.
3) In re Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d 419, 584 P.2d 524, 149 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1978): Order
against retarded 14-year-old for fighting in a public place reversed for erroneous
standard in rejecting idiocy defense; American Law Institute standard adopted; 4-3
decision, with court of appeal associate justice Bernard Jefferson joining Chief Justice
Bird in majority.
4) Younger v. Jensen, 26 Cal. 3d 397, 605 P.2d 813, 161 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980):
Authority of state attorney general to investigate antitrust violations not preempted
by federal law; 4-3 decision, with court of appeal presiding justice Clinton White
joining Chief Justice Bird in majority.
5) Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132 (1980): "Market share" liability imposed on drug companies where plaintiff can-
not identify particular manufacturer; 4-3 decision, with court of appeal presiding justice
Clinton White joining Chief Justice Bird in majority. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
6) DeRonde v. Regents of the University of California, 28 Cal. 3d 875, 625 P.2d
220, 172 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1981): Minority preferences in admissions policy at state
university law school not in violation of equal protection; 4-2 decision, with court
of appeal associate justice Joseph Rattigan joining Chief Justice Bird in majority.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
7) Okun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 442, 629 P.2d 1369, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1981):
Demurrer sustained to three causes of action for libel and slander, leave to amend
granted in a fourth; 4-3 decision, with court of appeal associate justice Gordon Col-
ogne in majority, while court of appeal presiding justice Gerald Brown and Chief
Justice Bird joined in concurring and dissenting opinion arguing for dismissal of fourth
cause of action as well.
8) Mandel v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 531, 629 P.2d 935, 174 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1981): Trial
1130
1986 / Temporary Justices
court order that defendant State of California pay plaintiff's attorney's fee upheld
on ground that once Legislature has enacted appropriation bill, courts may order
officials to disregard invalid restrictions on expenditures without violating separation
of powers; 5-2 decision, with court of appeal associate justices Cruz Reynoso and
Joseph Grodin in majority, while Chief Justice Bird agreed with result but "dissented"
on ground that rule that enforcement order against Legislature violates separation
of powers is anachronistic. (Since Chief Justice Bird's opinion was labeled a dissent,
her vote has been counted as disagreeing with the two temporary justices.)
9) Martinez v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 574, 629 P.2d 502, 174 Cal. Rptr. 701
(1981): Change of venue ordered in capital case; 5-2 decision, with court of appeal
associate justices Joseph Rattigan and Pauline D. Hanson joining Chief Justice Bird
in majority.
10) People v. Leyba, 29 Cal. 3d 591, 629 P.2d 961, 174 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1981): Search
of defendant in drug possession case upheld on finding of reasonable suspicion; 4-3
decision, with court of appeal presiding justice Wakefield Taylor in majority, court
of appeal associate justice Sidney Feinberg joining Chief Justice Bird in dissent.
11) People v. Calloway, 29 Cal. 3d 666, 631 P.2d 30, 175 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1981):
Defendant not entitled to specific performance where state broke plea bargain, but
may withdraw admission and enter new plea; 4-3 decision, with court of appeal
associate justice Clark E. Stephens in majority, while court of appeal associate justice
Arleigh Woods joined Chief Justice Bird in dissent arguing for specific performance.
12) People v. Fleming, 29 Cal. 3d 698, 631 P.2d 38, 175 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981):
Search warrant issued by magistrate for search in another county upheld where he
had probable cause to believe crime committed within his jurisdiction; 5-2 decision,
with court of appeal presiding justice Thomas Caldecott and associate justice Jerome
E. Smith in majority, Chief Justice Bird dissenting.
13) People v. Davis, 29 Cal. 3d 814, 633 P.2d 186, 176 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1981): Court
affirms conviction because defendant did not explicitly assert right to remain silent;
reverses penalty, interpreting Penal Code section exempting minors from death penalty
to exempt them as well from life without possibility of parole; 4-3 decision, with
court of appeal associate justice Robert Kingsley in majority, superior court judge
Robert Fainer dissenting as to penalty, and Chief Justice Bird dissenting as to con-
viction. (Although Judge Fainer and Chief Justice Bird both dissented, they did not
agree with each other; hence this case has been counted as a disagreement between
them.)
14) Breese v. Price, 29 Cal. 3d 923, 633 P.2d 987, 176 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1981): Third
party not given notice of workers' compensation settlement is not bound by it; 4-3
decision, with court of appeal associate justice Rodney K. Potter and retired superior
court judge Mary G. Rogan joining Chief Justice Bird in majority.
15) Landrum v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 1, 634 P.2d 352, 177 Cal. Rptr. 325
(1981): Writ of prohibition to prevent further prosecution on burglary information
denied on ground defendant was properly arraigned within statutory period on second
complaint; 4-3 decision, with court of appeal associate Justices Sidney Feinberg and
William Newsom joining Chief Justice Bird in majority; other justices join "concurr-
ing and dissenting" opinion agreeing with majority's result but not with statements
limiting magistrate's power and overruling prior case. ("Concurring and dissenting"
opinions are counted as dissents. See supra note I01.)
16) In re Wilson, 30 Cal. 3d 21, 634 P.2d 363, 177 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1981): Indian
tribe's aboriginal right to hunt held extinguished by payment for land; 5-2 decision,
with court of appeal associate justices Allison M. Rouse and Donald R. Franson
joining Chief Justice Bird in majority.
17) Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 30 Cal. 3d 70, 634 P.2d 917, 177
Cal. Rptr. 566 (1981): Chemical test for drunk driving upheld as bearing reasonable
relation to legitimate state interest; strict-scrutiny standard rejected because driving
not a fundamental right; 5-2 decision, with court of appeal associate justices Stephen
Tamura and Herbert L. Ashby in majority, Chief Justice Bird dissenting.
18) People v. Austin, 30 Cal. 3d 155, 636 P.2d 1, 178 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1981): Denial
of good conduct credit to minors when such credit available to adults held not to
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violate equal protection; 5-2 decision, with court of appeal associate justices Thaxton
Hanson and Margaret J. Morris in majority, Chief Justice Bird dissenting.
19) Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr.
39 (1981): "Dual capacity" doctrine applied to hold employer liable in tort to employee
where claim based on manufacturer's strict liability; 5-2 decision, with court of appeal
associate justices Robert Staniforth and Howard Wiener joining Chief Justice Bird
in majority. See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
*20) Price v. State Bar, 30 Cal. 3d 537, 638 P.2d 1311, 179 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1982):
Attorney's discipline upheld but penalty reduced from disbarment because of mitigating
circumstances; 4-3 decision, with retired supreme court justice Mathew Tobriner
(holdover) in majority, Chief Justice Bird dissenting against reduction of penalty.
21) Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 639 P.2d 939, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1982):
Legislature's redistricting plan ordered used in forthcoming elections though subject
to referendum on same ballot; 4-3 decision, with retired court of appeal associate
justice Stephen Tamura joining Chief Justice Bird in majority. See supra notes 33-34
and accompanying text.
*22) Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr.
496 (1982): Exclusion of families with children from rental housing held prohibited
by Unruh Act; 5-2 decision, with retired supreme court justice Mathew Tobriner
(holdover) and court of appeal presiding justice Clinton White joining Chief Justice
Bird in majority. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
*23) Kilgore v. Younger, 30 Cal. 3d 770, 640 P.2d 793, 180 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1982):
Dismissal of actions for defamation, emotional distress, and invasion of privacy against
state attorney general and media affirmed on grounds of privilege; 4-3 decision, with
court of appeal associate justice Howard Wiener in majority, while retired supreme
court justice Mathew Tobriner (holdover) and retired court of appeal associate justice
Stephen Tamura joined Chief Justice Bird in dissent as to attorney general.
*24) Estate of Black, 30 Cal. 3d 880, 641 P.2d 754, 181 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1982): Will
not invalidated by incorporation of printed language into holograph; 4-3 decision,
with retired supreme court justice Mathew Tobriner (holdover) joining Chief Justice
Bird in majority.
25) Frink v. Prod, 31 Cal. 3d 166, 643 P.2d 476, 181 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1982):
Independent-judgment standard instead of substantial-evidence standard applies to
judicial review of administrative decisions denying applications for welfare benefits;
4-3 decision, with retired court of appeal associate justice Stephen Tamura joining
Chief Justice Bird in majority. See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
26) Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1982), rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 1 (1984): Claims under Franchise Investment Law
not subject to arbitration; on other claims court may order class action arbitration;
4-2 decision, with court of appeal presiding justice Joseph Grodin and court of appeal
associate justice Cruz Reynoso joining Chief Justice Bird in majority. See infra note
305 and accompanying text.
27) People v. Romero, 31 Cal. 3d 685, 646 P.2d 824, 183 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1982):
New trial refused despite statement by six jurors that rather than finding defendant
guilty of burglary on count I and not guilty of burglary on count 2, they meant
the opposite; 5-1 decision, with court of appeal associate justices Marc Poche and
James B. Scott in majority, Chief Justice Bird dissenting.
28) People v. Cardenas, 31 Cal. 3d 897, 647 P.2d 569, 184 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1982):
Conviction reversed for nonprobative and inflammatory nature of evidence and for
reliance on single use of firearms to enhance sentences on two linked charges; 4-2
decision, with superior court judge Jerry Pacht joining Chief Justice Bird in majority.
29) Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 32 Cal. 2d 649,
652 P.2d 426, 186 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1982): Payments made by employers to employees
on claims under group insurance plan held taxable to insurance company as premiums;
4-3 decision, with court of appeal associate justice John J. Miller joining Chief Justice
Bird in majority, while court of appeal associate justice Betty Barry-Deal dissented.
30) In re Mudge, 33 Cal. 3d 152, 654 P.2d 1307, 187 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1982): Attorney's
discipline increased from probation to three-year suspension; 4-3 decision, with court
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Table 27 shows the first-case agreement rates of the temporary
justices appointed by.Chief Justice Bird (excluding holdovers) in cases
decided from the start of her tenure through 1984. The table shows
that justices who were never assigned to another case by Chief Justice
Bird agreed with her in their first case 70% of the time; justices who
were subsequently assigned to some case agreed with the Chief Justice
in their first case 84% of the time; and justices who were subsequently
assigned to a swing case agreed with the Chief Justice in their first
case 100% of the time (twenty times in twenty cases).
of appeal associate justice Mildred Lillie in majority, Chief Justice Bird in dissent
arguing for disbarment.
31) Westside Community for Independent Living v. Obledo, 33 Cal. 3d 348, 657
P.2d 365, 188 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1983): Attorney's fee award reversed on ground suit
had no effect in obtaining of relief; 4-3 decision, with court of appeal presiding justice
Gerald Brown joining Chief Justice Bird in majority.
32) People v. Miller, 33 Cal. 3d 545, 658 P.2d 1320, 189 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1983):
Burglary conviction reversed because defendant made timely motion to suppress
evidence before plea bargain; 5-2 decision, with court of appeal associate justices
George N. Zenovich and Wickson R. Woolpert joining Chief Justice Bird in majority.
33) American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 33 Cal. 3d 674 (advance
sheets only), 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983): Statute allowing periodic in-
stead of lump-sum payments on medical malpractice judgments struck down as violating
equal protection; 4-3 decision, with court of appeal associate justice Joseph Rattigan
and presiding justice John Racanelli joining Chief Justice Bird in majority, court
of appeal associate justice Sidney Feinberg dissenting. But see decision on rehearing,
Case No. 39 infra in this footnote; see supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
34) In re Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 662 P.2d 922, 191 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1983): Order
removing children from mother's custody on basis of neglect affirmed; 4-3 decision,
with court of appeal associate justice Pauline D. Hanson in majority, Chief Justice
Bird dissenting.
35) People v. Jasper, 33 Cal. 3d 931, 663 P.2d 206, 191 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1983): Pro-
bation revocation upheld though hearing held prior to conviction of crime, since defen-
dant's statements at hearing were inadmissible at trial; 4-3 decision, with superior
court judge Edward Panelli in majority, Chief Justice Bird dissenting.
36) In re Ibarra, 34 Cal. 3d 277, 666 P.2d 980, 193 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1983): Guilty
plea not involuntary or based on lawyer incompetence; 4-3 decision, with court of
appeal associate justice George E. Danielson in majority, Chief Justice Bird dissenting.
37) People v. Zimmerman, 36 Cal. 3d 154, 680 P.2d 776, 202 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1984):
Exclusion of jurors with reservations about death penalty held not to deny rights
of defendant who was sentenced to life without possibility of parole; 4-2 decision,
with superior court judge Harkjoon Paik in majority, Chief Justice Bird dissenting.
38) Rodgers v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 36 Cal. 3d 330, 682 P.2d
1068, 204 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1984): To invoke statutory credit employer need only pay
workers' compensation benefits equivalent to employer's proportion of negligence,
not employee's proportion as well; 5-2 decision, with retired superior court judge
Lawrence S. Mana and superior court judge Frank W. Shaw, Jr., in majority, Chief
Justice Bird dissenting.
39) American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d
670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984): On rehearing, statute allowing periodic instead of
lump-sum payments on medical malpractice judgments held valid under equal pro-
tection clause; 4-3 decision, with court of appeal associate justice Sidney Feinberg
in majority, court of appeal associate justice Joseph Rattigan joining Chief Justice
Bird in dissent. See Case No. 33 supra in this footnote; see supra notes 26-32 and
accompanying text.
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TABLE 27
FIRST-CASE AGREEMENT RATES WITH CHIEF JUSTICE BIRD OF NONREPEAT,
























Agreement Rate 70% 84% 100%
with Chief Justice (58/83) (41/49) (20/20)
Bird
Difference From 14% 30% b
Column (1) (p = .07) (p = .004)
Difference From 16%
Column (2) -- -- (p = .06)
aHoldovers excluded. Since the second assignments of Justices Rattigan and
Feinberg in the American Bank case, see supra Table 22, note a, were controlled
by their first assignments, this table counts, if relevant, only the first hearing in
that case.
bSignificant at the 5% level.
Table 27A is a variation of Table 27. It shows the same test for
the Bird temporary justices based on their agreement rates in their
first assignment, as distinct from their first case."5 '
251. As noted earlier (supra note 110), our comparisons of "first case" agreement rates
for nonrepeat, repeat, and swing-case-repeat temporary justices, like other references we make
to "repeat" appointees, define a "repeat" appointee as one who appears in more than one
case, whether or not those appearances result from more than one assignment. When an appointee
appears in more than one case under a single multi-case assignment, the chief justice obviously
could not have considered the appointee's vote in the first case when assigning the second
case. As explained in note 110 supra, we do not regard this fact as undermining the validity
of comparisons defining repeat appointees in terms of the number of cases in which they sit.
Nonetheless the question has concerned us, and we have sought to check the validity of our
approach by redoing Table 27 on the basis of Chief Justice Bird's first assignments of tem-
porary justices, as distinct from the first cases in which they sat. Thus, where the supreme
court Minutes report that a particular judge on a given date was assigned to sit with the court
on specified future dates (the Minutes do not name the cases in which the judge will sit, though
the chief justice surely knows them), and where that judge then sat and voted in two or more
cases argued on those specified dates, we have counted this for the purpose of the new table,
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Table 28 shows the agreement-rate comparison for Chief Justice
Bird among one-time appointees, appointees assigned to three or more
cases, and appointees assigned to five or more cases.252 The table shows
that the five-or-more-time appointees agreed with Chief Justice Bird
Table 27A, as a single assignment, instead of an initial case and one or more "repeat" cases.
For example, Chief Justice Bird's assignment on June 3, 1977, of associate court of appeal
Justice Bernard Jefferson to sit from June 13 through June 17, 1977 (see Minutes, June 3,
1977), which resulted in Justice Jefferson's voting in 18 cases (see supra note 203 and accom-
panying text), is counted as a single assignment. And since Justice Jefferson was never again
assigned to sit as a temporary supreme court justice by Chief Justice Bird (he retired from
the bench in 1980, see 27 Cal. 3d. v), this assignment is counted in Table 27A as a "first
assignment" for a "nonrepeat" justice. Further, it is counted as producing a 94% agreement
rate (Justice Jefferson agreed with Chief Justice Bird in 17 of the 18 cases). Table 27A thus
shows the first-assignment agreement rates of nonrepeat, repeat, and swing-case-repeat justices
appointed by Chief Justice Bird. The results are similar to those in Table 27 and seem to
us to validate the approach of defining "repeats" in terms of cases.
TABLE 27A
FIRST-ASsIGNMENT AGREEMENT RATES W ITH CHIEF JUSTICE BIRD OF NONREPEAT, REPEAT,
























Agreement Rate with 73% 83% 100%
Chief Justice Bird
(each assignment (96 assignments (36 assignments (15 assignments
weighted equally) b  involving 130 cases) involving 45 cases) involving 20 cases)
Difference From 10% 27%o





aHoldovers excluded. This table counts, if relevant, only the first hearing in the American
Bank case. See supra Table 27, note a.
bThe assignments were weighted equally regardless of the number of cases they entailed;
thus a four-case assignment with a 100% agreement rate was counted the same as a one-
case assignment with a 100% agreement rate. (This method seemed consistent with the approach
of treating each assignment as a separate entity and with the fact that each assignment,
regardless of how many cases it entailed, involved a single judge whom the chief justice
might or might not appoint again.)
cSignificant at the 5% level.
252. Compare supra note 251.
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more often than the one-time appointees in all cases, in close cases,
and in swing cases, by statistically significant margins of 18%, 30%,
and 43°70, respectively.
TABLE 28
AGREEMENT RATES WITH CHIEF JUSTICE BIRD OF ONE-TIME, THREE-OR-MORE-
TIME, AND FIVE-OR-MORE-TIME TEMPORARY JUSTICES APPOINTED BY HER
(1977-1984)a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Supreme One-Time Three-Or- Five-Or-More- Difference
Court Justices' More-Time Time Justices' (4) - (2)
Agreement Agreement Justices' Agreement
Rateb Rate Agreement Rate
Rate
All 7607o 6901o 85% 87016 + 18% c
Cases (57/83) (123/144) (94/108) (p = .002)
Close 5107o 43% 67% 73% + 30% c
Cases (9/21) (31/46) (27/37) (p = .02)
Swing 48% 27% 71% 70% +43 %'c
Cases (3/11) (24/34) (19/27) (p = .01)
aHoldovers excluded. This table includes only 'the first hearing in the American
Bank case. See supra Table 27, note a.
'The figures in this column are drawn from Tables 23, 25, and 26, supra.
cSignificant at the 5% level.
Table 29 provides a further analysis of the votes cast by repeat
appointees of Chief Justice Bird. It lists all the judges who sat under
her assignment in five or more cases, together with each judge's agree-
ment rate, the agreement rates of the supreme court justices in the
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253. TABLE 29
AGREEMENT RATES AND PouTcAL DERiVATIONS OF TEMPORARY JusTIcEs ASSIGNED TO FIVE





(3) (4) (5) (6)
Number Ag. Rate Associate Supreme
of Cases with Chief Justices' Ag. Court Ag.
Justice Bird Rate in Rate in
Same Cases Same Cases
Jefferson (AJ) Dem. 18 94% 76% 80% + 14%
(Brown Sr.) (17/18) (68/90) (86/108)
Rattigan (AJ)b Dem. 13 92% 69% 75% + 17%
(Brown Sr.) (12/13) (36/52) (49/65)
Reynoso (AJ) Dem. 11 82% 61% 69% +13%
(Brown Jr.) (9/11) (27/44) (38/55)
Grodin (AJ) Dem. 11 91% 82% 86% +5%
(Brown Jr.) (10/11) (37/45) (48/56)
White (PJ) Dem. 10 90% 71% 76% + 14%
(Brown Jr.) (9/10) (34/48) (44/58)
Feinberg (AJ)b Dem. 9 67% 56% 64% +3%
(Brown Sr.) (6/9) (20/36) (29/45)
Tamura (AJ)c Dem. 7 86% 59% 67% + 19%
(Brown Sr.) (6/7) (19/32) (26/39)
Staniforth (AJ) Dem. 7 100% 72% 78% +22%
(Brown Sr.) (7/7) (21/29) (28/36)
Caldecott (PJ) Rep. 6 83% 82% 85% -2%
(Knight) (5/6) (23/28) (29/34)
Thompson (TJ) Dem. 6 83% 83% 86% -3%
(Brown Sr.) (5/6) (25/30) (31/36)
Kingsley (AJ) Dem. 5 80% 57% 65% + 15%
(Brown Sr.) (4/5) (12/21) (17/26)
Wiener (AJ) Dem. 5 80% 68% 75% +5%
(Brown Jr.) (4/5) (13/19) (18/24)
Richardson Rep. 24 38% 81% 84% -46%
(RS) (Reagan) (9/24) (95/117) (119/141)
Tobriner (RS) Dem. 18 78% 68% 74% +4%
(Brown Sr.) (14/18) (58/85) (76/103)
Legend: AJ = Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal; PJ = Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeal; TJ = Trial Court Judge; RS = Retired Supreme Court (Holdover)
Justice.
aThe "appointing governor" is the governor who first appointed the judge to the bench,
except that in the case of retired supreme court justices it is the governor who appointed
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Table 30 shows the political-derivation test for the Bird temporary
justices, based on date of assignment and divided into the two "halves"
of the period covered. 24
bBoth hearings of the American Bank case, see note a to Table 22, supra, are included
in this Table, so that the numbers of cases for Justices Rattigan and Feinberg are the same
as in Table 22, supra. The resulting duplication increases the agreement rate of Justice Rattigan
and decreases that of Justice Feinberg.
CJustie Tamura retired as associate justice of the court of appeal on October 25, 1981.
His assignments as a temporary justice came both before and after his retirement.
254. The method is that described supra in note 117, except that this table is based on
date of assignment rather than date of decision. The data for the periods through March 25,
1981, and from March 26, 1981, through the end of 1984 show the assignments made by Chief
Justice Bird during those periods (drawn from the supreme court's Minutes), as reflected in
all cases decided by the court through July 1985. The statewide pools for the two periods
have been compiled, and weighted by "judge years," as described supra in note 117.
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TABLE 30
PoLinCAL DERIVATION OF TEMPORARY JUSTICES APPOINTED BY CHIEF JUSTICE
BIRD COMPARED WITH PoLmcAL DERIVATION OF STATEWIDE POOLS FROM WHICH
THEY CAME, FOR FIRST FOUR YEARS AND FOR REMAINDER OF PERIOD THROUGH







First First First First
Appointed Appointed Appointed Appointed
To Bench To Bench To Bench To Bench
by by by by Democratic Republican
Democratic Republican Democratic Republican Governor Governor
Gov. Gov. Gov. Gov. Appointees Appointees
MARCH 26, 1977, THROUGH MARCH 25, 1981
Court of
Appeal
Presiding 67% (32) 33% (16) 75% (12) 25% (4) +8% -8%
Justices (p =. 5 3)
Court of
Appeal
Associate 53% (88) 47% (79) 95% (71) 5% (4) +42% - 4 2 %b
Justices (p =.001)
Superior
Court 56% (1129) 44% (879) 100% (6) 0% (0) +44% - 4 4 %b
Judges (p =.00
1)
MARCH 26,,1981, THROUGH DECEMBER 19 84 c
Court of
Appeal




Associate 72% (158) 28% (61) 77% (70) 23% (21) +5% -5%
Justices (p =. 38)
Superior
Court 67% (1466) 33% (716) 74%o (54) 26% (19) +7% -7%
Judges (p =.2 3)
aThis table is based on assignments made during the periods indicated, as reflected
in cases decided through July 31, 1985.
bSignificant at the 5% level.
'This table counts only the first hearing in the American Bank case. The reasons
for counting that hearing given in note a to Table 22, supra, are applicable, and
since this table involves no agreement-rate comparison there is no reason to count
the second hearing as well.
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Chief Justice Bird was herself the appointee of a Democratic gover-
nor, Edmund G. Brown, Jr. Table 30 shows that during the first
four years of her tenure she favored appointees of Democratic gover-
nors by margins of 8% among court of appeal presiding justices, 42%
among court of appeal associate justices, and 44% among superior
court judges. In the remaining period, from March 26, 1981, through
the end of 1984, Chief Justice Bird favored appointees of Republican
governors by a margin of 15% among presiding justices, while conti-
nuing to favor Democratic governors' appointees by margins of 5%
among associate justices and 7% among superior court judges.2 "
In neither period were any of the statewide pools closer to Chief
Justice Bird in political derivation than were the justices of the supreme
court.256 During the first period the supreme court justices consisted
of 68% Democratic governors' appointees, 2" compared with
Democratic percentages in the statewide pools (as shown in Table 30)
of 67%, 53%, and 56%. During the second period the proportion
of Democratic appointees on the court rose to 87%,21 while the pro-
portions in the pools (as shown in Table 30) were 80%, 72%, and 67%.
3. Observations on Chief Justice Bird
a. General Appointment Policies
Throughout the almost eight years of Chief Justice Bird's tenure
reviewed here, her policy in choosing temporary justices differed from
the policies of her three immediate predecessors in two major ways.
First, while Chief Justices Gibson, Traynor, and Wright all made ap-
preciable use of retired supreme court justices apart from the holdover
situation,25 9 Chief Justice Bird made no assignments of retired supreme
255. The presiding justices represented 16% of the appointments in the three categories
during the latter period (31 of 195), while the associate justices represented 47% and the superior
court judges 37%. See Table 30.
256. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
257. Eight justices served on the court during this period, including five appointees of
Democratic governors (Chief Justice Bird and Justices Tobriner, Mosk, Manuel, and Newman)
and three appointees of Republican governors (Justices McComb, Clark, and Richardson). By
the weighting method described supra in notes 117-18, there were 14 judge-years for Democratic
appointees (68%) and 6.5 for Republican appointees.
258. Ten justices served, including eight Democratic appointees (Chief Justice Bird and Justices
Tobriner, Mosk, Newman, Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, and Grodin) and two Republican ap-
pointees (Justices Richardson and Lucas). Weighted for length of service, there were 24
Democratic judge-years (87%) and 3.5 Republican ones. See supra notes 117-18.
259. Nonholdover assignments of retired supreme court justices constituted 11% of the
temporary-justice assignments by Chief Justice Gibson, 68% of those by Chief Justice Traynor,
and 10% of those by Chief Justice Wright. See supra Tables 1, 8, 15.
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court justices except as holdover appointees. Second, while none of
her three predecessors appointed any trial court judges to sit with
the supreme court, Chief Justice Bird gave 21% of her assignments
to trial court judges. 6 0 In addition, Chief Justice Bird departed from
the policies of her two immediate predecessors, and returned to that
of Chief Justice Gibson, in choosing mostly associate justices rather
than presiding justices from the court of appeal.1
6'
In other respects Chief Justice Bird changed her assignment policy
dramatically in midstream. Beginning in April 1981, Chief Justice Bird
moved gradually from a practice of making multi-case and repeat
assignments of selected court of appeal justices to a practice of assign-
ing first all the court of appeal justices in the state, and then large
numbers of trial judges, mostly for one case at a time. The Bird period
thus divides into two parts and two different assignment practices.
While the period warrants appraisal as a whole, the two practices,
each lasting for several years and evidently representing a conscious
policy decision by the Chief Justice, 62 also need to be assessed
separately. If analysis of either practice suggests that temporary justices
were being chosen with an eye to how they would vote, ground will
exist for questioning the system of discretionary assignment by the
chief justice.
b. Evidence Concerning Bias
Over the entire Bird period the margins of vote bias shown by the
temporary appointees were 2% in all cases, 6% in close cases, and
8070 in swing cases. 63 These margins all are well below, indeed half
260. See supra Table 22. In cases decided in 1984, trial judges received two-thirds of the
assignments (excluding holdovers), see supra Table 24, and they received 69o of those made
in 1985. See supra note 227 (27 of 39 assignments in 1985). In the cases through 1984 the
trial-judge assignees were all superior court judges, save one assignment of a municipal court
judge in 1977. See Minutes, Sept. 29, 1977 (Judge Erich Auerbach); State of California v.
San Luis Obispo Sportsman's Ass'n, 22 Cal. 3d 440, 454, 584 P.2d 1088, 1096, 149 Cal. Rptr.
482, 490 (1978) (Auerbach, J., concurring and dissenting); see also P. SToLz, supra note 14,
at 301-03, 310. Assignments made in 1985 included 17 assignments of superior court judges,
nine of municipal court judges, and one of a justice court judge. See supra note 227.
261. Associate justices received 52% of all the Bird assignments, and presiding justices 14%.
See supra Table 22; compare supra Tables 1, 8, 15. Unlike Chief Justice Gibson's dispropor-
tionate preference for associate justices, see supra note 124 and accompanying text, Chief Justice
Bird's 52% to 14% ratio roughly mirrored the numbers in the respective pools; at the end
of 1981 there were 44 associate justices and 12 presiding justices. See 30 Cal. 3d iv-vii (1982).
Chief Justice Bird's appointment policy thus may be said to have treated presiding justices
and associate justices equally.
262. See Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying text.
263. See supra Tables 23, 25, 26; infra Table 31. These figures, and others used in this
discussion, represent the differentials between the temporary justices' agreement rate and the
supreme court agreement rate. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. The figures exclude
holdover appointees and holdover cases.
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or less than half, the comparable margins obtained by Chief Justice
Gibson and Chief Justice Wright, as well as the margin obtained by
Chief Justice Traynor in swing cases. The vote-bias margins for all
four chief justices are brought together in Table 31.264
The first four years of Chief Justice Bird's tenure, reflecting her
initial assignment policy, show much greater margins of vote bias.
In cases decided through March 31, 1981, Chief Justice Bird's ap-
pointees produced differentials of 12% in all cases, 38% in close cases,
and 49% in swing cases. 261 While the close-case and swing-case samples
were rather small, 66 these margins all are statistically significant at the
5 % level. 267 They far exceed-in all but one case, more than




COMPARISON OF AGRESm NT-RATE DnRENcEs FOR TEMpoRARY Jusincas APPOINTED BY
Cm-1F JusTicas GIBSON, TRAYNOR, WRIoT, AND BIRD
Differences Between Temporary Justices' Agreement Rate (Excluding Holdovers) and
Supreme Court Agreement Rate
All Cases Close Cases Swing Cases
Chief Justice Gibson +500 +22% +21%co
(1954-1964)a
Chief Justice Traynorb -90/% -16% + 21o




1984 + 2% +6% +8%
Through Mar. 31, +12% +38% +49%
1981
Apr. 1, 1981, +1%0 +1% +400
Through 1984
aSee Tables 2, 3, 4 supra.
bSee Tables 9, 10, II supra.
cSee Tables 16, 17, 18 supra.
dSee Tables 23, 25, 26 supra. The dates indicated for Chief Justice Bird are the dates of
case decisions. For the results for Chief Justice Bird by dates of assignment, see Tables 23A,
25A, 26A supra.
265. See supra Table 31; see also supra Tables 23, 25, 26.
266. See supra Tables 25, 26.
267. See supra Tables 23, 25, 26; see also supra Table 2, note b.
268. Chief Justice Gibson's close-case margin of +22% is the only one not doubled by the
comparable margin for the first four years of Chief Justice Bird (380 in this case). See supra
Table 31.
269. See supra Table 31.
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Turning to the assignment-date tables, we find for the first half
of the Bird period, including all assignments made through March
31, 1981, larger samples and lower vote-bias differentials: 9% in all
cases, 22% in close cases, and 21% in swing cases."' The first two
differentials are statistically significant at the 5% level, and the third
at the 10% level."' In the swing cases these differentials are no greater,
however, than those obtained by Chief Justice Gibson, Chief Justice
Wright, and Chief Justice Traynor. 2
In the second half of the Bird period the vote bias declined
dramatically. In cases decided from April 1, 1981, through 1984, the
margins were + 1°% in all cases, 73 + 1% in close cases, and + 4% in
swing cases.2 74 The assignment-date tables for this period show margins
of -2%, + 1%, and +2%, respectively. 27 All these figures are far below
the total-period margins of Chief Justice Gibson and Chief Justice
Wright, as well as that of Chief Justice Traynor in swing cases.
76
On the whole, these figures show little if any vote bias during the
second half of the Bird period.
77
The substantial vote bias in the first half of the period is consistent
with other results for Chief Justice Bird. Table 27 reports that the first-
case agreement rates for nonrepeat, repeat, and swing-case-repeat ap-
pointees in the entire Bird period were 70%, 84%, and 100%, respec-
tively.2 78 The other three chief justices also had 100% agreement rates
in the third category; that is, they made no assignment in a swing case
of any judge who had disagreed with them in the first case to which
the judge was assigned. 79 For those chief justices, however, the
numbers were small and the results insignificant.280 Under Chief Justice
270. See supra Tables 23A, 25A, 26A.
271. See supra Table 2, note b; Tables 23A, 25A, 26A.
272. See supra Table 31; compare supra Table 26A with Tables 4, 11, 18.
273. The margin was still + 60o above the associate justices' agreement rate. See supra Table 23.
274. See supra Table 31; see also supra Tables 23, 25, 26.
275. See supra Tables 23A, 25A, 26A.
276. See supra Table 31.
277. Numbers aside, however, some important swing cases in which a temporary justice
swung the result Chief Justice Bird's way were decided during this half. See infra note 278.
278. While Table 27 covers the entire Bird period, it reflects disproportionately the first
four-to-five-and-one-half years, when repeat appointments were much more common than
they later became. See supra notes 202-27 and accompanying text. On the other hand, more
than half the Bird swing cases (20 of 38) were decided in the years 1982-1984, and these in-
cluded some major or important rulings in which the swing votes were cast by frequent repeat
appointees: Assembly v. Deukmejian, Frink v. Prod, Keating v. Superior Court, and the first
hearing in the American Bank case. See supra note 250; supra Table 29; see also supra notes
26-34 and accompanying text; infra note 305 and accompanying text. Another controversial
case in which the assignments were made in 1983 and included one frequent repeat appointee,
though the case was not decided until 1985 and proved to be unanimous, was Perdue. See
supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
279. See supra Tables 5, 12, 19.
280. See supra Tables 5, 12, 19, and accompanying text. There were only three swing-case-
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Bird, twenty temporary justices were assigned to a swing case after
being assigned to one or more other cases, and all twenty had agreed
with Chief Justice Bird in their first case.28' Not only were the samples
much larger, but the differentials were greater. 8 ' Justices chosen to
repeat in a swing case agreed with Chief Justice Bird in their first
case significantly more often than one-time justices did, and justices
chosen to repeat in some case also exceeded the agreement rate of
the nonrepeats by a substantial margin. 83
Bias in the votes of repeat assignees under Chief Justice Bird also
appears in Table 28. The table shows that judges appointed in five
or more cases and in three or more cases agreed with Chief Justice
Bird substantially more often than judges appointed in only one case.28 "
The margins were all statistically significant, and they increased from
all cases to close cases to swing cases.285
It does not necessarily follow from Table 27 or Table 28 that Chief
Justice Bird selected judges for repeat appointments because of the
way they were voting.8 6 She may have chosen the judges she con-
sidered the best qualified, and the appointees' performances in their
initial sittings with the court-apart from their votes-may have helped
to demonstrate their qualifications. In fact, two of Chief Justice Bird's
favorite appointees, Justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso, subse-
quently were appointed to the supreme court by the same governor
who appointed her." 7 This suggests that Chief Justice Bird, like Chief
Justice Gibson, used temporary assignments as a way of grooming
judges for promotion.2 8 This explanation applies to only a small frac-
repeat appointees for Chief Justice Gibson, five for Chief Justice Traynor, and six for Chief
Justice Wright. See id. For Chief Justice Wright, moreover, the agreement rate was 1000 in
all three columns. See supra Table 19 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Table 27. (In some instances the successive cases were assigned simultaneously.
See supra note 110 and Table 27A.) Under Chief Justice Bird there were 152 first-case votes
in the three categories, compared with fewer than 25 for each of the other chief justices. Com-
pare supra Table 27 with Tables 5, 12, 19.
282. Compare supra Table 27 with Tables 5, 12, 19.
283. See supra Table 27. The 30% margin between the swing-case repeats and the nonrepeats
was significant at the 5% level; the 16% margin between the "some case repeats" and the
nonrepeats was significant at the 6% level. Id.
284. See supra Table 28. Table 28, like Table 27, reflects disproportionately the first four-
to-five-and-one-half years of the Bird period. See supra note 278.
285. See supra Table 28.
286. Higher agreement rates for repeat appointees might reflect their own incentives to win
reappointment or other favors from the chief justice. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying
text. While these incentives may affect all temporary justices, presumably they are somewhat
stronger for repeat appointees since these judges already have enjoyed one reappointment.
287. See supra Tables 22, 29. Justice Reynoso was appointed to the supreme court by Gov.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., and took office in February 1982. See 30 Cal. 3d iii (1982). Justice
Grodin, also appointed by Gov. Brown, Jr., took office in December 1982. See 33 Cal. 3d
iii (1982).
288. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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tion of Chief Justice Bird's repeat appointments, however, while it
applied to a large majority of those made by Chief Justice Gibson." 9
The political derivation test for the Bird appointees, reported in
Table 30, again shows the difference between Chief Justice Bird's first
and second assignment policies. In the first four years of her tenure
Chief Justice Bird favored court of appeal presiding justices, court
of appeal associate justices, and superior court judges who were
appointees, as she was, of a Democratic governor. In the latter two
groups the margins were substantial and statistically significant-42%
and 44%, respectively.2 9 This is the only instance we found where
the results of the political-derivation test coincide with vote bias in
the agreement-rate results. For Chief Justices Gibson, Traynor, and
Wright, the results of one analysis tended to offset any indication
of selection bias arising from the other.29' The first period under Chief
Justice Bird is unique in showing not only strong evidence of vote bias
in the agreement-rate data, but also a strong and consistent preference
in the political-derivation data for judges appointed by governors of the
chief justice's own political party.292
The second period under Chief Justice Bird again presents a dif-
ferent picture. The vote data for this period showed little or no
vote bias,2 93 and the political-derivation data are in accord. On one
hand they show a margin of 15% favoring Republican appointees
among presiding justices, on the other hand margins of 5% and 7%
289. Compare supra Table 1 & notes a, b, c, and supra notes 133-34 and accompanying
text, with supra Tables 22, 29. As Table 29 shows, Justices Grodin and Reynoso were among
12 lower-court judges appointed by Chief Justice Bird to sit in five or more cases; none of
the others received gubernatorial promotions during the 1977-1984 period.
290. See supra Table 30.
291. For Chief Justice Gibson and Chief Justice Wright, the agreement-rate results showed
substantial vote bias (see supra Tables 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11), as they do for the first period
under Chief Justice Bird. See supra Tables 23, 25, 26. The political-derivation results, however,
showed that Chief Justice Gibson, a Democratic appointee, favored judges appointed by
Republican governors, see supra Table 7 and accompanying text, and that Chief Justice Wright,
a Republican appointee, favored judges appointed by Democratic governors. See supra Table
21 and accompanying text. Meanwhile Chief Justice Traynor, a Democratic appointee, showed
virtually no favoritism with respect to the political derivation of his temporary appointees,
see supra Table 14 and accompanying text-a result coinciding with the absence of vote bias
that was the major theme in his agreement-rate results. See supra notes 155-77 and accompany-
ing text.
292. This preference appears also in the fact that 11 of the 12 judges (excluding holdovers)
who were assigned to sit in five or more cases by Chief Justice Bird were appointees of Democratic
governors. See supra Table 29. Possibly such a preference might be explained as an attempt
to mirror in temporary appointments the political complexion of the supreme court. But the
"Democratic" percentages among the Bird appointees during the first period-75% among
presiding justices, 95% among associate justices, and 100% among superior court judges (see
supra Table 30)-substantially exceeded not only the percentages in the statewide pools but
also the 680 "Democratic" make-up of the court. See supra Table 30, note 257, and accom-
panying text.
293. See supra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
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favoring Democratic appointees among associate justices and superior
court judges.29 While the last two categories comprised many more
appointments than the first category,2" these figures on the whole
show no clear favoritism.
296
c. Impact of Swing-Case Decisions
Statistics aside, the vote bias of temporary justices had a markedly
greater impact on California's law under Chief Justice Bird than under
any of her three predecessors. 297 Under her predecessors only one major
case, Belous under Chief Justice Traynor, 29s was decided the chief
justice's way by the vote of a (nonholdover) temporary justice. 299 Under
Chief Justice Bird, as noted earlier,300 there were several such cases:
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,30 ' imposing "market share" liability
on drug manufacturers; DeRonde v. Regents of the University of
California,30 2 upholding minority preferences in state university
admissions; Assembly v. Deukmejian,3" ordering districts drawn by
legislative Democrats used in the 1982 election though under challenge
by Republicans on the same ballot; and the decision on the first hearing
in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital,"' striking
294. See supra Table 30.
295. See supra Table 30 and accompanying text.
296. Such favoritism as there was during this period for Democratic appointees in the
associate-justice and superior court categories might be explained, as it could not be in the
first period (see supra note 292), as an attempt to bring the temporary appointees more into
line with the political complexion of the supreme court. The court's "Democratic" contingent
had risen to 8707, higher not only than the democratic percentages in the statewide pools (7201o
& 6707o) but also than the democratic percentages among the Bird associate justice and superior
court appointees (77%o & 74%). See supra Table 30, note 258, and accompanying text.
297. Swing cases were twice as frequent under Chief Justice Bird as under any of the three
predecessors, comprising 20% of the temporary-justice votes (excluding holdovers). Compare supra
Tables 23, 26; see supra note 249 and accompanying text. But this would not itself produce
a greater impact, since the amount of vote bias in swing cases for the entire Bird period was
considerably lower than for her predecessors. See supra Table 31,
298. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969); see supra
notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
299. There were two major cases in the 30-year period decided the chief justice's way by
holdover votes: Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975), under Chief Justice Wright, and Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640
P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982), under Chief Justice Bird. See supra note 16.
300. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
301. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980); see supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
302. 28 Cal. 3d 875, 625 P.2d 220, 172 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1981); see supra notes 36-37 and
accompanying text.
303. 30 Cal. 3d 638, 639 P.2d 939, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1982); see supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
304. 33 Cal. 3d 674 (advance sheets only), 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1982), set
aside on rehearing, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984); see supra notes
26-32 and accompanying text.
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down a key provision of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act. Meanwhile three other cases, also decided Chief Justice Bird's
way by votes of her temporary appointees, were important if not
major.3"5 In all seven cases, the appointees casting the deciding votes
were at least four-time appointees of Chief Justice Bird,3"6 and
all had been appointed to the bench by Democratic governors." 7
There were, to be sure, other swing cases in which temporary ap-
pointees of Chief Justice Bird cast deciding votes against her posi-
tion. But none of them could be called major or important rulings. °0
305. (1) Frink v. Prod, 31 Cal. 3d 166, 643 P.2d 476, 181 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1982). The
court held that administrative rulings denying applications for welfare benefits-and
an indeterminate range of other administrative rulings-henceforth would be reviewed
by courts under the "independent judgment" instead of the "substantial evidence"
standard. The decision, which overruled two of the court's precedents (see 31
Cal. 3d at 180, 643 P.2d at 484, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 901), was 4 to 3, with Chief
Justice Bird in the majority and the fourth vote provided by retired associate justice
Stephen Tamura of the court of appeal.
(2) Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1982) rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). The court held that claims under the state's
Franchise Investment Law were not subject to arbitration, and that on other claims
the trial court could order the arbitration to proceed as a class action. The vote
was 4 to 2, with Chief Justice Bird joined in the majority by court of appeal presiding
justice Joseph Grodin (who wrote the opinion) and court of appeal associate justice
Cruz Reynoso.
(3) Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr.
30 (1981). The question was whether an employee could sue his employer on the
basis of manufacturer's strict liability under the "dual capacity" exception to the
"exclusive remedy" provision of the workers' compensation law. See CAL. LABOR
CODE §§3600, 3601. The trial court had granted summary judgment for the employer,
the court of appeal had reversed (168 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1980)), and the supreme court
had granted a hearing, with the necessary four votes provided by Justices Mosk, Clark,
Richardson, and Manuel. Minutes, Dec. 18, 1980. When Justice Manuel died and
Justice Clark retired, Chief Justice Bird appointed in their place court of appeal
associate justices Robert Staniforth and Howard Wiener. Minutes, March 26, 1981.
The supreme court's decision, agreeing with the court of appeal and reversing the
trial court, was 5 to 2, with Chief Justice Bird and the two temporary justices in
the majority. Justices Mosk and Richardson, the remaining two of the four justices
who had voted to grant the hearing, dissented.
306. See supra note 250, Tables 22, 29.
307. See supra note 250, Table 29. Justice Racanelli in the American Bank case (see supra
notes 26-32 and accompanying text), a four-time appointee (hence not listed among the five-
time appointees in Table 29), was appointed to the bench by Gov. Brown, Sr.
Another major decision under Chief Justice Bird might have been a swing case, but proved
only to be a close case. In Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978), the court held that plaintiff's fault is a comparative defense in
actions based on strict products liability. The vote was 4 to 3, with temporary justice Bernard
Jefferson joining Chief Justice Bird in dissent. The majority consisted of Justices Richardson,
Clark, Manuel, and Tobriner. Justice Tobriner's vote was perhaps surprising. Had he gone
the other way, Justice Jefferson's vote would have been decisive for denying the defense.
308. See supra note 250. On the second hearing of American Bank, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683
P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984), a temporary justice cast a crucial vote against Chief Justice
Bird's position; but the assignment of temporary justices had a neutral effect in that case,
since the two assignees split. See id.; see also supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
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d. Retired Supreme Court Justices, Presiding Justices, and
Associate Justices
The assignment policies of Chief Justice Bird raise broader ques-
tions about ways of selecting temporary justices, questions not limited
to considerations of possible bias. One question arises from Chief
Justice Bird's departure-holdover appointments aside-from her
predecessors' practice of appointing retired supreme court justices to
sit with the supreme court.30 9 Not using retired supreme court justices
means foregoing a class of appointees who, as noted earlier, offer
important advantages over lower-court judges." ' The prior three chief
justices, and Chief Justice Traynor in particular, all made substantial
use of such appointees,31 ' thus adding tradition to the advantages they
offer.
Chief Justice Bird's abandonment of the practice, however, may
not have been voluntary. Chief Justice Wright reported that during
his years in office the available pool of retired supreme court justices
already was contracting. 312 Since then the process may well have
accelerated, as employment opportunities for retired judges have
notably increased.3 3 Hence, while outsiders can never be certain about
the availability of particular retired justices, the possibility exists that
none were available for assignment by Chief Justice Bird.
Another question is raised by Chief Justice Bird's decision-unlike
Chief Justice Traynor and Chief Justice Wright, but like Chief Justice
Gibson-to choose the court of appeal justices she assigned primarily
from the large pool of associate justices, instead of the smaller pool
of presiding justices. 3 4 The use of associate justices expands the chief
justice's field of choice and ability to exercise selection preference-
to find the most capable judges, for example, or those with expertise
in a particular field of law. By increasing the chief justice's discre-
tion, however, the use of associate justices also increases the poten-
309. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Tables 1, 8, 15, and accompanying text.
312. Wright Interview, supra note 38; supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
313. See, e.g., State Judges Find Wealth of Work During Retirement, L.A. Daily J.,
March 20, 1986, at 1, col. 6. The article reports that the Judicial Council "is having an in-
creasingly difficult time persuading retired judges to sit on assignment in state courts," and
that "[m]any ex-jurists acknowledge they are loath to accept court assignments because they
can earn far more money serving outside the court system as privately employed rent-a-judges."
Retired supreme court justices in recent years have also engaged in law practice or law teaching.
314. See supra note 261 and accompanying text; Tables 1, 8, 15, 22.
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tial for selection bias or the appearance of bias. 3"' Besides providing
a smaller pool, presiding justices are gubernatorial appointees of higher
rank than associate justices. Moreover, they probably have, on average,
more judicial and appellate experience than associate justices.
e. Appointment of Trial Court Judges
Chief Justice Bird after four years in office did gradually cease
relying on repeat appointees who were mostly from the ranks of court
of appeal associate justices.31 6 The policy to which she turned, however,
raises further questions. The new policy involved expanding, not con-
tracting, the field from which appointments were made. Chief Justice
Bird began by appointing seriatim all the court of appeal justices in
the state.3" 7 This approach could have been structured to make the
appointments by lot or predetermined rotation, but it appears that no
such structure was adopted and that the selections remained discre-
tionary." 8 The new policy nevertheless may have had the purpose,
in part, of reducing the possible appearance of selection bias by ex-
panding the number of different judges appointed.
31 9
The stated purpose of the new policy was "to give as many
justices and judges as possible the opportunity to sit with the supreme
court"-in the Chief Justice's words, "to give everyone a chance to
serve." ' 320 Consistently with this aim, Chief Justice Bird then expanded
the policy to include the appointment of large numbers of trial
315. Chief Justice Wright presumably had this danger in mind when he said he had limited
his appointees almost entirely to presiding justices in order to avoid being "too arbitrary."
Wright Interview, supra note 38; supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
316. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text; see also 1982 Judiciary Address, supra
note 41.
317. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
318. Chief Justice Bird described the policy as one in which assignments were "rotated
to give everyone a chance to serve." 1982 Judiciary Address, supra note 41. There appears
to be no claim, however, that this was an automatic or predetermined rotation, as distinguished
from a system in which the assignments were still made on a discretionary basis for each case.
Mi. Buehl's 1983 letter states that a system of automatic rotation was adopted by Chief Justice
Bird for assigning presiding justices of the first district court of appeal to sit when needed
on conference matters, but makes no comparable claim for the procedure used in assigning
temporary justices to hear oral arguments. Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying text.
See also Bird Letter, supra note 44 and accompanying text; supra notes 9-13 and accompany-
ing text (Perdue case).
319. Mr. Buehl was quoted in late 1985 as stating: "Anyone who believes that the chief
justice or anyone else could anticipate how about 620 different individuals [450 temporary
appointees to the courts of appeal and 170 to the supreme court] would rule on as many dif-
ferent matters is simply and flatly wrong. The numbers alone belie this fallacious proposition."
L.A. Times, Nov. 3, 1985, at II, 10, cols. 1-4 (AP dispatch).
320. Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying text; 1982 Judiciary Address, supra
note 41.
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judges.32' The main objectives in appointing trial judges appear to
have been inclusiveness, diversity, and equality,322 as well as the largely
symbolic goal of recognizing and rewarding lower-court judges. 23
The policy of appointing "as many justices and judges as possi-
ble," and trial court judges in particular, surely has some benefits.
To sit with the supreme court is an honor and a signal professional
experience for a lower-court judge.3 24 Both the appointment and the
experience no doubt enhance the appointed judges' morale, strengthen
their loyalty to the supreme court and the entire state judicial system,
and boost their sense of dignity, equality, and self-esteem. Further,
lower-court judges doubtless learn something when they sit with the
supreme court. They get useful insights into the processes and con-
cerns of that court, and they see how the judicial process looks from
the top rather than the bottom. For trial judges in particular, it must
be enlightening to observe and take part in a process that involves
reviewing the work of a trial judge. At the same time, the perspec-
tive of the lower-court judge may be helpful and enlightening to the
supreme court justices.32
Nevertheless, the desirability of the "inclusive" assignment policy
may be questioned. Temporary justices sit and decide cases as members
of the supreme court. If the work and role of that court are taken
seriously, the primary objective in choosing temporary justices should
be to provide the best possible assistance to the supreme court, not
to provide benefits for the temporary justices themselves or for other
courts.
321. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text; see also Buehl Letter, supra note 42
and accompanying text.
322. Mr. Buehl contrasts "Etihis inclusive assignment policy" with the asserted practice of
Chief Justice Bird's predecessors "to select primarily from a handfull of favored Court of Appeal
Justices .. " Id. Chief Justice Bird writes: "I can report to you that some 166 judges
and justices have been given the opportunity to sit with this court." Bird Letter, supra note
44. See also 1982 Judiciary Address, supra note 41; the 1984 interview with Chief Justice Bird,
quoted supra in note 224; L.A. Times, Nov. 3, 1985, at II, 10, col. 2 (AP dispatch) (members
of Chief Justice Bird's staff reported as calling her temporary appointees "far more diverse
than others in the court's history").
323. In testimony in 1979 Chief Justice Bird explained why she had appointed a municipal
court judge to sit with the supreme court: "When I first came on the court, I felt that our
trial courts had been overlooked, and I felt especially the tremendous contribution that the
municipal courts made to our system. And one way that I thought we could acknowledge that
would be by the appointment of a municipal court judge to sit for the very first time with
the California Supreme Court. I made that assignment . . . ." P. SToLZ, supra note 14, at 301-02.
Presumably the same purpose explains Chief Justice Bird's appointment in 1985 of a justice
court judge, see supra note 200, and her appointments generally of judges from the trial courts.
324. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
325. There is also the benefit of maximizing-satisfaction by spreading it around. Oppor-
tunities to sit with the supreme court probably yield a diminishing marginal utility; appointing
100 judges for one case each may well produce more total satisfaction for the appointees than
appointing ten judges for ten cases each.
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By this standard there are sound reasons why none of Chief Justice
Bird's three immediate predecessors appointed trial judges to sit with
the supreme court. 26 As Chief Justice Wright said in explaining why
he did not appoint trial judges, the appellate function is simply dif-
ferent from the trial function.327 Throwing a trial judge into deep
appellate waters is no doubt bracing for the judge, but the work of
the supreme court would be better assisted by judges whose experience
and competence lay in work more similar to what the supreme court
does. There is evidence that Chief Justice Bird herself does not expect
trial judges to contribute as much as other appointees to the work
of the court. While Chief Justice Bird made sixty-eight appointments
of trial judges in the 1977-1984 period, not one of those appointees
was assigned to write the supreme court's majority opinion.32
The appointment of temporary justices unaccustomed to appellate
work arguably might be innocuous if limited to cases in which the
appointee's vote was unlikely to make a difference.329 Chief Justice
Bird's assignments of trial judges have not been thus limited. Through
1984, Chief Justice Bird made nine assignments of trial judges in swing
cases 330 and fourteen in close cases.3 1' Such a limitation in any event
would not remove the objections to the extensive assignment of trial
judges. The role and the work of a supreme court justice involve
more than simply casting a vote. Whether or not the appointee's vote
is critical, to tell the bench, the bar, and the public that no special
326. So far as we can determine, trial judges likewise were not appointed by any prior
chief justice (nor by Chief Justice Gibson before 1954). Accord, Barrett Interview, supra note
83. The 1918 amendment to the state constitution did provide, among other things, that the
justices of the supreme court could fill temporary vacancies with superior court judges as well
as court of appeal justices. See supra note 1; Fay v. District Court, 200 Cal. 522, 531-32,
254 P. 896, 900 (1927). A search has disclosed nothing about the purpose of this change.
In 1918 there were only nine court of appeal justices in the state-one presiding justice and
two associate justices in each of three districts. See 37 Cal. App. iii. Since three of these
justices presumably were ineligible in any given case because it came from their district, the
availability of trial judges may have been thought a necessary precaution on numerical grounds.
In addition there was a war going on, which may also have decreased the available pool of judges.
327. Wright Interview, supra note 38; supra text accompanying note 189.
328. See infra Table 33. Among all appointees, excluding holdovers, 4% were assigned to
write majority opinions. See id. The trial judges themselves were not so diffident. Perhaps
seeking to make the most of their moment in the sun, they wrote dissenting or concurring opinions
in 13% of their assignments. See id.
329. See Chief Justice Wright's report of granting the wish of a court of appeal associate
justice who was about to retire by assigning him to sit in a "noncontroversial" case. Supra
note 48. But cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 54 U.S.L.W. 5381, 4386 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1986)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (participation of judge with personal interest in case would violate
due process even if judge had not provided swing vote); id. at 4386-87 (Blackmun, J., concurr-
ing) (same, even if judge had not written court's opinion).
330. See supra note 250.
331.. This figure comes directly from our data. See also the assignment of two trial judges
in the Perdue case. 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985); see supra note 12.
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judicial qualifications are needed to sit with the California Supreme
Court, that any judge can do it, seems inaccurate and unworthy of
the court.332
Apart from the qualifications of the appointees, the inclusive
assignment policy has other disadvantages. By maximizing the number
of judges appointed and minimizing the scope of each appointment
(usually to a single case), the policy imposes costs on the permanent
supreme court justices and the decision-making process of the court.
Instead of working with temporary justices whom they know personally
and with whom they are used to working, the supreme court justices
must adjust in each case to a different and unfamiliar colleague.
3 3
When there is a vacant seat on the court, or when for some other
reason temporary justices are needed in a succession of cases, the
parade of appointees must mean that the court's post-argument confer-
ence has to be continually interrupted and reconstituted, as one tempor-
ary justice departs and another enters for the discussion of each case.
This revolving door must slice the conference into case-by-case segments
even if common themes span cases or if the court desires to reopen
discussion of an earlier case.33
Evaluation of Chief Justice Bird's inclusive appointment policy is
332. If one looks for analogy to the United States Supreme Court, Justice Stevens has sug-
gested that retired justices of that Court be made available to break ties. See supra note 158.
He apparently did not suggest using court of appeal judges. The notion of appointing large
numbers of federal district judges to decide cases with the Supreme Court-setting aside
the question how they would be chosen-surely would surprise many people. Even more so
the idea of appointing federal magistrates, though their jurisdiction is comparable to that of
California municipal court judges. Compare 18 U.S.C. §3401(a) (Supp. 1985) (criminal jurisdiction
of federal magistrates limited to misdemeanors) with CAL. PEN. CODE §1462 (same for Califor-
nia municipal court judges).
333. Chief Justice Bird reportedly has said in an interview, speaking of the rapid turnover
of supreme court justices since she assumed office: "When new people come on the court,
it takes almost a year to adjust to the process, for the others to get to know what your style
is, to know how best to discuss the law with you or ask for changes [in proposed opinions]."
San Francisco Sunday Exam. & Chron., Jan. 5, 1986, special report sec., at 11, col. 2. One
would think the same problems would arise, but more acutely, when different trial judges were
brought in to hear one case at a time with the supreme court.
334. Another result of the inclusive assignment policy, at least as presently administered,
is that the reader of the Official Reports may not be able to tell who the temporary justice
is. Often only the judge's surname is given in those Reports (or in the unofficial reports).
So when the appointee is "Stephens, J., " as in Asdourian v. Araj, 38 Cal. 3d 276, 296,
696 P.2d 95, 107, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703, 715 (1985); or "Woods, J.," as in Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 179, 695 P.2d 665, 694, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 397 (1985), the
reader does not know which of the two sitting California judges by that surname the appointee
is. See CAUIFORNIA COURTS AND JUoES HANDBOOK 381-82, 419-20 (K. Arnold ed., 4th ed.
1985). To find out, one must search the court's Minutes (which do give the first names) to
find the assignment that resulted in the judge's appearance in the reported decision. Yet when
there are two court of appeal justices of the same surname, the appointee's first name ordinar-
ily is included, in parentheses, in the Official Reports (though not in the unofficial ones). E.g.,
People v. Austin, 30 Cal. 3d 155, 156, 166 ("Hanson (Thaxton), J."); but see same case at
636 P.2d 1, 8, 178 Cal. Rptr. 312, 319 (1981).
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particularly appropriate because it is not clear how long, or in what
form, she plans to continue that policy. 33 Although the policy has
benefits for the appointed judges, it may impair the work and demean
the role of the supreme court, and therefore it must be questioned.
DISCUSSION: FILLING TEMPORARY VACANCIES ON THE CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT
A. Is Pro-Chief-Justice Bias Undesirable?
In this part we consider whether our study has shown sufficient
pro-chief-justice bias in the votes of temporary justices, or sufficient
apparent bias in their selection, to warrant abandoning the present
assignment system-and, if so, what form a new system might take.
First, however, we must ask whether bias of either kind is a cause
for concern. Is it undesirable for the chief justice, in fact or ap-
pearance, to choose temporary justices because they are likely to vote
the chief justice's way?
It can be argued that such a practice is perfectly appropriate. The
California Constitution was amended in 1926 to remove from the
supreme court as a whole, and give to the chief justice, the power
to fill temporary vacancies on the court.336 Although in this study
we have defined and measured "bias" in the votes of temporary
justices by comparison with the votes of the permanent supreme court
justices, 37 it may be said that if this were the appropriate model-if
the framers wanted temporary justices to behave like the entire supreme
court-the assignment power would have been left with the entire
court. Many states do give the assignment power to their supreme
court as a whole.33 Since California gives the assignment power to
the chief justice alone, arguably this suggests that the votes of the
temporary justices are expected to reflect the views of the chief justice,
or at least that there is nothing inappropriate in their doing so.",
Just as the governor of California may appropriately appoint judges
on the basis of expectations about how they will vote, arguably the
335. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
336. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §la; 1927 Cal. Stat. lxxxviii; 1927 Cal. Stat. res. ch. 48, at
1369. See supra note 1; Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 481, 601 P.2d 1030, 1034,
159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (1979). See infra note 455 and accompanying text (purpose of
amendment).
337. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
338. E.g., New York, Oregon, Washington; see infra Appendix.
339. Temporary-justice votes might thus be considered analogous to a "casting vote" given
to a body's presiding officer in case of a tie, though typically that officer does not otherwise
have a vote. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, §3, cl. 4 (vice president of United States as presiding
officer of U.S. Senate).
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chief justice of California may appropriately use the power of tem-
porary assignment in a similar way.
But the argument surely must be rejected. When the governor
appoints a judge for the reason, in part, that the appointee is ex-
pected to vote in ways the governor approves, this is an inevitable
and probably a desirable incident of the judicial appointment process
in a democracy.4 0 Moreover, the appointee sits for years and votes
in countless cases; the governor is not handpicking a judge for a par-
ticular case on the basis of the judge's expected vote in that case.34'
Further, it is the governor of California, elected by the people of
the state, who is empowered to appoint supreme court justices. 42 The
discretionary "appointment" of judges is an executive power that
would not seem appropriately vested in a judicial officer. 34 1
In contrast, the power of temporary "assignment" given to the chief
justice by the California Constitution seems intended as an ad-
ministrative, managerial power, to be exercised in a neutral way.3 44
This seems implicit in its textual setting in the constitution. The power
appears in a paragraph beginning, "The Chief Justice shall seek to
expedite judicial business and to equalize the work of judges. 314
Chief justices themselves have apparently shared this understanding
of the temporary-assignment power. Chief Justice Bird's assistant has
stated, and Chief Justice Bird has confirmed, that "[n]o attempt is
ever made to predetermine the views of a particular assigned justice
on a particular issue. . . . [W]hen a justice pro tempore sits on a
case, the Chief Justice and the associate justices have no idea how
that individual will vote." 3 '6 Chief Justice Wright likewise stated that
when he assigned a temporary justice he did not consider how that
340. Cf. supra text preceding note 114.
341. See Comment, supra note 1, at 437 n.12.
342. CAL. CONST. art. 6, §16.
343. Cf. Hellman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will It Work?,
11 HAsTINGs CONST. L.Q. 375, 437-38 (1984). Many states give to their governor even the power
to make temporary assignments to the supreme court. E.g., Alabama, Rhode Island, Texas;
see infra Appendix.
344. See Fay v. District Court, 200 Cal. 522, 527-28, 254 P. 896, 898-99 (1927).
345. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §6. The rest of the paragraph reads: "The Chief Justice may
provide for the assignment of any judge to another court but only with the judge's consent
if the court is of lower jurisdiction. A retired judge who consents may be assigned to any
court." Id. While the words "to another court" have been interpreted to include assignments
to the supreme court itself, Fay v. District Court, 200 Cal. 522, 528, 254 P. 896, 899 (1927),
the framework they provide seems significant; it would hardly be suggested that the chief justice's
power to assign judges to courts other than the supreme court is anything but managerial and
neutral-that it is appropriately interpreted to give the chief justice a "vote" in lower-court
cases. For a complaint about lower-court assignments, see the report in the San Francisco Chroni-
cle, Feb. 7, 1986, at 6, col. 5, supra note 14.
346. Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying text; Bird Letter, supra note 44 and
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judge would vote.3"7 So the two most recent chief justices have
expressly disclaimed considering how a prospective appointee would
vote, apparently recognizing that selection on that basis would not
be appropriate.
This, we submit, is the widely shared and correct view. It is sup-
ported not only by the nature and purpose of the temporary-assignment
power but by widespread expectations concerning the judicial pro-
cess. To be sure, assignment of a judge because the judge was expected
to vote the chief justice's way would be entirely consistent with the
judge's own impartiality and open-mindedness." ' But the choosing
of a judge for a case because of the way the judge is expected to
vote, especially when the choice is made by another judge voting in
the same case, seems intuitively inconsistent with judicial neutrality
and fairness. It also impinges on the right of the people, through
their elected representatives, to make judicial appointments." 9
Therefore, if our results indicate that the temporary-assignment
power has been used to appoint judges because they were likely to
vote with the chief justice, or that a basis exists for perceiving that
chief justices have considered the potential votes of prospective ap-
pointees, then the reputation and integrity of the supreme court are
at risk. To be sure, the discretionary assignment system may have
advantages that outweigh the risk. Such results would provide reason
to consider, however, whether there are feasible alternatives to the
present system that would reduce or eliminate the bias, real or
perceived, without producing other effects even less desirable.
B. Results of the Study: How Much Bias and from What
Causes?
Our results, as summarized in Table 31,350 show substantial evidence
of vote bias. The temporary justices appointed by Chief Justice Gib-
son and Chief Justice Wright agreed with their chief justice in all
cases, close cases, and swing cases substantially to greater extents than
accompanying text; see also L.A. Times, Nov. 3, 1985, at II, 10, col. I (AP dispatch), quoted
supra note 319.
347. Wright Interview, supra note 38 and accompanying text; see supra note 189 and
accompanying text.
348. These qualities might be threatened, however, by the judge's incentives to vote the
chief justice's way for reasons of personal aggrandizement or gratitude, incentives especially
strong in a system of discretionary assignment by the chief justice. See supra notes 48-61 and
accompanying text.
349. See Fay v. District Court, 200 Cal. 522, 536, 254 P. 896, 902 (1927); see also
supra notes 342-43 and accompanying text.
350. See supra Table 31.
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the supreme court as a whole did."' The appointees of Chief Justice
Bird, while showing considerably smaller vote-bias margins over the
entire 1977-1984 period than those for the Gibson and Wright
appointees, considerably exceeded the Gibson and Wright margins
during the years of Chief Justice Bird's first assignment policy." 2 The
data show enough vote bias under Chief Justices Gibson, Wright,
and Bird to make selection bias a serious possibility.
The evidence of vote bias is strengthened, with respect to Chief
Justice Bird, by the analysis of repeat appointments. The com-
parison of first-case agreement rates,"3 while showing no differen-
tials for Chief Justice Wright and insignificant results for Chief Justice
Gibson and Chief Justice Traynor,354 yielded for Chief Justice Bird
substantial samples and significant or near-significant differentials."
The agreement-rate comparisons of one-time, three-or-more-time, and
five-or-more-time appointees were negative or insignificant for Chief
Justice Traynor (discounting his swing cases) and Chief Justice
Wright,356 and equivocal for Chief Justice Gibson. 3" For Chief Justice
Bird the test was positive, showing significantly higher agreement rates
for the five-time appointees than for the one-time appointees in all
three classes of cases.358
The political-derivation test tends to rebut the vote-bias evidence
for Chief Justice Gibson and Chief Justice Wright, each of whom
favored judges appointed to the bench by governors of "the opposite"
political party.359 For Chief Justice Traynor, who was almost exactly
evenhanded regarding the political derivation of his appointees,3 60 the
test reinforces the absence of vote bias in his all-case and close-case
samples (and tends to confirm the aberrational character of his swing
cases).3 6' For Chief Justice Bird, however, the political-derivation test
for the period of her first assignment policy shows that she favored
by substantial margins judges appointed, as she was, by a Democratic
351. See id. The same was true for Chief Justice Traynor in swing cases, but that was
mainly an aberration. See supra notes 162-77 and accompanying text.
352. See supra Table 31; supra notes 265-72 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Tables 5, 12, 19, 27.
354. See supra Tables 5, 12, 19,-and accompanying text.
355. See supra Table 27 and accompanying text. It should be remembered that tests based
on repeat appointments made by Chief Justice Bird, though covering the entire 1977-1984
period, reflect disproportionately her first assignment policy. See supra notes 202-27 and
accompanying text. But cf. supra note 278.
356. See supra Tables 13, 20, and accompanying text.
357. See supra Table 6 and accompanying text.
358. See supra Table 28 and accompanying text.
359. See supra Tables 7, 21, and accompanying text.
360. See supra Table 14.
361. See supra notes 162-77 and accompanying text.
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governor, though under her second policy this preference largely dis-
appeared.36
In sum, the results for Chief Justice Bird, which are all positive
for the period of her first assignment policy, combined with the
substantial vote-bias evidence for Chief Justices Gibson and Wright,
permit the inference that chief justices have selected temporary ap-
pointees with the aim, in part, of obtaining another vote for their
position.
To permit the inference is not to compel it. Vote bias may be due
to causes other than selection bias. Some evidence is notably consis-
tent with the temporary justices' having skewed their votes the chief
justices' way as a result of the appointees' own incentives to win reap-
pointment or otherwise advance their careers. The apparent use of
temporary appointments by Chief Justice Gibson, and to a lesser ex-
tent Chief Justice Bird, as a way of testing or grooming judges for
promotion,363 along with the many other ways a chief justice can in-
fluence the career of a lower-court judge, could well have accounted
for some of the vote bias we have found.
Other evidence, however, cuts against the incentives theory.
Especially dissuasive is the comparison of first-case agreement rates,
at least under Chief Justice Bird. This test compares three groups
of temporary justices who are all voting in their first case under the
same chief justice. No reason appears why these groups would differ
in their incentives to please the chief justice. Also hard to square
with appointee incentives are the differing degrees of vote bias under
different chief justices-and especially the sharp differences under
the same chief justice, Chief Justice Bird, between her first and second
assignment policies. It seems unlikely that these differences were due
to a changing psychology of lower-court judges rather than changing
selection policies of chief justices.
Finally, the incentives theory assumes that judges' votes will turn,
not on their disinterested view of the case before them, but on con-
siderations of personal aggrandizement, gratitude, or deference.
Without denying that this happens, it is hard to believe that it happened
so much, among the hundreds of California judges who sat temporarily
with the supreme court over the thirty years studied, that all or most
of the vote bias seen in our results was due to this cause.
In any event, insofar as the observed vote bias does reflect the ap-
pointees' incentives, that hardly exculpates the discretionary-assignment
362. See supra Table 30 and accompanying text; notes 220-27 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 133-34, 28"-89, and accompanying text.
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system. Votes cast to please the chief justice in the hope of advanc-
ing the voter's career are themselves a vice. They are, indeed, a worse
vice than selection bias, for they involve a corruption of the judicial
process, a shaping of decisions for the personal advantage of the
judge.
364
Incentives of temporary justices to please the chief justice probably
can never be eliminated, at least so long as the appointees include
lower-court judges and the chief justice administers the state's judicial
system.3 65 But discretionary assignment by the chief justice expands
and sharpens the incentives. Not only are the potential rewards greater
because they include reappointment to sit with the court, but a chief
justice who personally chooses the appointees is more likely to appear
interested in how they vote. Abandonment of discretionary assign-
ment by the chief justice therefore may be justified by its effect in
reducing appointee incentives, quite apart from its possible effect in
eliminating selection bias.
Another possible cause of vote bias, the pools from which the tem-
porary justices were drawn,3 6 cannot explain the vote bias found in
this study. The political-derivation tests show that in all cases the
judges in the pools from which the appointees came were not closer
to the chief justice, in terms of the political parties of their appointing
governors, than were the justices of the supreme court during the
same period.367 In most cases the appointees in any event were not
364. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 54 U.S.L.W. 4381, 4384-85 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1986);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1926); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59-60
(1972). Incentives based on gratitude or deference to the chief justice lack the element of the
appointee's self-interest, but they still distort the judicial process because they make votes turn
on considerations other than the judge's view of the merits of the case.
365. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
367. Under Chief Justice Gibson, a Democratic appointee, the pools of court of appeal
presiding justices and court of appeal associate justices contained 29% and 3500 Democratic
appointees, respectively, while the supreme court as a whole contained much more, 70%
Democratic appointees. See supra Table 7, note 122, and accompanying text. Under Chief Justice
Traynor, a Democratic appointee, the proportion of Democratic appointees in the pool of
presiding justices was 6506, while the proportion on the supreme court again was more, 85%0.
See supra Table 14, note 154, and accompanying text. Under Chief Justice Wright, a Republican
appointee, the statewide pool of presiding justices did contain a higher proportion of Republican
appointees (51%) than did the supreme court (45%), but the pool of presiding justices in the
First and Second Districts, which he used exclusively, contained a lower proportion, 43%. See
supra Table 21, note 187, and accompanying text. Under Chief Justice Bird, a Democratic
appointee, in her first four years the statewide pools of presiding justices, associate justices,
and superior court judges contained 67%, 53%, and 56% Democratic appointees, respectively,
while the supreme court contained more, 68%. In the remaining years the pools contained
800, 7206, and 6706 Democratic appointees, respectively, while the supreme court still had
more, 87%. See supra Table 30, notes 257-58, and accompanying text.
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representative of their pools so far as political derivation was con-
cerned.
3 68
The possibility remains that the vote bias was due to selection
preference by the chief justice-to outcome-innocent choices such
as Chief Justice Wright's professed favoring of the "most able"
judges. 69 Much of the evidence is consistent either with selection bias
or with selection preference. Evidence pointing against bias is found,
however, in the political-derivation results for Chief Justices Gibson,
Traynor, and Wright. Their lack of preference for judges appointed
by governors of their own political party suggests that they were look-
ing for qualities other than a sharing of their point of view. Chief
Justice Bird's distinct preference for Democratic appointees during
her first four years in office may lead to the opposite conclusion.
Also suggesting attention to outcomes are the correlations under Chief
Justice Bird between agreement rates and repeat assignments.37 °
The results in their entirety suggest that selection preference played
a role, naturally enough, in the assignment of temporary justices by
all four of the chief justices studied. The results further suggest that
this was a very substantial role under Chief Justices Gibson, Traynor,
and Wright. But the results also suggest that, a least in the first four
years under Chief Justice Bird, selection bias also was involved.
In any event, as between selection preference and selection bias there
is no ground for finding that the former cause alone has operated.
Indeed, since both causes represent states of mind of the chief justice,
they can never be objectively separated. Even the chief justice, while
asserting that consideration of an appointee's vote played no role in
his or her assignments (as both Chief Justice Wright and Chief Justice
Bird did assert),37' cannot know what considerations were operating
at the subconscious level.
368. Chief Justice Gibson chose presiding justices and associate justices of whom 15% and
27%o were Democratic appointees, respectively, while the Democratic percentages in their pools
were 290o and 35%o. See supra Table 7. Chief Justice Traynor chose presiding justices who
did consist of Democratic appointees in almost exactly the same proportion as their pool (64o
compared with 65076). See supra Table 14. Chief Justice Wright chose presiding justices of
whom 85% were Democratic appointees, compared with 49% in the statewide pool and 57%
in the First and Second District pool. See supra Table 21. Chief Justice Bird in her first four
years chose presiding justices, associate justices, and superior court judges of whom 750o, 9570,
and 100% were Democratic appointees, respectively, compared with 67%, 53070, and 56%yo in
their pools. In the remaining years Chief Justice Bird's appointees roughly did reflect the political
derivations of their pools: 65%, 77%, and 74% Democratic appointees among the temporary
justices, compared with 80%, 72%, and 6706 in the pools. See supra Table 30.
369. See supra text accompanying note 40.
370. See supra Tables 27, 28.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 41, 42, 44.
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In sum, the results show that vote bias has existed and exclude
the explanation based on the appointee pools. The results do not en-
tirely exclude the explanation based on appointee incentives, but those
incentives are themselves a cause for concern. And the evidence for
selection bias, while it varies with each chief justice (and with each
period under Chief Justice Bird), on the whole is at least as strong
as the evidence for selection preference, from which in any event it
cannot be satisfactorily extricated. It is therefore impossible to dismiss
the possibility that the discretionary power reposed in the chief justice
has been used to select temporary justices on the basis, in part, that
they were likely to vote the chief justice's way.
The discretionary assignment system can be challenged, moreover,
without recourse to statistical data. The system's inherent potential
for selection bias may be enough to condemn it. This is especially
so when some major and important cases have been decided the chief
justice's way by votes cast by appointees of the chief justice. Even
one such case casts doubt on the neutrality, fairness, and integrity
of the court. It is perhaps surprising that so few of these cases appeared
under Chief Justices Gibson, Traynor, and Wright, and that in those
years the discretionary assignment power of the chief justice apparently
raised no concern."' Under Chief Justice Bird, however, several ma-
jor cases and several important ones have turned on votes of tem-
porary justices agreeing with the chief justice."3' More such cases can
be expected under any chief justice, since the risk is built into the
system. This risk, combined with the empirical evidence we have
reported, makes a convincing case for abandoning the system of discre-
tionary assignment by the chief justice.
C. Leaving Vacancies Unfilled
One way to avoid the problems resulting from discretionary assign-
ment of temporary justices is simply not to assign temporary justices.
This is the practice in some states374 and in the United States Supreme
372. A partial explanation may be that Chief Justices Gibson, Traynor, and Wright, when
faced with a close and important case while there was a vacant seat on the court, would delay
the hearing of the case, if possible, until the new justice was appointed and available to sit.
Barrett Interview, supra note 83. This technique, if employed by Chief Justice Bird in the
American Bank case, might have avoided the need for two hearings and conflicting results.
See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 300-07 and accompanying text.
374. The laws of Indiana and Wisconsin apparently do not provide for the assignment of
temporary justices in the supreme court. See infra Appendix and note 19. In Pennsylvania, such
assignments are excluded as a matter of policy. See id. note 15. In Colorado, Illinois, and Oregon,
the law provides for such assignments but the supreme court has decided, at least as a general
rule, not to make them. See id. and notes 3, 7, 14.
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Court."'5 While this approach would represent a break with tradition
in California, 76 leaving seats unfilled would not in itself require any
change in existing law; since 1966 the state constitution has declared
that the chief justice "may," rather. than "shall," provide for the
assignment of any judge to another court. 77 Indeed, the nonassign-
ment practice is already followed to some extent in "conference
matters," where a temporary justice is assigned only if necessary to
produce a fourth vote in favor of some disposition.37
1. The Stanford Argument
Leaving seats unfilled would disable the supreme court from deciding
some cases-cases in which the remaining justices were evenly split
or the four-vote concurrence required for a valid judgment was other-
wise lacking.379 Over the thirty-year period examined in this study,
the vote of a temporary justice was needed for decision in at least
eighty-eight cases, amounting to almost three per year, or about 2%
of all the argued cases the court decided." The authors of the Stan-
ford comment, computing a similar figure, argued that 2% is a small
fraction of the court's cases.3"' They contended further that since these
were cases in which the justices were more or less evenly split, "it
375. The United States Supreme Court does not fill vacancies. When the justices split evenly
the decision below is affirmed, but the Court's determination is not entitled to precedential
weight. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972); Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
107, 112 (1868). If a six-justice quorum of the court (see 28 U.S.C. §1 (1976)) is lacking, a
case on direct appeal from a district court may be remitted to the court of appeals; other
cases may be put over to the next Term, or, if a majority of the qualified justices do not
think that will help, "the court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court from
which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally
divided court." 28 U.S.C. §2109 (1976).
376. Since 1904 the state constitution has provided for the assignment of temporary justices
to fill supreme court vacancies, and it appears that in argued cases assignments have consistently
been made. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
377. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, §6, See supra note 1 and accompanying text. But if vacancies
were to be left unfilled in all cases, even those where the court lacked a four-vote concurrence,
some change in the law probably would be necessary to enable the court to dispose of those
cases after accepting them. See CAL. CoNsr. art. VI, §2; infra notes 414-15 and accompanying text.
378. See PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 37, at 32; Buehl Letter, supra note
42 and accompanying text.
379. See CAL. CONsT. art. VI, §2, quoted supra note 71. See also PRACTICES AND PRO-
CEDURES, supra note 37, at 15 (4 votes needed to accept a case for hearing and decision).
380. This figure includes not only the cases in our sample but also cases in which the
temporary justices were assigned by an acting chief justice. See supra notes 2, 100, and accom-
panying text. (The figure includes holdover appointees and counts only the first hearing in
the American Bank case, see supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.) The number of argued
cases decided by the supreme court over the 30-year period was 4,717. (The figure comes from
LEXIS and tallies roughly with a count based on the Annual Reports of the Judicial Council
of California. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 440).
381. Comment, supra note 1, at 440.
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would be difficult to argue that the lower court's decision was plain-
ly erroneous," 381 2 and that there was no reason to think "the additional
vote of a lower-court or retired judge would somehow render the result
inherently more just than an affirmance for lack of a four-vote
majority." 3 83
2. The Contribution of Temporary Justices
Those are not the only arguments to be made in favor of leaving
vacancies unfilled. One may start by asking what temporary justices
contribute to the supreme court's decision-making under the present
system. The practices and procedures of the court, as noted earlier,384
signal that the role of a temporary justice is to fill a seat and cast
a vote and make as few waves as possible. Our data indicate that
temporary justices indeed play a subordinate, deferential role. We have
seen that they agreed with their appointing chief justice, except in
the case of Chief Justice Traynor, markedly more often than the
supreme court justices did.385 In addition, the Traynor appointees again
excepted, the temporary justices dissented markedly less often than
the supreme court justices did.
Table 32386 shows the dissent rates of various classes of permanent
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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and temporary justices in the cases in our sample. The table shows
that under Chief Justice Gibson the temporary justices, excluding
holdovers, dissented in less than 1% of the cases, while the perma-
nent justices dissented in 8%. Under Chief Justice Wright the figures
were 7% and 12%; under Chief Justice Bird, 11% and 16%. Chief
Justice Traynor's appointees broke ranks, dissenting in 21% of the
cases while the permanent justices dissented in 14%. Again the cause
lay in the repeated appointment of Justice Schauer and other retired
supreme court justices.387
Temporary justices thus are guest judges who agree with their hosts,
the chief justice and the other permanent justices, a good deal more
than the hosts agree among themselves. To some extent this may
be natural and inevitable. To some extent it is encouraged by
the court. Whatever the reason, judges who behave this way do not
participate as equals and make a full contribution of independent views
to the decisions of the court.
Temporary justices take a similar backseat role in writing opinions.
Table 33388 shows that in our thirty-year sample, the temporary justices,
excluding holdovers, wrote majority opinions for the court in 4% of
their cases. 89 The permanent justices, meanwhile, apparently wrote
majority opinions in some 13% of their cases.39 The temporary
justices, excluding holdovers, wrote concurring and/or dissenting opin-
ions in 8% of their cases.39' The permanent justices, in a recent year,
wrote concurring and/or dissenting opinions, on average, in some 16%
of their cases.392
387. "Retired Supreme Court Nonholdovers" cast 170 votes under Chief Justice Traynor-
two-thirds of the temporary-justice total-and dissented in 24% of them. See supra Table 32;
see also supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
388. See Table 33, infra p. 1165.
389. See supra Table 33. The figure is 3% if retired supreme court justices are excluded. Id.
390. Assignments to write majority opinions are distributed among the permanent justices
on a presumptively equal basis. See PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 37, 'at 16, 19,
20, 26, 29, 30. The average is slightly reduced from 14% (one-seventh) because some majority
opinions are signed by "The Court." See Barnett, The Supreme Court of California, 1981-1982,
Foreword: The Emerging Court, 71 CAULF. L. REv. 1134, 1138 (1983). On the other hand,
taking up the slack left by temporary justices must increase the contribution of each permanent
justice. Figures for 1982 confirm that the permanent justices wrote majority opinions, on average,
in 13% of the court's cases. See supra Table 33 & note c; Barnett, supra, at 1138.
391. See supra Table 33. The figure is 5% if retired supreme court justices are excluded. Id.
392. See supra Table 33 & note c; Barnett, supra note 390, at 1138.
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TABLE 33








Retired Supreme Court 8% (13/159) 13% (21/159) 21% (34/159)
Holdovers
Retired Supreme Court 6% (11/200) 17% (34/200) 23% (45/200)
Nonholdovers
Court of Appeal 2% (3/172) 3% (5/172) 5% (8/172)
Presiding Justices
Court of Appeal 4% (11/263) 3% (9/263) 8% (20/263)
Associate Justices
Trial Court Judges 0% (0/68) 13% (9/68) 13% (9/68)
All Temporary Justices 4% (38/862) 9% (78/862) 13% (116/862)
All Non-Supreme 3% (14/503) 5% (23/503) 7% (37/503)
Court Temporary
Justicesb
All Temporary Justices 4% (25/703) 8% (57/703) 12% (82/703)
Excluding Holdovers
Permanent Supreme 13% 16% 29%
Court Justices in 1982 1
aThis table reflects all the cases over the 30-year period studied in which a temporary
justice and the appointing chief justice both participated. See supra note 100 and accompanying
text.
bThis line includes all temporary justices other than retired supreme court justices (whether
holdovers or nonholdovers).
cOne wishes to compare the opinion-writing rates of temporary justices, shown in this
Table, with those of permanent supreme court justices. Unfortunately we did not compile
the opinion-writing rates of the permanent justices in the cases in our sample. A rough
comparison is made possible, however, by published data on the numbers of opinions written
by permanent supreme court justices in 1982. See Barnett, infra note 390, at 1138. The
percentages presented here are based on those data. We used the numbers of opinions of
each type written by six of the justices sitting in 1982 (the seventh, Justice Reynoso, was
not yet fully phased in, see id. at 1134 & n.2); translated those numbers into percentages
of the 129 cases that the court decided by written opinion in 1982 (see id. at 1138); and
combined the percentages to produce an average for the six justices in each opinion-writing
category. The resulting comparison obviously has flaws. Most important is the discontinuity
between opinion-writing rates of the temporary justices over the entire 30-year period and
opinion-writing rates of the permanent justices in 1982 only. Since the rate of dissents by
permanent supreme court justices under Chief Justice Bird was higher than under her pred-
ecessors (see supra Table 32), the comparison may be expected to inflate the rate of dissenting
(and probably concurring) opinions written by the permanent justices in 1982 as compared
with those written by the temporary justices over the entire period. But no reason appears
why the rates of writing majority opinions would have been different in 1982 from other
years, and even as to concurring and/or dissenting opinions, any differences between 1982
and other years would seem clearly less important than the similarities.
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The largely passive role that temporary justices play on the court 93
arguably would not be much missed. A policy of leaving vacancies
unfilled would have the advantage, moreover, of assuring the court
and the public that every judge deciding a case with the supreme court
was an authentic supreme court justice.
3. Standards for Disqualification
Another argument for leaving vacancies unfilled is that, if this were
done, there might be fewer vacancies. The two major causes of vacan-
cies are empty seats on the court and self-disqualifications by the
justices. A rough estimate indicates that vacancies due to empty seats
have been much more frequent during Chief Justice Bird's tenure than
in previous years.39 ' Vacancies due to disqualifications or other
393. This is especially true of lower-court appointees as opposed to retired supreme court
justices. Compare supra Tables 32, 33 (separate figures for retired supreme court justices, both
holdovers and nonholdovers). Such a second-class role is not an inevitable incident of assigning
outside judges, including lower-court judges. See Green & Atkins, Designated judges: how well do
they perform?, 61 JUDICATuRE 358 (1978). That study reports that "designated judges" sitting
with the federal courts of appeals, including district court judges, "write their share of [majority]
opinions, no more and no less." Id. at 367. The designated judges did, however, write less
than their expected shares of dissenting and concurring opinions, with the district court judges
falling farthest below expectations. Id. at 369. Since to dissent on a three-judge panel requires
the writing of a separate (and solitary) opinion, there is no level ground on which to compare
the rate of dissenting votes on federal circuit panels with the rate in the California Supreme Court.
394. See infra Table 34; infra note 395. On the rapid turnover of the court's membership
under Chief Justice Bird, see Barnett, supra note 390, at 1134; see also the comments of Chief
Justice Bird reported in the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, Jan. 5, 1986, supra
note 333.
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absences of sitting justices, however, also appear to have risen con-
siderably under Chief Justice Bird.395
395. Attribution of temporary assignments, as they appear in decided cases, to vacancies
due to empty seats on the one hand, or to disqualifications or other absences of sitting justices
on the other hand, is both laborious and problematic. We have made a rough allocation of
the assignments over the 30-year period studied. For this purpose we have counted not only
the cases in our samples, but also cases in which the assignments were made by an acting
chief justice or a prior chief justice (or a current chief justice who did not sit in the case).
See supra notes 2, 3; compare supra note 100. We used the following rules of thumb, admit-
tedly quite rough: (1) an assignment in a case decided while there was an empty seat on the
court, and in which the assignee replaced the "missing" justice, was attributed to the empty
seat; (2) an assignment made by a prior chief justice, in a case decided after the new chief
justice had taken office but in which the new chief justice did not sit, likewise was attributed
to the empty seat; (3) any other assignment in a case decided within six months after the ap-
pointment of a new justice, in which the new justice did not sit, also was attributed to the
empty seat; and (4) all other assignments were attributed to absences (or disqualifications) of
sitting justices. The results appear in Table 34. The table indicates that the frequency of tem-
porary assignments due to empty seats was more than twice as high in the years since Chief
Justice Bird took office than under any of the prior chief justices (an average of 44 per year
under Chief Justice Bird, compared with a previous high of 18 per year under Chief Justice
Traynor). Temporary assignments due to absences were most frequent under Chief Justice
Traynor-an average of 28 per year, due mainly to disqualifications of Justice Mosk in At-
torney General's cases, see supra note 147-but under Chief Justice Bird they were not much
less frequent: 24 per year, markedly more than the 14 per year under Chief Justice Wright.
(Chief Justice Wright in his interview with us commented that in his years the court "seldom
had disqualifications," and he did not know why they seemed to be so much more numerous
now (he spoke in 1983). Wright Interview, supra note 38.)
TABLE 34
CAUSES OF TEMPORARY VACANCIEs ON Tm CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, APPORTIONED
BETWEEN EMPTY SEATS AND A~sE~cEs (OR DIsQuAMncAToNs), 1954-1984
(ROUGH ESTIKATE)
a
Empty Seats Absences (Or Disqualifications)
Temporary Temporary
Temporary Assignments Per Temporary Assignments Per
Assignments Year (Average) Assignments Year (Average)
Chief Justice Gibson,
1954-1964 (10.25 48 (36%) 5 87 (64%) 8
years)
Chief Justice Traynor, 98 (40o) 18 1 4 9 b (60%) 28
1964-1970 (5.4 years) I )
Chief Justice Wright, 112 (54%) 17 95 (46%) 14
1970-1977 (6.75 years)
Chief Justice Bird, 342 (65%) 44 185 (35%) 24
1977-1984 (7.75 years) _4_6_)__8_(5)2
aSee supra, this footnote.
bSome 87 of these assignments were replacements for Justice Mosk in cases under the aegis
of the state Attorney General's office. See supra note 147.
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A supreme court justice who disqualifies himself or herself need
not explain why. " 6 Such recusals have seemed to proceed in recent
years on a rather permissive and casual basis. 91 Indeed the supreme
court in its 1985 Practices and Procedures booklet has taken the posi-
tion, in apparent conflict with existing law, that a justice may avoid
participating in a case not only when "he or she is disqualified,"
but also when he or she, "although not technically disqualified, deems
it advisable not to participate." 3 9
California supreme court justices might be less ready to disqualify
themselves-or to deem it "advisable not to participate"-if they
lacked the assurance that another judge would always be appointed
to sit in their place and protect the court from stalemate. 99 Hence
the number of cases in which temporary justices provide a necessary
fourth vote under the present system probably exaggerates the number
that could not be decided under a system in which vacancies were
left unfilled. ' At the same time, there would be an affirmative benefit
in the resulting cases in which real supreme court justices, their dis-
396. Kaufman v. Court of Appeal, 31 Cal. 3d 933, 937-39, 647 P.2d 1081, 1083-84, 184
Cal. Rptr. 302, 304-05 (1982). Compare CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE 170 (b) (1981).
397. Accord, Olson v. Cory, 27 Cal. 3d 532, 564-65, 568-69, 609 P.2d 991, 1009, 1012,
164 Cal. Rptr. 217, 236, 239 (1980) (Newman, J., dissenting). See Brown v. Superior Court,
33 Cal. 3d 242, 655 P.2d 1260, 188 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1982) (politically sensitive case in which
four supreme court justices recused themselves prior to decision on granting of writ, and then
one more supreme court justice, and apparently one temporary justice, recused themselves prior
to argument); Barnett, Brown v. Superior Court: New Charges of Politics at the California
Supreme Court, L.A. Daily J., Dec. 20, 1982, at 4, col. 3.
398. PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 37, at 32. Section 170 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (1984) provides that "[a] judge has a duty to decide any proceeding in which he
or she is not disqualified." It is true that this provision, like the rest of the 1984 enactment,
is not in terms applicable to appellate judges. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §170.5 (a). But the supreme
court has held that a judge, by virtue of his office and oath under the California Constitution,
has a duty "to hear and determine causes presented to him unless in a particular cause he
is disqualified or unable to act. He may not evade or avoid that duty." Austin v. Lambert,
11 Cal. 2d 73, 75, 77 P.2d 849, 851 (1938). While Austin involved a superior court judge,
it is hard to imagine why the duties imposed by a judge's office would be less demanding
for justices of the supreme court. See Giometti v. Etienne, 219 Cal. 687, 689, 28 P.2d 913,
914 (1934) ("appellate judges must be deemed subject to the rules applicable to judges general-
ly"); Kaufman v. Court of Appeal, 31 Cal. 3d 933, 937, 647 P.2d 1081, 1083, 184 Cal. Rptr.
302, 304-05 (1982).
399. A justice of the United States Supreme Court has cited the impossibility of appointing
a substitute justice in that Court as "a reason for not 'bending over backwards' in order to
deem oneself disqualified." Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837-38 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., in
Chambers).
400. The Stanford authors thought the number was tolerably low even under the present
system. Comment, supra note 1, at 440.
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qualification standards stiffened, sat in place of the temporary justices
who now take their seats.""1
A final point in favor of leaving vacancies unfilled is that, while
this approach would prevent the supreme court from deciding some
cases, such foregone decisions can be preferable to a decision in which
a temporary justice provides the deciding vote. Temporary justices
are, indeed, temporary, and a rule of law established by the vote
of a temporary justice may not be the rule to which a majority of
the permanent justices subscribe. It might well have been better if
the supreme court had rendered no decision in Amaya, °2 for example.
4. The Value of Supreme Court Decisions
All these arguments notwithstanding, the fact remains that leaving
vacancies unfilled would disable the supreme court from deciding some
cases. 03 This would be a major cost, even if we assume that the result
in those cases would be to leave standing the decision of a lower
court.404
Supreme court decisions have a value that lower-court decisions can-
not match. Despite the occasional Amaya problem, a decision by the
supreme court, even one that turns on the vote of a temporary justice,
401. Inability to make temporary appointments to the court could also be expected to reduce
the delays in filling vacant seats that now result from a leisurely appointment and confirmation
process on the part of the governor, the state bar, and others. These delays require numerous
temporary assignments during the interregnums and appear to be a main cause of the high
rate of temporary vacancies. See supra Table 34.
402. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. In the situation presented by Amaya,
or by Justice Reynoso's disqualification in American Bank, see supra text accompanying note
28, where the view of the case held by the disqualified justice is known, it may be suggested
that the temporary justice should adopt the role of voting the way the disqualified justice would
vote. But this seems indefensible; it would require the appointee to vote in a way other than
his or her true view of the merits, and perhaps inconsistently with votes cast or to be cast
in other cases. Alternatively, it may be suggested that the chief justice should appoint a temporary
justice who can be expected to vote the way of the disqualified justice. This would be an
outcome-based appointment, but not based on the outcome the chief justice desired. The trou-
ble is that, where the chief justice agrees with the disqualified justice, there is no way to prove
that the chief justice's motives were not affected by bias. If assignments were made by the
supreme court as a whole-a body that cannot be accused of outcome-based bias (see infra
notes 450-52 and accompanying text)-such an appointment might not be objectionable.
403. See supra notes 379-80 and accompanying text. It would not help much to change
the state constitution to eliminate the requirement of four concurring votes, as the Stanford
comment suggests. Comment, supra note 1, at 442. The main problem is ties. The Stanford
authors themselves noted that of the 74 cases they found in which a temporary justice's vote
was required for decision, 31 involved 3-3 ties of the permanent justices, and eight involved
2-2 ties. Id. at 440 n.24. Another 26 cases did not involve ties but would not have met the
5-justice quorum suggested by Stanford. Compare id. with id. at 442.
404. That is what the Stanford authors assumed. See Comment, supra note 1, at 440-42.
It is the practice in the United States Supreme Court. See supra note 375. But see infra notes
410-15 and accompanying text.
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is more likely to provide an accepted resolution of the matter and a
firm rule of law than a decision by the court of appeal." 5 Decisions
of the California Supreme Court are binding on all the state courts
of California,"' while court of appeal decisions increasingly are re-
jected by other courts of appeal." 7 The supreme court's ability to
provide a binding resolution of an issue, a uniform rule for the en-
tire state, is especially important in cases involving the state's political
processes or governmental institutions. Challenges to ballot initiatives
provide a frequent example.0 8 Inability to have such cases resolved
definitively and promptly by the supreme court, combined with forum
shopping and conflicting decisions in the lower courts, could create
confusion, uncertainty, and harm to public confidence in government
and law.40 9
Moreover, the supreme court's inability to decide a case for lack
of temporary justices would not necessarily leave a lower court
decision standing. In some cases, especially cases involving election
ballots and other urgent matters, there is no decision of a court of
appeal. Such cases typically come to the supreme court through its
original jurisdiction over writs of mandate, 10 a jurisdiction exercised
when "the public interest requires a more rapid determination . *
than can be provided in the normal course of appellate review.,,".;
405. See Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 486-87, 601 P.2d 1030, 1039, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 502-03 (1979). This follows from the state constitution, which in providing for a
seven-justice statewide supreme court (CAL. CONsT. art. VI, §§1, 2) presumes that a decision
by that court, in a case it deems worth deciding, is preferable to a decision by a three-judge
panel of the court of appeal somewhere in the state. After the illness of a justice of the United
States Supreme Court caused eight tie votes in that Court's 1984 Term, Justice Stevens promptly
suggested that Congress authorize the use of retired justices as temporary assignees. N.Y. Times,
July 8, 1985, at 4, cols. 5-6.
406. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455, 369 P.2d 937, 939.40,
20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323-24 (1962).
407. See Otto M, Kaus, Conflicting Court of Appeal Decisions: Precedent Is a Many-
Splendored Thing, Or Let Thirteen Flowers Bloom, unpublished speech on file with the Pacific
Law Journal; e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 223, 643 P.2d 954, 955, 182 Cal. Rptr.
337, 338 (1982); Appellate Courts Clash on Power of D.A. Seeking Child Support, L.A. Daily
J., Oct. 16, 1985, at 2, cols. 3-5.
408. E.g., Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982);
Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983); American
Federation of Labor v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984).
409. Recent cases of political or institutional importance in which necessary votes have been
cast by temporary justices include the 1982 reapportionment case, Assembly v. Deukmejian,
30 Cal. 3d 638, 639 P.2d 939, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1982), see supra notes 33-34 and accom-
panying text; the 1982 case upholding legislation creating 18 new judgeships on the court of
appeal, Brown v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 242, 655 P.2d 1260, 188 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1982),
see supra note 397; and the MICRA case, American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital,
36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984); see supra notes 26-32 and accom-
panying text.
410. CAL. CONS?. art. VI, §10.
411. Brown v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 509, 515, 487 P.2d 1224, 1227, 96 Cal. Rptr.
584, 587 (1971); see also, e.g., Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 241, 651 P.2d 274, 276,
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With no decision of a court of appeal, and sometimes none of any
lower court,4"2 to leave standing, the supreme court's incapacity to
rule would at least cause considerable delay-often unacceptable in
cases of this kind-as the case was sent elsewhere. Moreover, death
penalty cases are another category in which, under existing provisions
of the state constitution, no court of appeal decision exists and hence
supreme court decisions are indispensable. " 3
Still other legal obstacles confront any proposal that would leave
lower-court decisions standing or substitute lower-court decisions for.
supreme court decisions. When the supreme court is split 3 to 3, for
example, it is hard to see how the constitutional requirement of four
votes could be met even for the purpose of affirming a decision
below, ' or of transferring the case to a court of appeal."1 5
186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32 (1982); Clean Air Consituency v. California State Air Resources Board,
11 Cal. 3d 801, 806, 523 P.2d 617, 618, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577, 579 (1974).
412. In Legislature v. Deukmejian and American Federation of Labor v. Eu, supra note
408, the supreme court exercised its original jurisdiction over petitions for mandate without,
so far as appears, any prior proceedings in courts below. See 34 Cal. 3d at 663-64, 669 P.2d
at 19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 783; 36 Cal. 3d at 690-91, 686 P.2d at 611, 206 Cal. Rptr.
at 91. The same apparently was true in Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra note 409. See 30 Cal.
3d at 643, 639 P.2d at 942, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 300. In Brosnahan v. Brown, supra note 408,
the petition for mandate was originally filed in the court of appeal and was transferred to
the supreme court before decision in the court of appeal. 32 Cal. 3d at 241, 651 P.2d at
276, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 32. In Brown v. Superior Court, supra note 409, the supreme court like-
wise exercised its original jurisdiction and "bypassed Court of Appeal review." 33 Cal. 3d
at 261, 655 P.2d at 1272, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 437 (Reynoso, J.). While there was a superior
court decision in that case, it was affected by intervening legislation; thus, even if a trial court
ruling could appropriately be left standing as a final determination on a matter of statewide
importance, this trial court ruling could not have been. See id., 33 Cal. 3d at 246-47, 655 P.2d
at 1262-63, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
413. The supreme court, not the court of appeal, has appellate jurisdiction in death penalty
cases. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §11. The constitution further prohibits the supreme court from
transferring a death penalty appeal to a court of appeal. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §12 (d).
414. See CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §2. Conceivably the court might adopt a rule providing that
a 3 to 3 tie produces a per curiam affirmance, but that would be hard to square with the
4-vote requirement. Or the court might adopt a convention whereby, when the justices split
3 to 3, one of them would switch in favor of affirmance so that the decision below could
be affirmed 4 to 2. But this might seem devious, and even it would not work in a case such
as Brown v. Superior Court, where there were only three supreme court justices who had not
disqualified themselves. See supra note 397. As an additional problem, it is not clear, even
in a case from a court of appeal, that there would be a "decision below" to affirm. The
traditional rule is that, once the supreme court grants a hearing, the court of appeal decision
"becomes a nullity." Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 188 n.10, 339 P.2d 801, 817 n.10
(1959); CAL. R. CT. 976(d), 977 (pre-1985 amendment). Even if the court of appeal decision
could be recorporealized, presumably four votes would be required to work this miracle. The
1985 constitutional amendment, as interpreted by the amended California Rules of Court, ap-
pears not to change this situation. Amended Rule 976(d) requires an order of the supreme
court to revive all or part of a court of appeal opinion that has been "superseded by a grant
of review . . . ." CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §12; CAL. R. CT. 976 (d).
415. The constitution authorizes the supreme court, "before decision," to transfer a case
(except a death penalty case) from itself to a court of appeal. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §12 (a).
The required vote is not stated, but no reason appears why the four-vote requirement (CAL.
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Finally, a proposal to leave vacancies unfilled, if it meant all vacan-
cies,"" would prevent even the assignment of retired supreme court
justices as "holdovers" to finish cases on which they heard argument
before retiring. As we have seen, such assignments are traditional,
apparently routine, unobjectionable, and beneficial for the court.' 7
No reason appears why the value of this practice should be sacrificed
to an across-the-board policy of leaving vacancies unfilled.
The essential point, reflected in the supreme court's original jurisdic-
tion on mandate, its appellate jurisdiction in death cases, and other
jurisdictional specifics, is simply that there are many cases in which
the state needs a decision by its supreme court. This need, together
with California's long tradition of using temporary assignments in
the supreme court, seems to us persuasive against the proposal to
leave vacancies unfilled and abide the court's resulting inability to
decide some cases. This is especially so if some means can be found
to reduce or eliminate the disadvantages inhering in the present system
of discretionary assignment by the chief justice, while preserving the
supreme court's ability to use temporary justices and thus to decide
all cases that it should decide.
D. Filling Vacancies Only When Necessary for Decision
While the proposal to leave all vacancies unfilled must be rejected,
leaving some vacancies unfilled may be a good idea. Temporary
justices-holdovers aside-could be appointed only in cases where their
vote might be needed to enable the court to reach a decision. This
would not be something wholly new. It is similar to the practice the
court follows now, and traditionally has followed, in "conference mat-
ters" such as decisions on granting review.4t
CoNsT. art. VI, §2) would not apply. The newly amended Rules of Court state that four votes
are required to transfer a case from a court of appeal to the supreme court. CAL. R. Cr.
27.5 (e). While the Rules say nothing about transfers from the supreme court (except that
they require an order of the supreme court, R. 20), the same vote requirement presumably
would apply.
416. This was the Stanford proposal. See Comment, supra note 1, at 440-42.
417. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. Most recently, after Justice Otto Kaus
retired from the court on October 16, 1985, he was appointed as a holdover by Chief Justice
Bird (Minutes, Oct. 17, 1985) and in that capacity participated in 49 cases decided by the court
in the remainder of 1985. E.g., People v. Massie, 40 Cal. 3d 620, 709 P.2d 1309, 221
Cal. Rptr. 140 (Dec. 23, 1985) (opinion for court by Kaus, J.). As Table 33 shows, holdover
justices wrote more majority opinions (in 8% of their cases) than any other class of temporary
justice (the figure for all but holdovers was 4%). See supra Table 33.
418. In those matters a temporary justice is assigned only if "there are not four votes among
the regular justices who are participating in favor of any one disposition." PRACTICES AND
PROCEDURES, supra note 37, at 32; see also Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying
text. From 1926 to 1966 the state constitution stated that the chief justice "shall" provide
for the assignment of a judge to another court to act for a judge disqualified or unable to
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Since temporary justices in general contribute little to the supreme
court's decisions other than their votes,"1 9 little would be lost in
appointing them only where their votes might be needed. Such a policy
would not reduce the problem of bias in the selection of the tem-
porary appointees. Indeed it would highlight the problem, since the
appointees' votes always would be important. This proposal therefore
would have to be combined with a new selection process that dealt
with the problem of bias. By reducing drastically the number of
appointments made, the proposal would lend itself to different methods
of selection. These might include once again limiting appointments
to court of appeal presiding justices, plus retired supreme court justices
if available. They might also include shifting the assignment power
from the chief justice to the supreme court as a whole. We discuss
this approach presently, along with further discussion of the possibil-
ity of filling vacancies only when necessary.
4 20
E. Options in Filling Vacancies: Discretion Versus Rotation or
Lot
1. The Existing System: Three-Level Discretion in the Chief
Justice
If temporary justices are to continue to be used, whether for all
vacancies or only where their votes may be needed, the question re-
mains how to choose them. 2' One way is the way they apparently
have been chosen for at least the past thirty years. This system en-
tails discretion by the chief justice at three levels. The chief justice
makes a generic decision about the categories of judges from which
to draw temporary appointees. 22 The chief justice then favors some
approach for choosing judges from the selected categories. 23 In the
act. See supra note 1. But even before 1966 the practice was to make assignments in conference
matters only when necessary to provide a fourth vote. Barrett Interview, supra note 83.
419. See supra Table 33; notes 55-58, 384-85, and accompanying text. Retired supreme court
justices are an exception. See supra Table 33.
420. See infra notes 449-74 and accompanying text.
421. This discussion does not apply to holdover appointments. We assume here that the
practice of holdover appointment would continue undisturbed. See supra notes 94-98 and
accompanying text.
422. Thus, all four recent chief justices used supreme court holdovers; Chief Justices Traynor
and Wright used (with a few exceptions) only presiding justices from the court of appeal; Chief
Justices Gibson and Bird used associate justices as well; and Chief Justice Bird used trial judges.
See supra Tables 1, 8, 15, 22.
423. Thus, Chief Justices Traynor and Wright distributed their appointments, though far
from systematically, among court of appeal presiding justices, with Chief Justice Wright limiting
himself to those of the First and Second appellate districts. See supra Tables 8, 15, and accom-
panying text; notes 188-89 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Gibson made repeated use
of selected presiding and associate justices of the court of appeal, as did Chief Justice Bird
through her first four or five years in office. See supra Tables 1, 22; notes 202-19 and accom-
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framework of these policies, the chief justice then exercises ad hoc
discretion in deciding which judge to assign to each case. Apart from
the rotation system reportedly adopted by Chief Justice Bird for con-
ference matters,424 it does not appear that any of the four chief justices
studied took any steps to limit themselves in exercising such case-by-
case discretion.
By giving the chief justice maximum discretion and flexibility, the
existing system provides a number of advantages. The chief justice
is able to choose freely among categories of judges and then from
a wide spectrum of selection approaches, ranging from repeated use
of a handful of favored appointees to appointment of as many judges
as possible. At the case-by-case level a chief justice can choose the
"most able" judges, 25 while a chief justice following an "inclusive"
assignment program426 can assure that the weakest judges are assign-
ed to the least demanding cases. The chief justice can employ other
forms of selection preferences, such as grooming judges for promo-
tion, choosing judges known best to the chief justice, or seeking ap-
pointees who have expertise in the subject matter of a particular case.
The ad hoc discretion would also enable a chief justice, in a situation
like that of Amaya or American Bank, to select a temporary justice
who was likely to vote the same way as the disqualified supreme court
justice.1
27
Despite these advantages, and despite the discretionary system's
failure during most of the period studied to attract or warrant much
criticism, 28 this study has disclosed enough evidence of vote bias,
enough suspicion of selection bias, enough important cases decided
by temporary justices in agreement with the chief justice, enough poten-
tial for more cases of that kind, to establish the need for change. 29
panying text. Chief Justice Bird beginning in 1981 adopted a program of appointing "as many
justices and judges as possible," pursuant to which she appointed all the state's court of appeal
justices and then large numbers of trial judges. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text;
1982 Judiciary Address, supra note 41. Arrangements to accommodate geographical considera-
tions and to avoid having a judge sit in a case from the judge's own district are also part
of the approach adopted by a chief justice at this level of discretion. See Buehl Letter, supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
424. See id.
425. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
426. See Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying text; Bird Letter, supra note 44
and accompanying text; 1982 Judiciary Address, supra note 41.
427. See supra note 402.
428. One unfortunate result of temporary assignments was the Amaya contretemps, see
supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text, but it was not due to discretionary selection of the
temporary justice in that case. The risk that a temporary justice will produce a decision con-
trary to the views of the court's permanent majority would be just as great, if not greater,
under a nondiscretionary assignment system.
429. See supra notes 350-73 and accompanying text.
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The task is to eliminate the potential for bias while preserving, to
the extent possible, the advantages provided by the discretion and
flexibility of the present system.
2. Selection by Rotation or Lot
An obvious way of eliminating the potential for selection bias would
be to make the assignments by predetermined rotation or by lot.
4 30
This approach already exists in California. 3' The state constitution
provides that a recommendation for the censure, removal, or retire-
ment of a supreme court justice will be heard "by a tribunal of 7
court of appeal judges selected by lot." 3" Chief Justice Bird used
this procedure to select a court of temporary justices to hear Mosk.
v. Superior Court, 33 a case brought by a supreme court justice
challenging aspects of an investigation of the supreme court. The Mosk
supreme court, thus selected, upheld the chief justice's use of the pro-
cedure, declaring that "[s]election of assigned judges by lot is a pro-
per method which the Chief Justice may use to avoid charges of bias,
prejudice, or favoritism in making the selection."
3
Mosk was a unique and sensitive case, and one in which the chief
justice herself was disqualified. But it is not clear why charges of
bias, prejudice, or favoritism resulting from discretionary selection
of temporary justices by the chief justice were a greater concern in
Mosk than in other important cases in which an appointee's vote may
be decisive-cases such as Assembly v. Deukmejian," ' for example.
Indeed, the danger would seem more worthy of concern in cases in
which the chief justice is participating.
Besides the procedure used in Mosk, Chief Justice Bird and her assis-
tant have stated that she has used, at least between March 1983 and
February 1985, an automatic rotation system to select court of appeal
430. See Comment, supra note I, at 441.
431. And in the State of Washington. See Yelle v. Kramer, 83 Wash. 2d 464, 466 n.1, 520
P.2d 927, 928 n.1 (1974). See also Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago, 60 Ill. 2d 529,
530-32, 331 N.E.2d 65, 66-67 (1975) (Underwood, C.J., dissenting); see infra Appendix, note
7. In Delaware and New Jersey the law provides for a kind of predetermined rotation, requir-
ing the chief justice to choose the most senior lower-court judge. See DEL. SUP. CT. RULE
2 (b); N.J. RULES GOVERNING APPELLATE PRACTICE 2:13-2(a) (1978); infra Appendix.
432. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §18 (e). The supreme court has said that this provision was adopted,
in part, "to prevent the Chief Justice from selecting the judges to be assigned to hear the
matter." Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 482 n.6, 601 P.2d 1030, 1035 n.6, 159
Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 n.6 (1979).
433. Id., at 483, 601 P.2d at 1036, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
434. Id.
435.' 30 Cal. 3d 638, 639 P.2d 939, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1982); see supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
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presiding justices from the First Appellate District to sit, when needed,
on conference matters.436 If a rotation system is already used to select
temporary justices for this purpose, a similar system might be used
to select them for argued cases.
A system of rotation or assignment by lot could preserve the flex-
ibility now enjoyed by the chief justice at the first and second levels
of discretion (whether or not the full use of that flexibility is desirable).
A chief justice who wished to use (nonholdover) retired supreme court
justices,437 when available, could include them in the pool of judges
eligible for assignment. A chief justice who did not wish to use them
could leave them out. If retired supreme court justices were used and
were available to sit more often than other judges in the pool, the
rotation or drawing could be arranged so that their numbers came
up more often."3"
Similarly, a chief justice who wished to use only presiding justices
from the court of appeal, or only judges from certain districts, could
limit the pool to those judges. A chief justice wishing to appoint all
the court of appeal justices in the state could place them all in the
pool. A roll call then could proceed much like the one conducted
by Chief Justice Bird, 4 9 but without the element of case-by-case discre-
tion. A chief justice who wished to appoint as many trial judges as
possible could place all the trial judges of the state in the pool. Pro-
gramming the system to take account of factors such as geographical
proximity and the desire not to have a judge sit in a case arising
from the judge's own district should not be difficult.
40
The loss of case-by-case discretion under such a system would not
be costless. The judge assigned to sit in a particular case would be
the judge in the pool whose number came up. The chief justice would
not be able to choose the "most able" judge for a difficult or con-
436. See Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying text; Bird Letter, supra note 44
and accompanying text. Chief Justice Bird has also described her assignment policy, at least
as it existed in 1982 with respect to court of appeal appointees, as one in which assignments
were "rotated to give everyone a chance to serve." 1982 Judiciary Address, supra note 41.
437. Again we assume that holdover appointments would continue undisturbed, outside the
new system under discussion. Holdover justices are "preselected" by having heard argument
in the assigned case before retiring from the court, and hence could not be chosen by rotation
or lot. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
438. There would be a potential for selection bias through including one retired justice in
the pool while excluding another who was equally willing and able to serve (or through giving
more "numbers" to one than to another). But the potential would be smaller than it is under
the present system of totally discretionary assignments. The public identification of the members
of the pool would deter a chief justice from excluding a retired justice on grounds involving
outcome-related bias.
439. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text; see also 1982 Judiciary Address, supra
note 41.
440. See Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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troversial case, and would not be able to avoid the assignment of
a weak judge to such a case.
One may reply that the latter concern rings hollow, at least in the
case of a chief justice who appoints "as many justices and judges
as possible" in order to "give everyone a chance to serve. ' 442 This
policy, it may be said, would lend itself perfectly to choosing the
appointees by lot or predetermined rotation, and if some of them
are weak they should not be appointed by any method.443
This argument, however, may give insufficient weight to the prac-
ticalities of the situation. While some court of appeal justices and
even more trial judges may not be qualified in any authentic sense
to sit as supreme court justices, it may do only symbolic harm-
damaging as that may be-to appoint them in cases that are not close
or controversial. It is something else to appoint them in cases where
their votes may be decisive. A chief justice pursuing an "inclusive"
assignment policy may be exercising discretion to avoid such appoint-
ments.444 That discretion may be worth preserving. Indeed, the more
inclusive the assignment policy, the lower it reaches down the judicial
ladder, the more important it may be to preserve the chief justice's
ability to avoid choosing the least able judges for difficult cases. Even
a chief justice who appoints only presiding justices of the court of
appeal may wish to exercise discretion, as Chief Justice Wright said
he did, to choose the "most able" of those justices.4 5
These "quality" considerations could be accommodated under a
random or rotational system. Instead of eligibility pools containing
all the judges of a given rank or location, the chief justice could
designate pools of selected court of appeal presiding justices, court
of appeal associate justices, or even trial judges (plus any retired
441. Nor would the chief justice be able to choose a judge with particular expertise in the
subject matter of a case, but that seems little if any loss. A chief justice's knowledge of a
judge's expertise in a particular subject is almost inevitably merged with knowledge of the judge's
point of view or past decisions in that area, creating a special danger of selection bias. Cf.
Reply Brief of Crocker National Bank in Support of Application to Replace Temporary Vacancies
by Selection by Lot (Oct. 27, 1983), in Perdue v. Crocker National Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913,
702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985), at 2: "Would a former poverty lawyer have more
or less 'particular expertise' than a former bank lawyer in litigation between a bank and a
low-income customer?" See also supra note 10.
442. Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying text; 1982 Judiciary Address, supra
note 41; see also supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
443. The state constitution, in providing that recommendations against supreme court justices
be heard by seven court of appeal justices selected by lot, see supra note 432 and accompany-
ing text, apparently assumes that all the state's court of appeal justices are qualified to sit
as supreme court justices in important matters.
444. Chief Justice Bird, however, has appointed trial judges in a number of swing cases
and close cases. See supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
445. See supra text accompanying note 40.
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supreme court justices who were available). 4 '6 The members of these
pools would serve for a set period, perhaps three years, and would
be chosen for particular cases on a random or rotated basis. This
approach would eliminate the risk of unqualified judges and retain
the ability to choose the best judges.
True, the selection of judges for the pool might reflect ideological
bias."4 7 But the public designation of the pool members would
reduce this danger. In any case the rotation or random choice within
the pool would provide the important assurance that no bias was
operating with respect to the selection of a particular judge for a
particular case.
The inclusive-pool and the selected-pool versions of a random or
rotational system thus offer different trade-offs between preserving
discretion and eliminating the potential for bias that comes with discre-
tion. Neither version could be expected to purge all pro-chief-justice
bias from the votes of temporary justices. The appointees in the pool
still would have incentives to vote with the chief justice.4 8 Either form
of a random or rotational system, however, would eliminate the
possibility of selection bias in handpicking particular judges for par-
ticular cases, and thus would remove the chief threat to the integrity
of the court posed by the present system of discretionary assignment
by the chief justice.
F. Transferring the Assignment Function to the Supreme Court
A system of random or rotational choice administered by the chief
justice, while preferable to the present system of discretionary choice
by the chief justice, would have two important drawbacks. First, either
the system uses an inclusive pool and thus forfeits the benefits of
selection preference and the ability to avoid appointing the least
qualified judges; or it uses a selected pool and thus preserves the poten-
tial for bias by the chief justice in choosing the members of the pool.449
Second, the proposed system is essentially a recommendation to the
446. It would not seem appropriate to select for this purpose among available retired supreme
court justices. Their numbers are so small and their qualifications so special that if any of
them are included in the pool, all who are able, willing, and available should be included.
447. This approach also would have the disadvantage of strengthening the incentives of
the selected judges to agree with the chief justice, out of gratitude for having been appointed
to the pool and hope of reappointment. Cf. supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text. For
that reason immediate reappointment for a second term in the pool might well be prohibited.
448. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 421-48 and accompanying text. Selected pools also give the members
a special incentive to agree with the chief justice. See supra note 447.
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chief justice. It assumes that the constitutionally-conferred assignment
power will remain with the chief justice, and asks the chief justice
to implement the power through a random or rotational system. If
a chief justice did not do so, he or she could not be required to
without amending the state constitution. Such an amendment would
have to spell out the required selection system, especially the categories
of judges to be included in the pool, in detail that might well be
inappropriately specific and chafing. "s' If the amendment allowed the
chief justice to use selected pools, the problem of bias or perceived
bias by the chief justice in choosing the pool members would persist.
Given these drawbacks, the question arises whether the temporary-
assignment power should be left with the chief justice. There is another
place for it, a place that would simply and cleanly eliminate the poten-
tial for selection bias that inheres in any system of choice by the chief
justice. That place is the supreme court.
Early in this study we decided that "bias" in the votes of tem-
porary justices would be defined and measured by comparison with
the votes of the permanent supreme court justices (preferably including
the chief justice). 45 ' The primary test we have used for bias by
temporary justices thus has been a comparison with the supreme court
as a whole. One justification for this approach is that temporary
justices are appointed as substitutes for permanent supreme court
justices. Hence if they vote as permanent justices do, mirroring the
behavior of the court as a whole, their votes presumably are "nor-
mal" and offer no cause for concern.
Assurance that the temporary justices represent the supreme court
as a whole can be achieved directly by shifting the assignment power
to the court as a whole. Under such a system there would be no
"selection bias," however the appointees were chosen by the court,
because the choice would reflect the will of the entire court (or the
court's majority).5 2 Nor would there be "vote bias," in the sense
of votes skewed in favor of the assigning authority. Though the ap-
450. Questions would arise about the inclusion of retired supreme court justices (how the
eligible ones would be identified, and how often they might sit); about possible differentiation
between court of appeal presiding justices and associate justices; about inclusion of trial court
judges; about accommodations for geography; and so forth. It would not do to leave these
questions to the Judicial Council, since the chief justice is chairman of that body and appoints
the overwhelming majority of its members. See CA. Co NsT. art. IV, §6; CAL. R. CT. 995.
451. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
452. This would be true even if the choice was based on the appointee's expected vote,
since the court's majority presumably would agree with that vote. Apart from bias, however,
the handpicking of a judge for a particular case on the basis of the judge's expected vote
may still be offensive. See supra notes 348-49 and accompanying text. But cf. supra note 402
(the Amaya problem).
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pointee would have some incentive to please the chief justice, the prob-
lems of bias that arise from assignment by the chief justice would
be eliminated.
Such a system is far from unknown. Many states give the power
to fill temporary vacancies on their supreme court to the court as
a whole. "53 California law already gives appointment power to the
supreme court in some instances.45 While the state constitution once
did give the supreme court the power to fill its own temporary vacan-
cies, and that power was shifted to the chief justice in 1926, this change
was made as part of the general unification of the state's judicial
system.4" That unification would not be significantly impaired if this
particular power was restored to the court as a whole. 56
Assignments by the court as a whole could be made on a discre-
tionary basis for each case, as the chief justice makes them now. Par-
ticipation in the appointment by all the supreme court justices (or
all the nondisqualified ones) could be expected to lead the justices
453. A partial list includes Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, New York, Oregon, and
Washington. See infra Appendix.
454. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. VI, §8 (appointment of five lower-court judges to Com-
mission on Judical Performance); CAL. R. CT. 907 (appointment of special masters for hear-
ings in proceedings of Commission on Judicial Performance); Minutes, Sept. 25, 1985 (special
master appointed by court).
455. From 1904 to 1926 the state constitution authorized the remaining justices of the supreme
court to fill temporary vacancies on the court (and also on the court of appeal), a power
that in 1926 was shifted to the chief justice as chairman of the simultaneously created Judicial
Council. See Fay v. District Court, 200 Cal. 522, 531-32, 254 P.2d 896, 900 (1927); supra
note 1. The purpose of the 1926 amendment was to unify the state's judicial system by creating
the Council; the assignment power that the amendment gave to the chief justice as chairman
of the Council thus included the power to fill temporary vacancies not only on the supreme
court but on all the state's courts, "in the interest of the unification of action in that regard."
Fay v. District Court, supra, 200 Cal. at 542, 254 P. at 905; see id. at 537, 254 P. at 903;
Edler v. Hollopeter, 214 Cal. 427, 429, 6 P.2d 245, 246 (1931); Traynor, Rising Standards
of Courts and Judges, 40 CAL. ST. B.J. 677, 678-83 (1965). To restore the assignment power
to the supreme court so far as its own vacancies are concerned would not affect the power
of the chief justice to assign judges to other courts, nor the general administrative power of
the chief justice over the state's judicial system.
456. An analogous question has arisen in connection with proposals to create an "Inter-
circuit Tribunal" to lighten the burden of the United States Supreme Court. An early proposal
would have vested in the Chief Justice of the United States the power to designate the federal
circuit judges who would serve on the tribunal. H.R. 4762, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); see
127 Cong. Rec. pt. 18, 24470-24471 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
More recent proposals have provided for designation by the Chief Justice with confirmation by the
Supreme Court as a whole. See S. 645, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. §§601-07 (1983); Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Judiciary Comm. on the Court Improvements Act of
1983, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., (March 11, April 8, 1983) at 132-33 (testimony of Prof. A Leo
Levin), 144 (testimony of former Sen. Roman Hruska), 556-57 (statement of Judge Joseph
T. Sneed). See especially id. at 133, remark of Sen. Heflin: "So I think that somehow . . .
we have to address the mechanism by which the Chief Justice . . . or whoever it is, can cause
a panel to be selected that would decide it in accordance with his philosophical bent, and that
is the purpose of what we are trying to achieve in that regard"). See also Hellman, The Pro-
posed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will It Work?, II HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 375,
437-38 (1984).
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to avoid divisive considerations of how a potential appointee might
vote, and to focus instead on shared perceptions of a judge's ability,
experience, congeniality, and prior working relations with the justices.
Consensus appointees might well appear.
Assignments by the court, however, could also be made, and
preferably so, by a random or rotational system.457 With the court
administering the system, selected pools could be used free of any
potential for bias or perceived bias in the selection.4 58 The court could
appoint for set terms a panel consisting of selected court of appeal
presiding justices, court of appeal associate justices, and available
retired supreme court justices.459 Judges from the panel would be
selected for each case by rotation or lot.460 Besides removing the ele-
ment of ad hoc discretion, such an automatic system would reduce
the administrative burden that assumption of the assignment func-
tion would impose on the court.46'
The question then arises whether assignments by the court should
be made, as assignments by the chief justice traditionally have been,
for all temporary vacancies. 462 Earlier, while rejecting the proposal
that all temporary vacancies be left unfilled, 63 we saw more possible
457. See supra notes 430-48 and accompanying text.
458. The incentive to vote the chief justide's way in order to be reappointed to the pool,
see supra note 447, would also disappear, though incentives to please the Chief Justice for
other reasons would persist. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text. There would be
a possible incentive to gain reappointment by pleasing the court's majority, and hence not
dissenting, but it would be diffused over many cases with many different majorities and thus
seems insubstantial. Since pool members would have more prestige, visibility, and experience
in the supreme court's work than most temporary justices under the present system, they might
well dissent more often than temporary justices now do. See supra Table 32 and accompanying
text.
459. The court could also appoint selected trial court judges, but we recommend against
it. See supra notes 316-34 and accompanying text. So far as retired supreme court justices
are concerned, the court should be free to decide whether to include them and which ones
to include; with the court making the decision, the objections to having the chief justice choose
among available retired justices would not apply. See supra note 446. No problem would arise
from participation in the selection by a supreme court justice who proved to be disqualified
in a particular case in which a selected justice sat. See Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d
474, 482, 601 P.2d 1030, 1035, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 (1979) (chief justice may make tem-
porary assignments though disqualified in case).
460. The random or rotational system should exclude holdover assignments, which cannot
be made by that method. See supra note 437. Such assignments should continue undisturbed
under an assignment function exercised by the court, as the court presumably would want them
to. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
461. The random or rotational system administered by the court should apply to conference
matters as well as argued cases. Those matters are not without potential for bias or perceived
bias by the chief justice, see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (defendant's complaint
in the Perdue case), and a rotational system reportedly has already been created for them.
See Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying text.
462. If the filling of all vacancies is continued, having the supreme court make the
assignments on a discretionary basis, instead of by rotation or lot, would seem out of the
question as a matter of time and 'administrative burden.
463. See supra notes 403-17 and accompanying text.
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merit in the idea of filling vacancies only when the vote of the tem-
porary justice might be needed for a decision.4 61 Transfer of the assign-
ment function to the supreme court could be combined with a policy
of filling vacancies only when the extra vote might be needed.4 6
This policy would apply to argued cases a system like the one the
court already uses for conference matters.4
6
Such a system, which is used in other states, 67 should not be dif-
ficult to implement. Since assignments of temporary justices are made
shortly before argument, and well after the conference at which the
court has voted to review the case, 6 8 the court usually would have
a good idea at the time of assignment whether a temporary justice
was likely to be needed." 9 The court presumably would want to err
on the side of caution and make the assignment whenever there was
some chance that the extra vote would be needed. Still, there would
be some cases in which no such chance had been foreseen and then,
after the argument, a surprising vote-shift or other development left
the court without a four-vote majority. Those cases would have to
be reargued, with a temporary justice participating.470 This should
not happen often.
Failing to fill all vacancies, however, would have one signal disad-
vantage. Especially in view of California's tradition of providing a
full court for all cases, the absence of seven justices at the oral
argument might by symbolically harmful, and perhaps demoralizing
to the parties and counsel, since it would indicate that the case was
not close and the argument not likely to matter. At least one other
state that uses such a system fills the temporary vacancies in cases that
are close or important. 7' California surely would wish to do at least
464. See supra notes 418-20 and accompanying text.
465. Such a policy might also be adopted by the chief justice in conjunction with a system
of random or rotational selection. See supra notes 430-48 and accompanying text.
466. See Buehl Letter, supra note 42 and accompanying text. Holdover appointments,
however, should continue in all cases where the holdover justice is available-if only because
the holdover justice may have written the calendar memorandum that normally leads to writing
the majority opinion. See supra note 83. Holdover justices not infrequently write majority opin-
ions. See supra Table 23; notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
467. States in which temporary justices are appointed only when their votes may be needed
or in other selected cases apparently include Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, and Texas. See infra Appendix.
463. See supra notes 56-57.
469. This is especially so because the 1985 amendment to the constitution (Proposition 32)
now relieves the court of the need to decide issues in a case other than the particular issues
on which it granted review. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §12; see CAL. R. CT. 28 (as amended). Com-
pare supra note 83 and accompanying text.
470. The occasional need to appoint a temporary justice in this situation, where the appointee
almost surely will cast a swing vote, argues for making the appointments by rotation or lot;
a court already split on the case might also find itself split on the appointment.
471. See infra Appendix, note II (New Jersey).
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that. Failing to provide seven justices in a death penalty appeal, for
example, or in important cases coming up on writ of mandamus, would
seenj inappropriate.
47 2
But the empty chair at the bench might be troubling in any case.
To be sure, there would be nothing new in giving cases differential
treatment on the basis of their closeness or perceived importance. The
supreme court does that each time it declines to hear a case, and
other courts do it when they decide some cases without oral argu-
ment. 73 Still, a procedure that effectively announces at the argument
that the case is not close or important gives pause.
Hence, while we confidently conclude that the temporary-assign-
ment function should be transferred from the chief justice to the
supreme court, and that the court should make the assignments by
rotation or lot (preferably from selected pools of judges, not inclusive
pools), we find it difficult to say whether the court should limit the
assignments to close cases and important cases, rather than continue
to provide a full court for all cases. Not only is the full-court ap-
proach traditional in California, and the other approach symbolically
troubling, but under a system of selected pools the temporary justices
might contribute more to the court's decision-making process than
has previously been the case.
There is no need, however, to resolve the question now. It is a
question for the supreme court, which is in by far the best position
to appraise the relevant considerations. Indeed, the court, after assum-
ing the assignment function, might wish to experiment with leaving
vacancies unfilled in particular cases to judge the effects and accep-
tance of that approach. The first step, and the most important one,
is to transfer the assignment function from the chief justice to the
court.
How should this be accomplished? Transfer of the assignment power,
to be done formally, would require amending the state constitution. '74
No reason appears, however, why an enlightened chief justice could
not under present law simply delegate the assignment function, the
exercise of the existing power, to the entire court.
CONCLUSION
This study has found enough evidence of pro-chief-justice bias in
the votes, and possibly the selection, of temporary justices sitting with
472. See supra notes 410-13 and accompanying text.
473. See, e.g., FED. R. App. PRO. 34(a); infra Appendix, note 6 (Hawaii).
474. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, §6.
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the California Supreme Court to conclude that the present system
of appointing those justices, a system of virtually unlimited discre-
tion in the chief justice, threatens the reputation and integrity of the
court. Chief Justice Gibson once said for the court: "It is important
.. not only that the integrity and fairness of the judiciary be main-
tained, but also that the business of the courts be conducted in such
a manner as will avoid suspicion of unfairness. ' ' 75 A system in which
the chief justice handpicks a judge for each case is subject to the
suspicion of unfairness.
To remove that suspicion, California chief justices either should
adopt a system of rotation or random choice or, what is distinctly
preferable, should delegate their assignment function to the supreme
court as a whole. The court then should adopt a system of rotation
or random choice, preferably using a pool of judges selected by the
court. The court also should consider whether to make assignments
in all cases, or only in close cases and important cases. Failing
such action by the chief justice, the state constitution should be
amended to transfer the assignment power to the supreme court.
1184
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APPENDIX
LAW AND PRACTICES OF THE STATES
CONCERNING THE ASSIGNMENT OF
TEMPORARY JUSTICES TO THEIR SUPREME COURTS
Assignment Legal Legal Authority




ALABAMA X ALA. CODIE § 12- If qualified supreme
2-14 (1975) court judges equally
divided or their number
reduced below 6,
governor appoints one
or more members of
supreme court bar to sit
as judges in the case.
ALASKA X AL.KA COST. Chief justice may assign




art. 6, §§ 3, 20
Chief Justice may assign
judges to serve in other
courts. Retired justice
or judge may serve in
any court. No
assignments made in
supreme court for past
8 years.2
1. The footnotes to this column describe the state's practice as reported in late 1984 or sub-
sequently by the state's chief justice or a designate. Inquiries were made to the chief justices of all
states that appeared, from their constitutional and statutory provisions, to follow California's model
of giving the temporary-assignment power to the chief justice. Follow-up inquiries were sent to a
number of states. The letters and notes of telephone interviews responding to the inquiries are on
file with the Pacific Law Journal.
2. The administrative director of the Arizona courts reports (1986) that no assignment has
been made to the supreme court during his 8 years of service. Vacancies due to disqualification are
left unfilled, and there have been no ties or missing quorums to cause a problem.
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Assignment Legal Legal Authority





U e M0 Z Z
ARKANSAS X ARK. CONsT. art. Governor appoints
7, § 9 "men learned in the
law" to replace any
disqualified justices.
CALIFORNIA X CAL. CONSTr. art. Chief justice may assign
VI, § 6 any judge to another
court, and a consenting
retired judge to any
court.
COLORADO X COLO. CONST. Chief justice may assign
art. VI, § 5(3) any district, probate, or
juvenile judge, or any
retired justice or judge
who consents, to sit
temporarily with any
court. Assignments to
supreme court no longer
made.'
CONNECTICUT X X CONN. GEN. If more than 2 justices
STAT. § 51-204 lacking, remaining
(1958) justices may appoint
superior court judes to




judges to hear case.
3. The chief justice of Colorado reports (1984) that temporary assignments to the supreme
court are no longer made; the remaining justices sit alone. District judges (trial judges) used to be
assigned, when the supreme court sat in departments. But this experience "was not wholly satis-
factory," in part because the judges weretoo burdened with their own case loads to prepare opinions
for the supreme court, in part because of "the unfamiliarity of most trial judges with proper ap-
pellate court procedures and the style for writing an appellate opinion." Trial judges were used rather
than intermediate appellate judges, and intermediate appellate judges are not used now, "because
their court is the most overworked court in the state."
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DELAWARE X DEL. CONST. art. If a quorum lacking,
IV, §§ 12, 38; chief justice may assign
DEL. SuP. CT. lower-court judges or
R. 2, 4(a) (1985) retired supreme court
justices; assignees must
be "the most senior




FLORIDA X FLA. CONST. art. Chief justice may assign
5, § 2(b); FLA. judges, including
R. JuD. ADmN. consenting retired
2.030(a)(4)(A) judges, to duty in
(1978) supreme court.3
GEORGIA X GA. CONST. § 2- Remaining justices may
3201 (art. VI, § designate a substitute
VI) judge.
4. The court administrator of the Delaware Supreme Court estimates (1986) that temporary
assignments are made in "less than 5% of the cases argued orally or decided on the briefs."
5. The chief justice of Florida reports (1984) that, as a general rule, temporary assignments
are made only when "there is an evenly divided vote among the justices participating" or when the
court lacks a quorum. They are not made when "there is sufficient agreement among the partici-
pating" or when the court lacks a quorum. They are not made when "there is sufficient agreement
among the participating justices that the case can be disposed of readily by the concurrence of at
least four justices." A former chief justice of Florida reports (1984) that during his tenure he was
"fortunate to have a well-respected retired supreme court justice available." He continues:
[W]hen a justice had disqualified himself, I would advise the parties at the commence-
ment of oral argument that the court would proceed to hear the cause with six justices;
that if the court was unable to reach a decision I would assign the named retired justice
and he would have available to him not only the briefs but also the electronically recorded
tape of the oral argument. If the case had a high public profile, I made the asignment
prior to oral argument and allowed the parties the opportunity to object to the assign-
ment. In my view, it is important that the parties know in advance who may be assigned
to sit on the court, and care must be taken by the assigning authority that the individual
is not perceived by the parties or the public to have been handpicked for that particular
case.
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HAWAII X HAwAn CONST. Chief justice may assign
art. VI, § 2; circuit judge or retired
HAwAn REv. supreme court justice.
STAT. 602-10 Court must be full.6
(Supp. 1984)
IDAHO X IDAHO CONST. Supreme court may
art. 5, § 6 appoint a district judge.
ILLINOIS X X ILL. CONST. art. Supreme court may
VI, §§ 3, 16 assign a judge
temporarily to any
court. But in case on
appeal from appellate
court, though required
concurrence of 4 justices
is lacking, no
assignments are made





Chicago, 60 111. 2d 529,
331 N.E.2d 65 (1975).
7
6. A staff attorney of the Hawaii Supreme Court reports (1984) that for at least the past 15
years the practice has been to appoint the substitute justices "on a case-by-case basis," though com-
monly for an entire day if substitutes are needed for more than one case being argued on the same
day. The task of finding substitutes "is normally delegated to the chief justice's second administra-
tive assistant," and in most instances the chief justice simply signs the order of appointment, al-
though the ultimate responsibility clearly lies with the chief justice. In 1984 there were 131 cases
scheduled for oral argument in the Hawaii Supreme Court, and 37 substitute justices were appointed
in 25 (19%) of those cases. In the same year there were some 120 cases decided by the court on full
briefs but without oral argument, and it would be fair to assume that substitutes were appointed in
approximately the same proportion of these cases.
7. In Perlman, a case coming to the Illinois Supreme Court on appeal from the appellate court,
the court held that in such case it would make no assignments, letting a tie vote affirm the decision
below. In dissent, the chief justice pointed out that this could not be done in original actions falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court. He argued that machinery for dealing with such actions
should be set up in advance, and that the court should use its constitutional power to make tem-
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INDIANA X IND. CoNsT. art. Temporary justices
7, § 2; IND. cannot be appointed.
CODE § 33-2.1-2- State ex rel. Mass
1 (1983) Transp. Authority of
Greater Indianapolis v.
Indiana Revenue Board,
254 N.E.2d 1 (1969).
IOWA X IOWA CODE § Supreme court may
602.1612 (1) assign retired supreme
(Supp. 1985) court justices.
KANSAS X KAN. STAT. ANN. Chief justice may assign
§ 20-2616 (a) (b) retired justices or judges
(1981) to sit with any court,
but "in an advisory
capacity only" with
supreme court.
KENTUCKY X Ky. CONST. § If 2 justices (of 7) are
110(3) lacking, governor
appoints "a sufficient
number of justices" to
make a full court.
LOUISIANA X LA. CONST. art. Supreme court may
5, § 5 (A) assign a sitting or
retired judge to any
court, including supreme
court itself. State v.
Bell, 392 So. 2d 442
(1981).
porary assignments in all cases in which four justices failed to agree. "In order to eliminate any
possibility that the result in a given case had been preordained by the selection of a particular judge,"
he proposed that "our courts should select now a list of seven appellate court members," who would
be assigned to cases by rotation or lot as the need arose. Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,
331 N.E.2d at 66-67 (Underwood, C.J., dissenting).
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MAINE X ME. REV. STAT. Governor, subject to
ANN. tit. 4, § 6 confirmation by
(Supp. 1985) legislature, may appoint
retired supreme court
justice as "active retired
justice" for "/-year term,
and chief justice then
assigns him or her to
cases."
MARYLAND X MD. CO ST. art. Chief judge may assign
IV, §18A; MD. a current or former
CTS. & JUD. judge, but subject to
PROC. CODE rules the court may
ANN. § 1-302(bo) make; and in case of
(1984) former judge, only with
approval of majority of
court.
MASSACHUSETTS X MAss. GENq. Chief justice makes list
LAws ANN. Ch. of eligible retired
32, § 65E; ch. supreme court justices
211, § 24 (Supp. and may assign justices
1986) from that list.9
8. The chief justice of Maine writes (1984) that because of the vet# limited number of active
retired justices, "the chief justice has a very limited range of discretion as a practical matter." (In
1984 there were four active retired justices, a record high, but three preferred trial work, and hence
only one was regularly available for appellate ssigments with the supreme court.) Because of "the
general acceptance of [these justices] as a part of the membership" of the supreme court, the chief
justice finds no problem "with routinely assigning them to sit whenever a short court otherwise would
result."
9. An administrative assistant of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reports (1984)
that, since the authority to recall retired justices was established in 1978, it has never been used to
recall a justice to sit with the entire court (as distinguished from "single justice" duties). The reason,
he suggests, is that an assignment would be made only if the court might otherwise divide evenly,
and in such a case "that appeal could be, if practicable, rescheduled until the filling of the vacancy."
He knows of one case in which a newly appointed seventh justice was "added to the quorum" and,
after reviewing the briefs and record and the recorded oral argument, provided the swing vote for
a 4-3 decision.
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MICHIGAN X MICH. CoNSr. Supreme court mayart. 6, § 23; authorize retired judge
MICH. COMP. to sit in any court. BuTr
LAws § ciF. Sculthorp v.
600.226(l) (1981) American Motors Corp.,
4 Mich. App. 65, 143
N.W.2d 767 (1966)
(decision by less than
majority of supreme
court is not precedent,
but binds parties).
MINNESOTA X X MINN. STAT. § Supreme court may
2.724 (2), (3) assign lower-court judge
(Supp. 1986) or retired supreme court
justice. Chief justice
also may assign retired
supreme court justice.lu
MISSISSIPPI X Miss." CODE. Governor "shall
ANN. § 9-1-13 commission a like
(1972) person" to sit.
MISSOURI X MO. Co~sT. art. If court is equally
5, § 2; Mo. divided, parties may
REv. STAT. § agree on "some person
477.020 (Supp. learned in the law" to
1986) act as special judge. If
they cannot, court
appoints such a person.
10. A staff attorney of the Minnesota Supreme Court reports that since the provision author-
izing the filling of temporary vacancies was enacted in 1973, it appears to have been used only onthree occasions, in which most or all of the supreme court justices recused themselves. "Temporary
assignments occur only in critical 1ases in which there are num rous recusals," and are not used
otherwise even to avoid tie votes, which result in affirmance of the decision below. The staff attor-ney suggests that the reasons for not making greater use of temporary assignments lie partly "in the
disruption of collegiality" and partly in "accountability," since "[psotentially, a retired justice or
a judge not accountable through state-wide election could cast the deciding vote in a sharply divided
cOUrt"
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State a
0 - Z Z
MONTANA MONT. CONST. "A district judge shall
art. VIII, § 3 (2) be substituted .... 11
No provision found as
to how the judge is
chosen.
NEBRASKA X NEB. CONsr. art. Supreme court may
V, § 2 assign district court
judges.
NEVADA X X NEV. CONsT. art. Governor may appoint
6, § 4; NEV. district judge or, at
SP. CT. R. 11 request of chief justice,














hear the case. Chief
justice may assign
retired supreme court
justice or may choose
from 2 or more
superior court justices
named by chief justice
of superior court.
N.J. CONST. art. Chief justice may assign
6, § 2 1; retired supreme court
N.J.R. justices, or sitting
GOVERNING ApP. appellate judges in order
PRAc. 2:13-2(a) of seniority."
(1986)
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11. The chief justice of New Jersey reports (1984) that temporary assignments for single-case
vacancies are viewed as required only when the court would not otherwise have a quorum (5 of 7
justices), and whether they are made in other cases "depends upon whether there is a significant
1986 / Temporary Justices
Assignment Legal Legal Authority




. o - a.
NEW MEXICO X N.M. CONST. Remaining justices may
art. VI, § 6 assign a district judge.
NEW YORK X N.Y. CoNsT. art. The court of appeals
6, § 2(a) (highest court) may
assign a judge of the
supreme court (appellate
and trial court).
NORTH X N.C. GEN. STAT. Chief justice may assign
CAROLINA § 7A-39.3, 39.5, retired supreme court or
39.6, 39.9, 39.13, court of appeal justice
39.14 (1981 and who has been certified
Supp. 1985) by governor as
"emergency justice."'1
2
NORTH X N.D. CONsr. art. Chief justice shall assign
DAKOTA VI, § 11; N.D. a lower-court judge, or
CENT. CODE § a retired justice or
27-17-03 (Supp. judge who has been





split on the court or whether the case is of such overwhelming general importance that it should not
be considered by-a truncated Court." When such assignments are made, the chief justice's tendency
in recent years has been "to determine whether retired justices are available before calling upon an
Appellate Division judge." In the past, however, an Appellate Division judge has been called on
for long-term assignments. A special assistant to the chief justice reports (1985) that in the three
most recent years, when the total matters disposed of by the New Jersey Supreme Court exceeded
2,500 per year, the matters involving the use of a substitute justice numbered two, two, and five per
year. The special assistant further reports (1986) that although the assignments are made by the chief
justice, "It]hese assignments.., are always discussed preliminarily among the Associate Justices
in the interests of collegiality. Although the decision is that of the Chief Justice or acting Chief Jus-
tice, the approval and support of the Court is sought and obtained."
12. The chief justice of North Carolina reports (1984) that his power to make temporary as-
signments exists "only when a justice is temporarily incapacitated and when there is an emergency
justice available." Fortunately, "we have seldom had justices incapacitated for any length of time,"
but, unfortunately, "at this particular time we do not have a single emergency justice qualified for
recall"-a situation brought about by new legislation permitting judges and justices to return to
private practice upon retirement, and one which "[w]e are trying to alleviate... by legislation."
13. The clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court reports (1984) that surrogate judges are
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OHIO X OHIO CoNsr. art. Chief justice may assign
IV, § 2 a court of appeals
judge.
OKLAHOMA X OKLA. CoN~sr. art. General provisions
7, § 5; OKLA. governing supreme
STAr. ANN. tit. court. No provision
20, §§ 1-24 (1962 found concerning
and Supp. 1985) temporary vacancies.
OREGON X OR. Rmv. STAr. Supreme court may
§ 1.600 (1985) assign a judge of court





PENNSYLVANIA X PA. R. JNT. Court administrator
Am5. 701 (e) shall recommend to
(1986) chief justice, and chief
justice may effectuate,
assignment of any active




assignments not made to
that court."
preferred when they are available, and that when sitting judges are used "we try to make the selec-tions on arotation basis. ... " The clerk furtherreports (1986) that temporary assignments are made
"in approximately 15%o of the sases decided by the Supreme Court in a year."
14. A justice of the Oregon Supreme Court reports (1986) that despite the statutory authori-
zation, that court essentially stopped using temporary justices wPen it became a court of discre-
tionary jurisdiction. "If we take aases only because they should be settled by the supreme court, it
would be unfortunate if the vote of a judge pro tern should prove essential to the result .... We
can, of course, decide cases in which the pro tern judge's vote would not matter without having sucha judge." Consequently, the court now uses temporary justices "only in exceptional situations,"
such as where many or all of the supreme court justices are disqualified.
15. The chief justice of Pennsylvania reports (1984) that active and senior judges, "as a matter
of policy, are not assigned to the SeeSupreme Court."
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State
RHODE X R.I. CoNsT. art. Vacant seats on court





SOUTH X S.C. CODE ANN . If any justice lacking,
CAROLINA § 14-3-60 (1977) governor appoints "the
requisite number of men
learned in the law."
SOUTH X S.D. CONST. art. Chief justice may assign
DAKOTA V, § 11; S.D. a circuit judge or a
CODIFIED LAWS retired justice or judge.16
ANN. § 16-1-5
(1979)
TENNESSEE X TENN. CODE. If any justice lacking,
ANN. § 17-2-102, governor appoints
-103, -104 (1980) "competent lawyers" or
"4persons learned in
C.' V. 0
16. The state court administrator of South Dakotareports (1984) that sitting circuit judges and
retired supreme court justices are regularly assigned to replacedisqualified justices, and that in 1984,
for the first time, the chief justice appointed a temporary justice (a presiding circuit judge) to fill a
vacant seat until the governor made a permanent appointment. He continues: "To my recollection,
all of our thirty-five circuit judges have sat at one time or another on Supreme Court cases and are
generally invited to do so within the first year of their appointment to the circuit court bench. Over
the years, each Chief Justice gets a feel for the ability of each circuit judge and tends to select the
more capable ones to write cases .... Generally the retired Justice [or] judge does get the opinion
to write." The administrator further reports (1986) that over the past two years the court has had
temporary justices assigned "on all cases." The seat that became vacant in 1984 was not filled until
March 1986, and meanwhile a second vacant seat from August 1985 to January 1986 led the chief
justice to appoint a second" 'permanent' temporary justice." Prior to these two years, the admin-
istrator guesses that temporaryjustices were assigned in "roughly ten to fifteen percent of the cases."
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TEXAS X TEx. Gov'T When court lacks
CODE ANN. § quorum or is equally
22.005 (1986) divided, governor
appoints "persons who
possess the qualifications
prescribed for justice of
the supreme court."
UTAH X UTAH CONST. Chief justice, or in
art. VIII, § 2 chief justice's absence
the remaining justices,
shall appoint a lower-




cases. UTAH CONST. art.
VIII, 2 (1953).)
VERMONT X VT. STAT. ANN. Chief Justice may assign
tit. 4, § 22 a sitting or retired
(Supp. 1985) judge.'7
VIRGINIA X VA. CODE §§ 17- Chief justice may assign
7, 51-178(a) an active or retired
(Supp. 1960, justice or judge.,
1985)
17. The court administrator of the Vermont Supreme Court reports (1984) that temporary va-
cancies are regularly filled - except "when there is no controversy and when the parties agree" -
and that the practice is to assign "one of five currently retired Justices of the Supreme Court."
Although the chief justice is also authorized to assign active or retired trial judges (there is no in-
termediate appellate court), this has been done only twice in the last ten years.
18. The executive secretary of the Virginia Supreme Court reports (1986) that only retired su-
preme court justices are assigned to sit temporarily with the supreme court. Such assignments are
for 90 days at a time. The recalled justices are used not only to fill temporary vacancies but also to
lighten the court's workload by sitting in 3-judge panels on petitions for appeal. Temporary vacan-
cies are generally filled, though not in every case. Temporary justices are assigned "infrequently,"
in less than 5% of the court's cases. The choice of the retired justice is made by the chief justice;
"but from a practical standpoint, the chief justice confers with the whole court, and they agree on
the choice."
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WEST X X W. VA. CONST. Chief justice may assign
VIRGINIA art. 8, § 8 retired justice or judge
with approval of court.
WISCONSIN X Wis. CONST. art. Four of seven justices
7, § 4 make a quorum. Chief
justice may assign a




WYOMING X WYO. CONST. Chief justice may assign
art. 5, § 4(a); district judge or retired
Wyo. STAT. § 5- judge or justice.2  s
1-106 (f) (1977)
19. The chief justice of Wisconsin writes (1984): "Needless to say, our inability to assign sub-
stitute judges to this court could create a serious problem. Fortunately, in the 20 years I have been
a member of this court, we have not had any protracted illnesses or any reason for disqualification
other than an occasional recusal by an individual judge."
20. The chief justice of Wyoming reports (1984) that "[wihen necessary, I designate one of the
district court judges to substitute for a [disqualified] supreme court justice .... In each instance,
the one chosen is determined by availability, including travel distance (although I try to designate
newly appointed judges for a case or two so that they can observe our procedure and problems)."
The clerk of the Wyoming Supreme Court estimates (1986) that a temporary justice sits in about
5% of the court's argued cases. The clerk further reports that while the appointment is made "tech-
nically" by the chief justice, in practice "the justices always agree" on the choice.
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